Opinion
24A-MI-78
12-30-2024
Michael A. Blanch Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. Joyce Acuti, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Alan D. Wilson Kokomo, Indiana Attorney for Appellee Mark R. McKinney McKinney & Company Law Muncie, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable Judi L. Calhoun, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C01-2103-MI-200
Attorney for Appellant Alan D. Wilson Kokomo, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee Mark R. McKinney McKinney & Company Law Muncie, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAY, JUDGE
[¶1] Michael A. Blanch Jr. appeals following the trial court's order partitioning the property he and Joyce Acuti acquired during their long-term romantic relationship. Blanch raises three issues which we reorder and restate as, whether the trial court clearly erred when it:
1. assigned each party a one-half interest in the house they shared while cohabitating;
2. ordered that the proceeds from the sale of a bass boat be used to pay Acuti's tax debt before being divided equally; and 3. ordered Blanch to return a tractor to Acuti.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 1985, Blanch and his first wife purchased a 1100 square foot house on nine acres in Yorktown, Indiana. Blanch and his first wife divorced in 2006, and Blanch refinanced the property as part of the divorce settlement. Blanch paid his first wife her share of the house's equity and she was removed from the house's title.
[¶3] Blanch met Acuti in January 2007. They soon started a romantic relationship and Blanch moved into Acuti's house. Blanch and Acuti decided to extensively renovate the Yorktown house, and they obtained a construction loan to finance the renovations. Those renovations expanded the house to 2000 square feet, and Blanch and Acuti moved into the Yorktown house in December 2008. They eventually converted the construction loan into a mortgage. At that time, Blanch added Acuti to the Yorktown house's title as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship.
[¶4] In 2015 or 2016, Acuti's father gave Acuti and Blanch a Ford tractor and garden tiller. Blanch and Blanch's father used the tractor while farming and maintained the tractor in good condition. In 2017, Blanch found a 2016 Ranger Bass Boat for sale. Blanch told Acuti that he wanted to purchase the boat, but he was concerned the seller would sell the boat before Blanch could obtain a loan to finance his purchase. Acuti then withdrew $60,000 from her 401(k) so that Blanch could buy the boat before it went off the market. Blanch never obtained a loan for the boat, and Acuti was not able to reimburse her 401(k) within 60 days of the withdrawal, which resulted in significant tax penalties and liabilities.
[¶5] At some point thereafter, Blanch and Acuti ended their romantic relationship, and Acuti moved out of the Yorktown house in February 2021. Acuti routinely made the mortgage payments while living in the Yorktown house, but she stopped making the mortgage payments after she moved out of the house. Blanch continued to live in the Yorktown house, but he also failed to pay the mortgage, and the house fell into foreclosure. The couple also neglected to pay property taxes for the Yorktown house. Blanch retained possession of the tractor and the bass boat after Acuti moved out.
[¶6] On March 26, 2021, Acuti filed her complaint against Blanch. She asked the trial court to order the Yorktown house sold, with the proceeds being used to pay the mortgage debt and the delinquent property taxes, and the remainder of the proceeds divided equally between her and Blanch. She also asserted a replevin claim seeking return of the tractor and garden tiller and claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment related to the bass boat. She asked the court to order that the bass boat be sold and the proceeds from the sale be used to pay the tax penalties she incurred when she withdrew funds from her 401(k) early.
[¶7] On November 28, 2023, the trial court held a bench trial. Acuti asked the court to award her father's tractor to her. She explained the tractor was a "family heirloom" and her father owned the tractor for many years before gifting it to her and Blanch. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18.) Acuti also testified that, when she withdrew the money from her 401(k) so Blanch could purchase the bass boat, she expected Blanch to reimburse her. Blanch testified that he believed the money Acuti had given him to purchase the bass boat was a gift, and he did not think he bore any responsibility for her tax debt. He also explained that, although he had the bass boat listed for sale for months, he had not received any offers.
