Opinion
Civ. No. 04-3040 (WGB).
December 23, 2004
Arthur Lee Raynes, Esq., WILEY, MALEHORN AND SIROTA, Morristown, New Jersey, Counsel for Plaintiff.
John Kenneth Fiorilla, Esq., CAPEHART SCATCHARD, Laurel Corporate Center, Mount Laurel, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendants.
Laura Eytan, Esq., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendants.
Kraig M. Dowd, Esq., BROWNSTEIN, BOOTH BARRY, ESQS., Union City, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendants.
OPINION
The Plaintiff Blanchard Securities purchased real estate situated on opposite sides of a railroad right-of-way from the now defunct Rahway Valley Railroad Company. As part of the purchase Blanchard Securities received three easements over the right-of-way, which was then not in use. The right-of-way was subsequently sold to the State of New Jersey and the Defendants are planning to reactivate the rail line. Plaintiff seeks to stay this reactivation or, in the alternative, to receive compensation for an anticipated diminution in the value of the easements and the adjacent property.
The Complaint contains seven state law claims and one federal law claim. The federal claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks compensatory damages and an injunction "preventing [Defendants] from entering onto or otherwise burdening the three unencumbered easements held by Plaintiff." (Complaint at ¶ 74.) Because as of this date Plaintiff's Complaint alleges no actual or anticipated deprivation of its easements over the railroad right-of-way and for the following reasons, the Complaint is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUNDPlaintiff Blanchard Securities Co. ("Blanchard"), a New Jersey limited liability company, owns two commercial properties separated by a railroad right-of-way in Springfield, Union County, New Jersey. Blanchard purchased these properties from Rahway Valley Railroad Co. ("Rahway") pursuant to a Contract of Sale dated January 3, 1989. (Complaint at ¶ 10.) At the time of the sale Rahway had not used the rail line for many years. In the Contract, Rahway agreed to provide Blanchard with three tracts — A, B and C — in exchange for $300,000. The contiguous tracts A and B are separated from tract C by a twenty-foot wide railroad right-of-way, which the Contract dubs "Tract D." The Contract grants Blanchard the option to purchase the right-ofway, but this option may be exercised " only in the event Seller obtains an authorized abandonment of the right-of-way located on said Tract D." (Contract at 9; emphasis added.) The Contract further states that Rahway is "to provide [Blanchard] at closing" with three thirty foot wide easements for pedestrian and vehicular traffic across Tract D.
Rahway Valley Railroad Co., a New Jersey corporation, is now defunct. Originally named as a defendant, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice all of its claims against both Rahway and Delaware Osetego Corp., a New York corporation, in a stipulation dated September 8, 2004, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).
The property sale was effectuated at a closing held on June 29, 1989. Rahway executed a quitclaim deed ("Deed"), which details the boundaries of the three tracts conveyed. (Complaint at ¶ 19.) The Deed additionally conveys to Blanchard three thirty foot wide easements, set out in detail, for vehicular and pedestrian crossing of the railroad right-of-way.
On April 26, 1995, Rahway and Defendant New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) entered into a contract for the sale of the Rahway railroad line in Union County, including Tract D, pursuant to the State of New Jersey's right of first refusal under N.J.S.A. 48:12-125.1. (Complaint at ¶ 27.)
N.J.S.A. 48:12-125.1 provides:
In order to permit the State and its political subdivisions to receive notice of, and be afforded an opportunity to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, railroad rights of way proposed to be abandoned, any railroad company which makes application to the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to abandon any part of its right of way on which passenger or freight services are operated, or to abandon, sell or lease any of its right of way over which services have previously been abandoned and title to such right of way currently remains with the railroad shall, within 10 days of making such application, serve notice thereof upon the State and upon each county and municipality in which any part of the right of way proposed for abandonment is located. No sale or conveyance of any part of such right of way shall thereafter be made to any person other than the State, a county or municipality for a period of 90 days from the date of approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission of the application for abandonment or from the date of service of the notice in this section required, whichever occurs later, unless prior thereto each governmental agency entitled to such notice shall have filed with the railroad company written disclaimer of interest in acquiring all or any part of said right of way. Any sale or conveyance made in violation of this act shall be void.
