Morse v. Converse, supra at 25, 113 A. at 215. A mere change in form of the gift is not an ademption, but a complete change in nature and character is. Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 171, 139 A. 758, 760 (1927). In this case, at the testatrix's death, she no longer owned the farm, but rather a mortgage and a promissory note.

This conversion follows on the theory that equity regards as done that which is agreed to be done. Estate of Bernhard (1907), 134 Iowa 603, 607, 112 N.W. 86. Estate of Sprague (1953), 244 Iowa 540, 57 N.W.2d 212 (land contract); Estate of Bernhard (1907), 134 Iowa 603, 112 N.W. 86, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1029 (land contract); Willoughby v. Watson (1923), 114 Kan. 82, 216 P. 1095 (purchase-money mortgage); Walker v. Waters (1912), 118 Md. 203, 84 A. 466 (purchase-money mortgage); Blaisdell v. Coe (1927), 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758, 65 A.L.R. 626 (purchase-money mortgage); Righter v. First Reformed Church of Boonton (1952), 17 N.J. Super. 407, 86 A.2d 305 (land contract); Lewis v. Thompson (1943), 142 Ohio St. 338, 52 N.E.2d 331 (purchase-money mortgage); and Newport Water Works v. Sisson (1893), 18 R.I. 411, 28 A. 336 (land contract). See also 3 American Law of Property, p. 609, sec. 14.13.

The mortgages the dominant feature of which is security for the performance of the primary obligations evidenced by the notes become void upon payment according to terms or by legal tender thereof. RSA 479:6; Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 168. A mortgagor, however, in the absence of a provision so providing has no right to pay in advance of maturity. Buffum v. Buffum, 11 N.H. 451, 456; Trahant v. Perry, 253 Mass. 486; 1 Glenn, Mortgages, s. 50, p. 319; 59 C.J.S. 695. Plaintiffs argue that by their failure to make the payments due as indicated above, the maturity of the notes has been automatically accelerated by their provision that "sixty (60) days default in payment of any interest or principal payment to make the entire unpaid balance due and payable."

True, the testator did not wholly dispose of the property by conveying it to a stranger but he so altered the status of it as to indicate a change of his intention. See In re Cooper's Estate, 95 N.J. Eq. 210, 123 A. 45, 30 A.L.R. 673; Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758, 65 A.L.R. 626. It seems to have been the common law rule in England that an alteration of the estate devised would work a revocation of the will to that extent except "`* * * in the case of mortgages and charges on the estate, which are only a revocation in equity pro tanto, or quoad the special purpose, and they are taken out of the general rule on the fact of being securities only * * *.'"

Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Keller, 197 Miss. 1, 17 So.2d 797. III. The trial court erred in sustaining the general demurrer to the amended bill in holding that any debt owed an estate is considered personal property when applied to this particular will of the said Mrs. Eldridge, deceased; in not finding that said item One of said will was revoked or adeemed by conveyance of the property therein specified prior to the death of the Testatrix; and in misinterpreting item Three of said will by failing to find that Mrs. Willie Deane Davis was entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale of realty or other money due the estate of the said Mrs. Eldridge, deceased, under said item Three. Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758; Brady v. Paine, 391 Ill. 596, 63 N.E.2d 721, 162 A.L.R. 138; Callicott v. Horn, 161 Miss. 395, 137 So. 190; Campbell v. St. Joseph's Industrial School (Del.), 53 A.2d 768; Dantone v. Dantone, 205 Miss. 420, 38 So.2d 908; Dollahite v. Orne, 10 Miss. 590, 2 Sm. M. 590; Everett v. Hubbard, 199 Miss. 857, 25 So.2d 768; First Natl. Bank v. Union Hospital, 281 Mass. 64, 183 N.E. 247; Gorham v. Chadwick, 135 Maine 479, 200 A. 500; Industrial Trust Co. v. Saunders, 71 R.I. 94, 42 A.2d 492; In re Kamba, 230 Wis. 246, 282 N.W. 570, 119 A.L.R. 1383; In re Kipp, 37 N.Y. Supp.2d 541; In re Noble, 141 Kan. 432, 41 P.2d 1021; Jackson v. McCoy, 56 Miss. 781; Kimbrough v. Curtis, 50 Miss. 117; Lane v. Railey, 280 Ky. 319, 133 S.W.2d 74; Lansdale v. Dearing, 351 Mo. 356, 173 S.W.2d 25; McCorkle v. Brown, 17 Miss. 167, 9 Sm. M. 167; McCullen v. Daughtry, 190 N.C. 215, 129 S.E. 611; Mann v. Haines, 146 Kan. 988, 73 P.2d 1066; Pan-Am Pet. Corp. v. Barkwell, 203 Miss. 833, 33 So.2d 451; Perrin v. Morga

Wentworth v. Waldron, 86 N.H. 559, 561. The following are some of the cases in which an executor (or adm'r w. w. a.) was given advice involving the construction of a will previous to the filing of a final account and a petition for a decree of distribution. Franklin National Bank v. Gerould, 90 N.H. 397; McAllister v. Elliot, 83 N.H. 225; Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167; Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393; `Chase v. Moore, 73 N.H. 553; Gardner v. Gardner, 72 N.H. 257; Goodhue v. Clark, 37 N.H. 525. Moreover, a decree of direction and advice concludes the parties upon all points that were adjudicated. McAllister v. Elliot, supra. It may be noted that Laws 1947, c. 90, provides an alternative remedy which in certain cases may be more expeditious for ascertaining requested instructions.

"In the majority of jurisdictions, the rule, although affected in many instances by statutes regarding devises of real property, seems well settled that a change from absolute ownership of property to a mortgage interest in such property by way of security upon its sale adeems or revokes a legacy or devise." Numerous supporting cases are there cited, among which are the following: McNaughton v. McNaughton, 34 N.Y. 201; Walker v. Waters, Admx., 118 Md. 203, 84 A. 466; Blaisdell, Exr., v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758, 65 A. L. R., 626; Wolcott, Exr., v. Shaw, 21 Del. Ch. 1, 2 A.2d 913; Moncreif v. Shuman, 169 Ga. 217, 150 S.E. 98; Pape v. U.S. National Bank, 135 Ore., 650, 297 P. 845; and Willoughby v. Watson, 114 Kan. 82, 216 P. 1095. The provisions of the Ohio statute (Sections 10504-51 and 10504-52, General Code) are, in almost identical language, the provisions of the Kansas statute under consideration in the Willoughby case, supra, and the factual situation in that case is also quite similar to that presented in the instant case.

This approach is that the complete physical disappearance of the subject matter of a specific bequest constitutes an ademption independently of the testator's intention. If, however, the subject matter of the specific bequest still "exists," but has been altered in form or substance, the testator's intention must be ascertained as to whether the change has so changed the gift as to cause an ademption by extinction. See: Succession of Levy (1945), 207 La. 1062, 22 So.2d 650; Blaisdell v. Coe (1927), 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758. The dissatisfaction of the early English judges with the confusion and uncertainty created by applying the testator's intention rule ( Partridge v. Partridge, supra) led to the third approach to ademption by extinction.