[¶8] On December 8, 2023, the trial court entered its order of judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded Blanch and Acuti each held a 50% interest in the Yorktown house because they were listed on the house's deed and accompanying mortgage as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The trial court ordered that the Yorktown house be listed for sale and that "[t]he proceeds of the sale shall first be applied to the mortgage balance and the remainder split equally between the parties." (App. Vol. 2 at 41.) With respect to the bass boat, the trial court explained that it was "not convinced that the boat was a gift" by Acuti to Blanch. (Id. at 42.) The trial court ordered "the boat be sold at the highest price possible. The proceeds shall be applied to the IRS penalties first in [Acuti's] name. If there is any additional amount received from the sale of the boat, the amount will be divided equally between [Acuti] and [Blanch]." (Id.) Regarding the tractor, the trial court found:
It is clear to the Court that the Ford tractor, along with a garden tiller, was a gift from [Acuti's] father. The Court is not swayed by who primarily used the tractor. The Court is also intentionally not placing a value on the tractor. Neither party presented any credible evidence as to the value of the Ford tractor, only speculation. The Court is not taking value into consideration. The only issue is who gets to keep the tractor.
The Court finds that the Ford was a tractor owned by [Acuti's] father and is very sentimental to her. While [Blanch] may have paid to maintain the tractor over the years, he has also had the use of the tractor for years.
The Court hereby orders that [Blanch] return the Ford tractor and any implements, including but not limited to the garden
tiller, to [Acuti] in the same, or better, condition than it was in [in] February 2021. The Ford tractor shall be returned to [Acuti] within ten (10) days of this order. [Blanch] is to deliver the tractor to a location specified by [Acuti].(Id. at 42-43.)
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] Blanch challenges the trial court's judgment and contends the trial court clearly erred in its division of the couple's property. When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte, "the findings control our review and the judgment only as to the issues those specific findings cover. Where there are no specific findings, a general judgment standard applies, and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial." Williams v. Cardona-Feliciano, 245 N.E.3d 626, 634 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (internal citation omitted).
[¶10] With respect to the trial court's specific findings and judgment, we apply a two tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of A.G., 199 N.E.3d 1220, 1223 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). "We determine first whether the evidence supports the findings and second whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions." Id. We will only set aside a finding or judgment if it is clearly erroneous. Id. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it." Id. "A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings, when the findings fail to support the judgment, or when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts." In re Paternity of M.R.A., 41 N.E.3d 287, 293 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In conducting our review, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom." Williams, 245 N.E.3d at 634. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
1. Yorktown House
[¶11] Blanch argues the trial court clearly erred when it awarded him only half of the equity in the Yorktown house because he "contributed far more than one half of the accumulated equity" in the house. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) Indiana Code chapter 32-17-4 governs property partition proceedings, and Indiana Code section 32-17-4-2.5(1) provides that after ordering sale of property and accounting for liens, title search costs, taxes, and the expenses of the sale, "the court shall divide the proceeds of the sale among the remaining property owners in proportion to their ownership interest." (emphasis added). When real estate is conveyed to two people as joint tenants, each person receives an undivided one-half interest in the property. Ramer v. Smith, 896 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Thus, because Blanch and Acuti owned the Yorktown house as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, they each held a one-half interest in the property. While Blanch asserts that equitable considerations entitle him to a greater interest in the property than Acuti, we explained in Cunningham v. Hastings that "[e]quitable adjustments to cotenants' equal shares are allowed when the cotenants hold the property as tenants in common, not when they hold as joint tenants." 556 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990) (internal citation omitted). Thus, because Blanch and Acuti held the Yorktown house as joint tenants, the trial court did not err in finding each held a one-half interest in the property and ordering that the proceeds from the sale of the Yorktown house be divided accordingly. See, e.g., id. (holding joint tenants were entitled to equal shares of the proceeds from the sale of their property even though only one of the tenants paid the purchase price for the property).