On June 23, 2000, NJDOT entered into an agreement with Defendant County of Union ("County") granting the County the right to enter upon the right-of-way property acquired from Rahway for purposes of restoring the railroad line to operational status for light freight service. The County was authorized to execute this agreement by a resolution of the Defendant Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Union ("Freeholders") made on June 22, 2000, entitled Freeholder Resolution 813-2000. (Complaint at ¶ 30.)
On May 9, 2002, the County entered into an Operating Agreement with Defendant Morristown and Erie Railway ("ME"), a New Jersey corporation. (Complaint at ¶ 31.) The Operating Agreement grants ME access to the former Rahway railway properties to rehabilitate and reactivate the railroad lines and the exclusive right to provide local railroad service as a common carrier on those lines. On June 27, 2002, the STB approved a Modified Certificate for ME to operate the former Rahway railroad lines. (Complaint at ¶ 33.)
Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, rehabilitation of the former Rahway railroad lines is to take place in four distinct phases. (Complaint at ¶ 31.) Tract D is situated on the portion of the railroad line scheduled as Phase IV of the rehabilitation plan. (Complaint at ¶ 32.) On June 6, 2003, the Freeholders authorized implementation of Phase IV in Freeholder Resolution 633-2003. (Complaint at ¶ 34.)
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Counts One and Two assert that Defendants County, NJDOT and John F. Lettiere, Jr., Commissioner of NJDOT ("Lettiere"), failed to supply government records in contravention of New Jersey's Open Public Records Act (ORPA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.
Count Three alleges that NJDOT, Lettiere, County and ME's actions in reactivating, restoring and operating the former Rahway railroad constitute a breach of the Contract of Sale between Plaintiff and Rahway.
Count Four requests that, on the basis of ME's alleged representations to Plaintiff and the STB, the Court issue an injunction restricting the ME's use of the rehabilitated rail lines to three round trip train trips per week, at night during non-business hours.
Count Five asserts that unspecified Defendants, in their efforts to rehabilitate the rail line, have interfered with Plaintiff's easements and caused damage to Plaintiff's improvements on those easements.
Count Six requests that the Court issue a declaratory judgment to resolve the "cloud on Plaintiff's title" to the easements.
Count Seven alleges that the actions of unspecified Defendants in rehabilitating the rail line amounts to a compensable taking.
Count Eight asserts that Lettiere, County and Freeholders have deprived Plaintiff of unspecified rights protected by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions while acting under color of State law, which constitutes an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants now move to dismiss this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court held oral argument on December 17, 2004.
JURISDICTION
The only possible basis for personal jurisdiction in this case is that it raises a federal question for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Count Eight, Plaintiff asserts it has a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Diversity jurisdiction is inapplicable as all of the parties are citizens of New Jersey. Plaintiff asserts the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 reads: "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
DISCUSSION
I. 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
(A) GOVERNING STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for a dismissal based upon the pleader's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." District courts generally disfavor Rule 12(b)(6) motions because the long-established policy of the federal rules is to decide cases on the proofs. See Caldwell Trucking PRP Group v. Spaulding Composites Co., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.N.J. 1995); Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F. Supp. 1228, 1229 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1969) and Oil, Chem. Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Delta Ref. Co., 277 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 1960)).
"The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). "All the rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from the pleading after construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit "dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989), but a court should reject legal conclusions presented in the form of factual allegations. See Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 745 (3d Cir. 2004). Accepting the facts in the pleadings as true and giving them all reasonable inferences, a court must dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "[i]f as a matter of law 'it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (citing Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1957)).
(B) EXTRINSIC DOCUMENTS
The Court must determine whether, in the course of deciding Defendants' motions to dismiss, it may consider extrinsic documents submitted by the parties, namely the Contract of Sale between Rahway and Blanchard (submitted by Defendant ME as Exhibit A to its Supplemental Brief) and the corresponding Deed (submitted by Plaintiff as Exhibit B to its Certification of Plaintiff's Counsel). Ordinarily, when the Court considers matters outside the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment as provided by Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); see Eli Lilly Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475 n. 21 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[U]nless a Court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the court cannot consider material outside the pleadings (i.e. facts presented in briefs, affidavits or exhibits)."). Rule 12(b)'s conversion requirement affords the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond to extraneous evidence submitted by the defendant. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Third Circuit, however, carved out an exception that permits a court to consider "an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document," without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see also In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (holding that the document must be " integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint" (citation and quotation marks omitted)). This exception does not undermine the rationale underlying Rule 12(b)'s conversion requirement of affording plaintiff notice.Pension Benefit, 998 F.2d at 1196-97. "When a complaint relies on a document . . . the plaintiff obviously is on notice of the contents of the document, and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished." Id.
