Summary
In Blaise v Blaise (206 AD2d 715), a divorce was granted where the plaintiff wife proved a pattern of continuing verbal abuse associated with alcohol abuse.
Summary of this case from CL v. RGOpinion
July 21, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Clinton County (Ryan, Jr., J.).
In 1990, plaintiff commenced this action to terminate her 31-year marriage upon the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Defendant opposed the action and after a bifurcated nonjury trial, Supreme Court first granted a divorce and thereafter distributed marital property.
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to establish that the conflicts between the parties, which he classifies as only marital discord, bickering and name calling, were more than transient discord in a long-term marriage and do not support her action for a divorce. We disagree. Plaintiff clearly established that defendant's misconduct was substantial and distinctly not transient (see, Brady v. Brady, 64 N.Y.2d 339, 344). She offered proof to show a pattern of continuing verbal abuse associated with alcohol abuse which caused her to fear for her safety and negatively effected her mental well-being. Plaintiff met the high degree of proof required when the marriage is of long duration (see, Silvera v. Silvera, 147 A.D.2d 473). Defendant's generalized denials merely raised an issue of credibility which were resolved in plaintiff's favor. The findings of Supreme Court are entitled to due deference (see, Northern Westchester Professional Park Assocs. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499; Saulpaugh v. State of New York, 132 A.D.2d 781, 782) and, inasmuch as the record shows that the court's findings are fully supported by the evidence, we decline to disturb them (see, Lenner v. Globe Bag Co., 154 A.D.2d 862, 864).
We find defendant's remaining contentions lacking in merit. The essentially equal distribution of marital property by inkind distribution rather than by liquidation was well within Supreme Court's discretion and supported by the record. Nor do we find error in the bifurcation of the trial. Defendant's contention that Supreme Court lost jurisdiction to equitably divide the marital property by signing a judgment of divorce which contained a decretal paragraph scheduling a trial on the issue of equitable distribution is simply incorrect. It was not a final judgment of divorce (see, Garcia v. Garcia, 178 A.D.2d 683) and may be characterized as "nothing more than a decision stating the intention on the part of the court to divorce the parties in the future" (Sullivan v. Sullivan, 174 A.D.2d 862; cf., Zack v. Zack, 183 A.D.2d 382).
Mikoll, J.P., Crew III, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the amended judgment and order are affirmed, with costs.