Opinion
Case No. 2:97-CV-00781PGC
August 21, 2003
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
In this case, Mr. Blair alleged that the air bag of a 1996 Toyota Camry, which he rented from Alamo Rent-A-Car, and made in part by TRW Inc, improperly deployed and injured him. On April 28, 2003, the court began a jury trial regarding this allegation. On May 5, 2003, at the close of all evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. That same day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Blair, finding Toyota, TRW, Alamo, and Mr. Blair each liable for twenty-five percent (25%) of the total damage award of $258,674.
Now before the court are the following post-trial motions: (1) Toyota's motion for judgment as a matter of law or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial; (2) TRW's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) Mr. Blair's motion to amend the judgment to include pre-judgment interest.
1. Toyota's Post-Trial Motions
The court finds that the record properly supports the jury' s verdict; therefore, the court denies both Toyota's motion for judgment as a matter of law and its motion for a new trial. The court will grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law only "if during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party." The court will grant a motion for a new trial only if the court, in its discretion, finds that justice requires a new trial because the verdict is "against the weight of the evidence" or "prejudicial error" has occurred. In this case, the record was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and therefore justice does not require a new trial.
Federal R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); See also Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999).
McHargue v. Stokes Division of Pennwalt Corp., 912 F.2d 394, 396 (10th Cir. 1990).
Toyota argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial for three reasons: 1) that the evidence did not sufficiently support Mr. Blair's claims; 2) that the record does not support the jury's allocation of responsibility between Mr. Blair and the defendants; and 3) that because the air conditioning turned off during the later hours of the jury's deliberations, a new trial must take place. The court disagrees with these arguments.
First, Toyota argues that Mr. Blair failed to provide legally sufficient evidence that the Camry at issue was defective. Toyota concedes, as it must, that Mr. Blair "can certainly present circumstantial evidence" regarding the alleged defect. However, Toyota argues that Mr. Blair's evidence "cannot satisfy his burden of proof in this products liability case." After reviewing the record, the court disagrees. Under Utah law, which applies in this diversity case, "plaintiffs may prove [a] product defect through circumstantial evidence." Circumstantial evidence is particularly widespread in cases involving vehicle defects, since in those cases an ordinary user is not in a position to pinpoint evidence of a specific design defect or manufacturing defect. That is why in vehicle defect cases the "testimony of a product's user or operator about the circumstances of the event complained of has been held sufficient to establish the product's alleged malfunction."
Toyota Defendants' Renewed Motion for Directed Verdict, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial and Memorandum in Support Thereof ("Toyota's Memo in Support") at 5; See also Taylor v. Cooper Tire Rubber Co, 130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997).
Toyota's Memo in Support at 5.
Taylor, 130 F.3d at 1398.
See generally C. Wallace and A. Wampler, Comment: Skimming the Trout From the Milk: Using Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Product Defect Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 3, Tennessee and Beyond, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 647, 652 (Spring 2001).
Ford Motor Co v. Gonzalez, 9 S.W.3d 195, 199-200 (Tex, Ct. App. 1999) (collecting cases).
Although Toyota cites two Utah Court of Appeals cases to support its argument, the court distinguishes both cases. First, Toyota cites Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., where the court held that a plaintiffs claim that he "was riding the bicycle when the bike suddenly stopped, throwing [him] over the handle bars" was not sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. Rather, the court held that the plaintiff "must provide some evidence that a defect existed at the time he bought the bicycle and that the defect caused his injury," Next, Toyota cites Kleinart v. Kimball Elevator Co., where the court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendants despite a plaintiffs allegation that she was injured when "for forty minutes [she was] tossed about the inside of [an] elevator by the sudden, abrupt movements of the elevator." In Kleinart, the court affirmed the summary judgment because the plaintiff did not submit "any evidence showing a defect or defective condition."
876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
See Burns, 876 P.2d at 416.
Id.
854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct App, 1993).
Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
However, both cases are distinguishable for an important reason: Mr. Blair, unlike the plaintiffs in either Burns and Kleinart, presented significant circumstantial evidence of the Camry's defect. Further, the Tenth Circuit has held that the type of circumstantial evidence Mr. Blair submitted is sufficient to support a plaintiffs verdict. Specifically, in Taylor v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., the Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, held if a product's failure is combined with other evidence, such as "the age of the truck;. . . the fact that it had no record of prior damage; [and] the description of the mishap by plaintiff . . . then the [product's failure] may have provided the requisite force to tip the scales in favor of plaintiff" Accordingly, the Circuit found that a plaintiff may prove a product defect through this type of circumstantial evidence. In this case, Mr. Blair submitted exactly the type of circumstantial evidence that the Taylor court held was sufficient. For example, Mr. Blair presented evidence that the 1996 Camry was new when the incident occurred, with only 1200 miles on it. Further, he submitted evidence that the air bag system was the original equipment, and had not deployed prior to the date of the incident. Mr. Blair also testified that he was driving on a smooth two lane asphalt road at about 55 mph when the air bag deployed without impact. Mr. Blair corroborated his testimony with his friend's (John Siefer) eye-witness account that one half hour before the incident there were no rocks or debris in the road where the deployment took place. Since this evidence is the type of evidence that the Tenth Circuit, in Taylor, held sufficient to support a verdict in favor of a plaintiff, the court DENIES Toyota's motion for judgment as a matter of law on this ground.
130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997).
Taylor, 130 F.3d at 1398 (quoting Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953).
See id.
Second, the court also denies Toyota's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or judgment as a matter of law, on the basis that the record "cannot legally or logically support the jury's assessment" of 25% responsibility to Toyota, TRW, Alamo, and Mr. Blair. Toyota argues that the jury's verdict was an obvious compromise, and specifically argues that the jury's assignment of 25% liability to Mr. Blair is evidence that they did not really believe Mr. Blair's story. The court disagrees. The record contains evidence that Mr. Blair was not using his seat belt, and in fact took the car off-road at times. These facts alone could support the jury's decision to assign partial blame to Mr. Blair. Further, Toyota fails to cite any cases or other legal support for its argument that the jury's allocation of equal responsibility (25% each) to all parties is an impermissible compromise verdict that warrants a new trial. Accordingly, the court DENIES Toyota's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on this second argument.
Toyota's Memo in Support at 12.
See id. at 13.
Third and finally, the court disagrees with Toyota's argument that since the air conditioning at the courthouse turned off after 5:00 or 6:00 pm, during the jury's deliberations, this constituted an "outside influence" on the jury and a new trial must take place. Toyota cites no cases or other law to support its argument that this is a legal basis for granting a new trial. Moreover, the jury deliberations proceeded normally, and the jury asked intelligent and appropriate questions during its deliberations. Further, neither Toyota, nor any other party, raised a legal objection during the deliberations, and no juror complained about the temperature.
For all these reasons, the court DENIES Toyota's motion for a directed verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial (Doc. # 304-1, 304-2, and 304-3). To the extent that TRW's motion for judgment as a matter of law joins in Toyota's post-trial motions, the court DENIES it for the same reasons.
2. TRW's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The court DENIES TRW's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court finds that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict against TRW, who supplied the air bag sensors and diagnostic module. In essence, TRW asks the court to follow the reasoning of House v. Armour of America, Inc. where the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of a component part manufacturer. However, the component part manufacturer in House (who supplied bulk fibers for bullet proof vests) played a drastically different role than TRW plays here. Specifically, the component manufacturer in House only supplied bulk fibers which were "woven into ballistic fabrics according to the design specification of the individual vest manufacturers." Thus, the court held that summary judgment was appropriate because the fiber manufacturer could not be held liable for violating a "duty to warn" someone using the vest about the vest's limitations. This makes sense, since the "fibers are not, nor can they be, specifically labeled." In other words, it was impossible for the component part manufacturer in House to have contributed to a labeling defect, since the individual fibers in the vest could not be labeled. In stark contrast, TRW's parts were alleged to play a central role in this litigation; Mr. Blair alleged that it was TRW's air bag sensors that triggered the improper air bag deployment. Therefore, the link between TRW's parts and the alleged defect in the air bag system is sufficiently strong to support the jury's verdict against TRW. For this reason, the court DENIES TRW's motion.
886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
Id. at 554.
Id.
See id. at 553-54.
Id. at 554.
3. Mr. Blair's Motion to Amend Judgment
Finally, the court GRANTS Mr. Blair's motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest on the special damages award. This motion is unopposed. Accordingly, the court amends the judgment in this matter to add an additional $5,772.37 to the jury's verdict on special damages. Therefore, the total jury verdict award in this case totals $264,446.37.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, the court DENIES Toyota's motion for a directed verdict, (Doc. # 304-1) motion for judgment as a matter of law, (Doc. #304-2) and its motion for a new trial (Doc. #304- 3). The court DENIES TRW's motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc. #302-1), and GRANTS Mr. Blair's motion to amend the judgment.
SO ORDERED.