2. Bass Boat
[¶12] Second, Blanch asserts the trial court erred in finding that the money Acuti gave him to purchase the bass boat was not a gift and ordering that the proceeds from selling the boat first be used to pay the tax liabilities and penalties Acuti incurred when she withdrew funds from her 401(k). A person "who cohabitates with another without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express contract or a viable equitable theory such as an implied contract or unjust enrichment." Bright v. Kuel, 650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), reh'g denied. "[U]njust enrichment requires a party who has been unjustly enriched at another's expense to make restitution to the aggrieved party." Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 296 (Ind. 2012). To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must prove three elements:
(1) he rendered a measurable benefit to the defendant at the defendant's express or implied request; (2) he expected payment from the defendant; and (3) allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust. Equitable principles prohibit the unjust enrichment of a person who accepts the unrequested benefits provided by another despite having the opportunity to decline those benefits.Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
[¶13] Acuti rendered a measurable benefit to Blanch by giving him $60,000 to purchase the bass boat, and she expected him to reimburse her 401(k). Blanch retained the bass boat but never reimbursed Acuti's 401(k). Because Acuti did not timely reimburse her 401(k), she incurred significant tax penalties. Saddling Acuti with that entire tax burden while allowing Blanch to keep the boat would be unjust. While Blanch points to his testimony that Acuti intended to give him the bass boat as a gift, the trial court did not credit that testimony because it found that it was "not convinced that the boat was a gift," (App. Vol. 2 at 42), and we will not second guess the trial court's credibility determination. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of Madison, 213 N.E.3d 530, 543 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (holding defendant's contention was "nothing more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do"). Consequently, Blanch would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to retain all proceeds from the sale of the bass boat, and therefore, the trial court's judgment that the proceeds from the sale first be used to pay the tax penalties Acuti accrued and then divided evenly between Blanch and Acuti was not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 951 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (holding evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant was unjustly enriched by plaintiff's domestic services).
Blanch also contends that Acuti failed to mitigate damages by not taking steps to reduce her tax liabilities. However, Blanch did not raise this argument before the trial court, and therefore, it is waived. See, e.g., Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 380 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (holding issue raised for first time on appeal was waived).
3. Tractor
[¶14] With respect to the tractor, Blanch contends "there was no evidence that the tractor was anything special, not an antique, not an heirloom, rather a gift that was a useful tool for farming, which was [Blanch] and his father's avocation, one in which [Acuti] apparently had no involvement." (Appellant's Br. at 18.) However, Acuti did testify the tractor was a "family heirloom" that had been in her family for many years. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18.) Acuti's testimony supports the trial court's finding that the tractor was "very sentimental to her." (App. Vol. 2 at 42.) Consequently, the trial court's judgment that Blanch should return the tractor to Acuti was not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712, 722 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) (trial court's finding ring had sentimental value to the owner supported judgment awarding an amount above the ring's fair market value), reh'g denied.
Blanch also notes his general disagreement with how the trial court divided some of the couple's remaining assets including a Chevrolet Suburban, two parcels of real estate, and joint credit card debt, but he does not develop an argument with respect to any one of these miscellaneous assets that the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. Therefore, any such argument is waived. See Hay v. Hay, 885 N.E.2d 21, 23 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (failure to develop argument on appeal results in waiver).
Conclusion
[¶15] Because Blanch and Acuti held the Yorktown house as joint tenants, the trial court was required to award each one-half interest in the property. The trial court's finding that the bass boat was not a gift was supported by the evidence, and the trial court did not clearly err by ordering that the proceeds from sale of the boat be used to pay Acuti's tax liabilities because holding otherwise would have resulted in Blanch's unjust enrichment. Likewise, evidence supported the trial court's finding that the tractor Acuti's father gifted had special sentimental value to Acuti, and the court did not clearly err in ordering Blanch to return the tractor to Acuti. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.