"A trial judge has the discretion to consider evidence outside the complaint in ruling on motions to dismiss." Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366, at 491 (2d ed. 1990)). The critical inquiry is "whether the claims in the complaint are 'based' on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited." In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426.
The Court concludes that under these principles it is appropriate when ruling on this 12(b)(6) motion to consider additional materials submitted by the parties. In its complaint Plaintiff alleges violations of its rights arising from the Contract and Deed. These two documents are necessarily integral to the Complaint and are therefore properly within the scope of the Court's consideration.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Defendant ME argues that this entire case ought to be dismissed on the grounds that the controversy presented in the Complaint has been federally preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., which grants the STB exclusive jurisdiction over such a dispute. Blanchard responds that while it is generally true that the ICCTA federally preempted all regulation of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, the STB has carved out an exception to its exclusive jurisdiction. Blanchard, relying on one STB decision, argues that this case is subject to the principle that when a railroad carrier has voluntarily contracted with another party to limit its operations, preemption no longer applies because the carrier's voluntary obligations amount to an admission that such restrictions do not unreasonably interfere with railway operations.
Under the ICCTA, 49 U.S.C. § 10501, the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over a broad range of railroad activity. According to the legislative history, Congress enacted the ICCTA in order to ensure regulatory uniformity and to shield railroads from state and local regulation:
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) states:
The jurisdiction of the Board over —
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.
For purposes of this part, 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) states: "transportation" includes —
(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and
(B) services related to that movement, including receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, and interchange of passengers and property.
Although States retain the police powers reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass all such regulation and to be completely exclusive. Any other construction would undermine the uniformity of Federal standards and risk balkanization and subversion of the Federal scheme of minimal regulation for this intrinsically interstate form of transportation.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 96 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 808. Furthermore, federal courts have interpreted the language of the ICCTA jurisdiction provision broadly. As one district court observed, in language often quoted by other courts:
It is difficult to imagine a broader statement of Congress's intent to preempt state regulatory authority over railroad operations . . . The most natural reading of section 10501(b)(2) is that federal remedies provided by the [ICCTA] are the only remedies available as to the regulation of rail transportation, and that the federal remedies are exclusive of state remedies except the [Act] has expressly provided otherwise.CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
ME has cited a number a cases in which courts have found that the ICCTA preempts state and local regulation of rail lines: City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the ICCTA preempted regulation of a railroad through state and local environmental laws; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 944 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1996), where the court found that the ICCTA preempted a Georgia state agency's authority to regulate railroad agency closings in Georgia; and In re Borough of Riverdale, STB Docket No. 33466, 1999 WL 715272, *6 (STB 1999), in which the STB recognized that state and local regulations of railroad facilities are preempted because of "the inherent delay and interference with interstate commerce that such requirements would cause."
Blanchard, relying on the STB decision of Township of Woodbridge v. Consolidated Rail Corp., STB Docket No. 42053, 2000 WL 1771044 (STB 2000), responds that the STB has explicitly waived preemption when a rail carrier has voluntarily entered into a contractual agreement limiting its rights. In Woodbridge, the Township of Woodbridge and a rail carrier had entered into a settlement to resolve state court litigation over the allegedly excessive noise emitted late at night from idling rail cars in the carrier's train yard. Under the terms of the settlement, the carrier agreed to curtail the idling from the hours of 10:00 pm to 6:00 am. This agreement was further clarified in a consent order. When Woodbridge filed in federal court to enforce the consent order, Judge Debevoise found the carrier had violated the agreement but dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue a remedy in light of the broad preemption of the ICCTA. The STB concluded, however, that federal courts do have jurisdiction enforce such a consent order. The STB reasoned,
These voluntary agreements must be seen as reflecting the carrier's own determination and admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce. Moreover, Conrail has not shown that enforcement of its commitments would unreasonably interfere with the railroad's operations . . . [W]e do not believe that all state and local regulations that affect railroads are necessarily preempted by 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). Rather, we believe that state and local regulation is permissible when it does not interfere with interstate rail operations.Id. at *3.
