No authorities are cited directly in support of this, and the authorities called to our attention are only general statements of the rule involving wholly dissimilar fact situations. The rule in Block v. Atlas Supply Co., 51 Okla. 426, 152 P. 81, that a property owner must use care to minimize the damage to his property due to the injurious acts of another is wholly inapplicable under this assignment and the record. The remaining contentions are not argued at length or supported by citations, and hence will not be discussed herein.

The case of Slane v. Curtis cited by plaintiff is not in point on the facts. Nominal damages are frequently awarded for a technical injury due to a violation of some legal right. 17 C.J. 714; Sutherland Damages, 2d Ed. Section 9; 1 Joyce Damages, Sec. 8; Chaffin v. Frees Mfg. Co. (N.C.) 47 S.E. 226; Blink v. Co. (Okla.) 152 P. 81; Maher v. Wilson, (Cal.) 73 P. 418; Western Union Co. v. Lawson (Kans.) 72 P. 283.

To show that a legal right has been violated is sufficient, the violation itself, supplying a foundation for nominal damages. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lawson, 66 Kan. 660, 72 P. 283, defining nominal damages as those arising "by implication of law for the violation of the rights of another, from which injury arises but which is either incapable of ascertainment, or the value of which the proof wholly fails to show," Duggan v. Baltimore etc. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248, 39 Am. St. 672, 28 Atl. 182, declaring nominal damages recoverable "where a legal right is to be vindicated from an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind," Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 514, 73 P. 418, denominating them "a trifling sum awarded . . . . where, from the nature of the case, some injury has been done, the amount of which the proofs fail entirely to show," Blake v. Atlas Supply Co., 51 Okl. 426, 152 P. 81, recognizing them as a "trivial sum properly awarded in certain cases for mere technical injury as contradistinguished from actual or compensatory damages," Chaffin v. Fries Mfg. Power Co., 135 N.C. 95, 47 S.E. 226, quoting Cooley on Torts, 2d. ed., p. 74, to the effect that "in the case of a distinct legal wrong, which in itself constitutes an invasion of the right of another, the law will presume that some damage follows as a natural, necessary and proximate result." Almost the same language was employed by the South Carolina court in Reaves v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 S.C. 233, 96 S.E. 295, holding that "where there is evidence of a reckless or wilfull invasion of a legal right the law presumes sufficient actual damages to sustain the verdict for punitive damages."

1. Plaintiff contends that, assuming that it so breached its contract, it was the duty of defendants to mitigate their damages by paying the extra $5 per day, and recoup themselves thereafter. In Blake v. Atlas Supply Co., 51 Okla. 426, 152 P. 81, it is laid down that a party whose property is endangered or injured by the act or omission of another must reasonably exert himself to prevent or lessen his damage. Sackett et al. v. Rose, 55 Okla. 398, 154 P. 1177.

Reversed and remanded. See, also, Blake v. Atlas Supply Co., 51 Okla. 426, 152 P. 81. W.P.Z. German and Wm. T. Hutchings, for plaintiff in error.

The question of whether an injured party, acting in good faith, exercised reasonable care and diligence in doing what he did to mitigate damages under a given set of circumstances is a factual question, and, in case of conflicting evidence, is to be resolved by a jury or court sitting without one. Blake v. Atlas Supply Co., 51 Okla. 426, 152 P. 81 (1915). A synthesization of the decisions leads to the conclusion that the scope of the mitigation effort is circumscribed by these factors: (1) it must be in good faith; (2) it must be executed with reasonable skill, prudence, and efficiency; (3) it must be reasonably warranted by and proportioned to the injury and consequences to be averted; and (4) it must be undertaken in a reasonably justified belief that it will avoid or reduce the damage otherwise to be expected from wrongdoing.