Opinion
No. 15–P–1561.
09-27-2016
Mark BLAKE v. CRNC OPERATING, LLC & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
CRNC Operating, LLC and Yehudah J. Walden (collectively, the employer) appeal from a decision and order entered in favor of the employee in the Appellate Division for the Northern District of the District Court Department. We affirm.
Background. In October 2013, the employee commenced a small claims action against the employer in the Somerville Division of the District Court Department pursuant to G.L. c. 149, § 148, as amended through St.2008, c. 532 (the Wage Act). After the employer appealed from a decision of the clerk magistrate and a jury-waived trial took place before a judge in the District Court, judgment entered in favor of the employee in the amount of $27,428.15. The judgment consisted of $7,000 in damages, “trebled to the amount of $21,000, plus interest, costs, [and] attorney fees of $5,663.25.” The judge then reported the case to the Appellate Division as follows:
“Where a statute such as M.G.L. c. 149, § 148, the (‘Massachusetts Wage Act’) provides, ab initio, for mandatory treble damages for violation thereof, does a claim for damages greater than $2,333.34, which when trebled, exceeds the $7,000.00 maximum claim for damages allowable in the Small Claims Session of the District Court, preclude the matter from being heard in that Court, or does the exception set forth in the small claims statute, M.G.L. c. 218, § 21, which provides that ‘the court may award double or treble damages in accordance with any general or special law’ render jurisdiction proper (emphasis added).”
Relying on Travis v. McDonald, 397 Mass. 230 (1986), the Appellate Division concluded “that a claimant is not jurisdictionally barred from being awarded an amount in excess of $7,000.00 as the result of the trebling of single Wage Act damages of $7,000.00 or less.”
Discussion. The Appellate Division rejected the employer's argument that $21,000 was the “initial amount of damages claimed” by the employee, as that term is used in G.L. c. 218, § 21, as appearing in St.1992, c. 379, § 135, because the employee sued under the Wage Act. See G.L. c. 149, § 150 (mandating treble damages for a plaintiff prevailing on a Wage Act claim). We review the Appellate Division's disposition for an error of law, Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 127 (1939) ; Butler v. Cromartie, 339 Mass. 4, 6 (1959), and we review de novo the question of statutory construction. Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 569–570 (2015).
“We construe the words of [G.L. c. 218, § 21,] ‘in association with other statutory language and the general statutory plan.’ “ Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 804 (2007), quoting from Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Rev., 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984). Pursuant to St.2004, c. 252, approving the one-trial system for civil cases, see id. at 803, the District Court Department is empowered to hear, among other things, “civil actions for money damages” up to $25,000. G.L. c. 218, § 19, inserted by St.2004, c. 252, § 5. Within the District Court Department is “a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure” known as small claims, for the determination of contract claims “in which the plaintiff does not claim as debt or damages more than $7,000.” G.L. c. 218, § 21, as amended by St.2010, c. 240, § 156. A small claims action may be commenced in the District Court “if the initial amount of damages claimed is $7,000 or less ... notwithstanding that the court may award double or treble damages in accordance with the provisions of any general or special law.” Ibid.
“Clear and unambiguous language in a statute is conclusive as to legislative intent,” Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC, supra at 575, and we think it abundantly clear from the plain and unambiguous language of G.L. c. 218, § 21, that the “initial amount of damages claimed” by a plaintiff in a small claims action is the amount stated on the “Statement of Small Claim” form, see Rule 2(a) of the Uniform Small Claims Rules (2009), rather than the amount of any judgment. Construing G.L. c. 218, §§ 19 and 21, “harmoniously so as to give full effect to all of their provisions and give rise to a consistent body of law,” Ciardi v. F. Hoffman–La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 53, 62 (2002), “the amount of single damages [claimed in an action in the District Court Department] shall control” where “the court may award double or treble damages in accordance with the provisions of any general or special law.” G.L. c. 218, §§ 19 and 21. The employer's interpretation of G.L. c. 218, § 21, would render superfluous the phrase “notwithstanding that the court may award double or treble damages in accordance with the provisions of any general or special law,” and “[i]t is [another] common tenet of statutory construction that, wherever possible, no provision of a legislative enactment should be treated as superfluous.” Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic Bevs. Control Commn., 377 Mass. 231, 234 (1979). Our conclusion that the “initial amount of damages claimed” is the amount stated on the “Statement of Small Claim” form and not the amount of any judgment “furthers the legislative purpose of the statute creating the small claims sessions” within the District Court, Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Framingham Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 81 Mass.App.Ct. 732, 735 (2012), and there was no error in the Appellate Division's disposition.
Because he prevailed on his Wage Act claim, the employee “is statutorily entitled to recover reasonable appellate attorney's fees and costs.” Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 132 (2014). See G.L. c. 149, § 150. The employee is invited to file a verified and itemized application for fees and costs within fourteen days of the date of this decision, and the employer will have fourteen days thereafter in which to file any opposition to the amounts requested. See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004).
Decision and order of the Appellate Division affirmed.
Yehudah J. Walden.