According to Blanchard, Woodbridge stands for the proposition that ICCTA preemption would not be applied when a carrier attempted to use it to avoid its contractual commitments. That may be a fair assessment, butWoodbridge does not control here. Defendants have not entered into any contract with Blanchard. Even assuming the easements constitute an agreement of a similar order to the contract in Woodbridge, the remedy Blanchard seeks — an injunction from entering upon Tract D that would prevent Defendants from reactivating the rail line — would unquestionably interfere with interstate rail operations in contravention ofWoodbridge.
Furthermore, in attempting to fit this case within the controlling ambit of Woodbridge, Blanchard' argument forces the Rahway-Blanchard Contract of Sale to perform more work than it can legitimately do. First, none of the Defendants are parties to the Contract. Second, even if the conveyance of the easements could be construed as a voluntary restriction of Defendants' rights, Blanchard did not receive its property interest in the easements at issue from the Contract. By its plain terms the Contract of Sale is simply an agreement to sell something (Tracts A, B and C, and the easements) at a future time (the date of the closing). Blanchard admits as much when it states, "[the Contract of Sale] itself did not grant the Plaintiff a specific property interest. Rather, the contract was a legally enforceable promise to provide those easements." (Blanchard Brief in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1.) While this statement is certainly correct, that "legally enforceable promise" was fulfilled when Rahway presented Blanchard with the Deed conveying the easements. If there is interference with the easements, Blanchard has a claim sounding in tort arising out of a property right, not out of the Contract of Sale. See American Metal Co. v. Fluid Chemical Co., 296 A.2d 348, 350-51 (N.J.Super.Ct. Law Div. 1972).
In light of the plain language of the ICCTA, its legislative history and the broad reading that courts have given both, Counts Three through Six are dismissed with prejudice on the grounds that Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction of such claims to the STB. These Counts impermissibly seek to regulate the rehabilitation and operation of the rail line by NJDOT, County, Freeholders and ME through the remedy of injunctive relief. Similarly, Counts Seven and Eight are dismissed with prejudice to the extent that they request injunctive relief because under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) such relief is within the exclusive capacity of the STB. Counts One and Two, which allege violations of New Jersey's Open Public Records Act, and Counts Seven and Eight, to the extent that Blanchard seeks compensation for a taking, are not preempted by the ICCTA as the relief sought in these counts, if granted, would in no way regulate railroad operations.
III. PLAINTIFF'S STANDING TO ASSERT ITS § 1983 CLAIM
Defendant County argues that Blanchard's § 1983 claim must be dismissed on standing grounds. According to this argument, the Supreme Court decision of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), requires Plaintiff to first exhaust the available state law procedures to remedy the alleged violation before it can bring a § 1983 action in federal court. Blanchard argues that under287 Corporate Center Associates v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 1996), a § 1983 plaintiff is not required to exhaust available state law remedies before filing a federal action. In the alternative, Blanchard maintains that if the Court remands the inverse condemnation claim, it should retain jurisdiction of the § 1983 and state law claims.
In Williamson, the Supreme Court held that "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compenstation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." 473 U.S. at 195. This procedure is justified "because the Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State's action here is not 'complete' until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking."Id. As the district court in Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 696 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.N.J. 1988), recognized, New Jersey's inverse condemnation procedures provide "an appropriate procedure when a governmental entity with eminent domain power has taken property but has not given just compensation." Accordingly Blanchard must avail itself of these state procedures before it has standing to bring its § 1983 claim in this Court.
Blanchard's reliance on 287 Corporate Center Associates is misplaced. That case was dismissed on statute of limitation grounds. Id. at 323-24. Whether the plaintiffs had exhausted their state law remedies was not an issue on appeal.
Blanchard argues that it faces a dilemma like the one faced by the plaintiff in Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1989). If during the course of an inverse condemnation action the state court also adjudicates upon the federal claims as part of the entire controversy doctrine, Plaintiff upon return to federal court will discover its federal claims precluded on grounds of collateral estoppel.Id. at 728-29; Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F.3d 118, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2003).
