Similarly, under the IDEA, the proper defendant is the school district, and not the individually named Defendants, because it is the school district who is the responsible for providing a FAPE under the IDEA. See Everett, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 ("The few decisions that have examined this issue have generally recognized that the IDEA does not permit damages for compensatory education or reimbursement against individual defendants."); see, e.g., Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., No. C06-5166 FDB, 2006 WL 2459167, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2006) ("[I]ndividual defendants 'may not be sued in their individual capacities under . . . the IDEA because [the statute does] not provide for individual liability'"). Thus, Claims Seven and Eight against Dr. Grant and Taylor are DISMISSED without leave to amend.
Evertt H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School, 5 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy, 273 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Although the IDEA does not specifically name the party against whom such an action may be brought, the 'language and structure of [the] IDEA suggest that either or both entities [the SEA or LEA] may be held liable for the failure to provide a free appropriate public education....' "); Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., No. C06-5166 FDB, 2006 WL 2459167, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2006) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 260 F. App'x 992 (9th Cir. 2007) ("defendants may not be sued in their individual capacities under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act or the IDEA because these statutes do not provide for individual liability."); Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-5101 FDB, 2006 WL 1075222, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2006) judgment corrected, No. CV 02-5101 FDB, 2006 WL 1419381 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2006) and aff'd, 504 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2007) opinion amended and superseded, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2007) and aff'd, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2007) ("As noted by the Ninth Circuit, '[t]he remedies available under the IDEA include educational services for disabled children.' ").
The Court agrees with Local Defendants that only the LEA, and not its individually named defendants, bears the responsibility for providing FAPE under the IDEA. The few decisions that have examined this issue have generally recognized that the IDEA does not permit damages for compensatory education or reimbursement against individual defendants. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2459167 at *2 (W.D.Wash.2006) (individual defendants “may not be sued in their individual capacities under ... the IDEA because [the statute does] not provide for individual liability”). Although Plaintiffs' First Claim herein is against the individuals in their official rather than their individual capacities, that distinction does not help Plaintiffs since suing the administrators in their official capacity is nothing more than another way of stating a claim against the District itself and is therefore duplicative.
Consequently, several courts have determined that there is no individual liability under the IDEA. Blanchard v. Morton School District, 2006 WL 2459167, at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59417, at *7 (W.D.Wash. August 23, 2006); Colon, 443 F.Supp.2d at 669; M.T.V. v. Perdue, 2004 WL 3826047, at * 11, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29670, at *37 (N.D.Ga. February 3, 2004); P.N., 282 F.Supp.2d at 239.
The defendants insist that the NCLBA confers no private right upon the plaintiff to bring an action, and they point out that every court to have considered the question whether the NCLBA creates a private right of action has answered that question in the negative. See Fresh Start Academy v. Toledo Bd. of Educ., 363 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2005); ACORN v. NY City Dept. of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D. N.Y. 2003); Stokes ex rel. K.F. v. United States Dept. of Educ., 2006 WL 1892242 (D. Mass. July 10, 2006); Blanchard ed rel Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2459167 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2006); Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. California, 2005 WL 1869499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005). This Court agrees.