To avoid depriving a plaintiff of having a federal claim adjudicated by a federal court, the Supreme Court crafted a reservation procedure by which a plaintiff compelled by Williamson to first exhaust state remedies may reserve the federal claim for later determination in a federal forum. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). While the Second Circuit has expressly embraced a specific procedure to reserve federal claims, Santini, 342 F.3d at 130, the Third Circuit has been less clear. In Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Ed., 913 F.2d 1064, 1072 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit expressly declined to articulate "the general parameters of an England reservation." In Bradley, the Circuit concluded the procedure there for a reservation was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff initiated the action in federal court, (2) the plaintiff explicitly reserved the federal claim, (3) the defendant and state tribunal acquiesced to the reservation, and (4) the federal court stayed the action pending state court resolution of the state law claims.
In Santini, the Second Circuit explained,
Future takings plaintiffs will still have to comply with the Williamson County requirement that they pursue available inverse condemnation actions under state law before bringing federal takings claims. In doing so, however, such parties may explicitly reserve their federal takings claims, making clear to the state court and adverse parties that they intend to bring a federal takings claim in federal court once the litigation of the state-law claim has been completed. This "Santini reservation" will mean that the state court's judgment on the state-law claim would not have preclusive effect in the subsequent federal action.Id.
As only the first two of the four Bradley elements have been met in this case, it is unclear in which direction Third Circuit case law compels this Court. The Court need not sort this out, though. As explained above, Plaintiff cannot bring its § 1983 claim before a federal court until it has first exhausted the remedial procedures available at state law. Whether it is more appropriate under England and Bradley for the Court to dismiss the § 1983 action or to stay it and retain jurisdiction pending final determination of Plaintiff's inverse condemnation action by a state tribunal is an issue this Court need not reach, because, as explained below, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.
IV. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Count Eight does not allege any cognizable violation of a property right. There is no allegation in the complaint that the Defendants have prevented or intend to prevent Plaintiff from using its easements in any way. Plaintiff's arguments are premised on a fundamental misconception of the easements: that Defendants necessarily interfere with the easements anytime they enter upon the subservient tract that they own. It is certainly true that Defendants could hypothetically use their property in such a way that would bar Plaintiff from the reasonable use of its easements. This would give rise to a legally cognizable action sounding in tort for interference with a vested property right. See American Metal Co., 296 A.2d at 350-51. But the idea that Defendants automatically interfere with an easement simply by entering onto the subservient tract they hold in fee absolute is a legal theorem unsupported by Plaintiff's briefs perhaps because it is a principle unknown to property law.
Plaintiff argues that any reactivation of the railroad would interfere with its use of the easement. Regardless of what Plaintiff expected from its purchase of Tracts A, B and C or what Blanchard may have said about never intending to rehabilitate the rail line, the right-of-way was always legally capable of reactivation. That is implicitly recognized in the language of the Contract that gave Blanchard the option to purchase the right-of-way " only in the event Seller obtains an authorized abandonment of the right-of-way located on said Tract D." (Contract at 9; emphasis added.)
The State of New Jersey always had the right to purchase the "railroad rights of way proposed to be abandoned." N.J.S.A. 48:12-125.1. The State's right to purchase and utilize the right-of-way to run a railroad (or assign such a right) could not be voided by a railroad's grant of an easement over the railroad right-of-way. Such a grant of an easement would be tantamount to the sale of the right-of-way in derogation of the State's right of first refusal under N.J.S.A. 48:12-125.1. Moreover, an easement to cross a railroad right-of-way cannot prevent the use of the right-of-way for its legal use: a railroad.
Furthermore, at oral argument in response to questioning by the Court, Plaintiff's counsel stated that Plaintiff was concerned that the use of the railroad right-of-way might prevent its use of the easement. But a possible infringement some time in the future does not create a substantial controversy between the two parties "of sufficient immediacy and reality" to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of ripeness.Peachlum v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 333 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Maryland Casualty CO. v. Pacific Coal Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
In light of the above discussion and in the absence of any allegations that Defendants are interfering or even plan to interfere with Plaintiff's use of its easement, Plaintiff has failed to state a federal cause of action. Absent a federal cause of action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the balance of the state law claims. They too are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed as follows:Counts One and Two are dismissed without prejudice as the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims;
Counts Three through Six are dismissed with prejudice on the grounds that Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction of such claims to the Surface Transportation Board;
Counts Seven and Eight are dismissed with prejudice to the extent that they request injunctive relief because under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) such relief is within the exclusive capacity of the STB;
Count Seven, to the extent that it seeks relief other than an injunction, is dismissed without prejudice as the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim; and
Count Eight, to the extent that it seeks relief other than an injunction, is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate Order follows.