The seller told them not to worry about it. Under OCGA § 16-9-70, knowledge that the identification mark has been removed for purposes of concealing the identity of the article is an essential element of the crime, Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977), which may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656 ( 229 S.E.2d 132) (1976).
The charge as to his interest in the case merely stated a self-evident fact and was proper. Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118, 119 (4) ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977). There is no merit in these enumerations of error.
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-70 (a), criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark, requires knowledge and intent as essential elements of the offense. See Power v. State, 260 Ga. 101 ( 390 S.E.2d 47) (1990); Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977); Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656 ( 229 S.E.2d 132) (1976). The defendant and his co-defendants were arrested in possession of seven weapons, the serial numbers on each having been removed, immediately after confronting their victims.
OCGA § 16-9-70 (a), criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark, requires knowledge and intent as essential elements of the offense: "which he knows the . . . serial number . . . has been removed for the purpose of concealing or destroying the identity of such article." See Power v. State, 260 Ga. 101 ( 390 S.E.2d 47) (1990); Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977); Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656 ( 229 S.E.2d 132) (1976). The testimony of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms ("ATF") Agent Randy Beach gave rise to circumstantial evidence of possession of the pistol, but not of knowledge of the altered serial number on the pistol.
" These were appropriate instructions. Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118, 119 (4) ( 240 S.E.2d 319). 4.
4. A charge of criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark includes knowledge that the mark was removed to conceal the identity of the article. Code § 26-1506 (a); Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977). Such knowledge may, however, be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656 ( 229 S.E.2d 132) (1976). Compare Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 (2) ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977). For this reason it could not be determined whether the television set was stolen property.
The court ruled that this fact was not in evidence and instructed the district attorney to confine his argument to the evidence. As appellant did not request further curative instructions, he cannot complain on appeal of the court's failure to give them. Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118 ( 240 S.E.2d 319) (1977). 5. The record shows that the testimony of appellant's accomplice was corroborated by the testimony of a third party and that at the time of his arrest identification used to cash the money orders was found in his possession.
We conclude that this is nothing more than an observation that such circumstances are less suggestive and less likely to give rise to an irreparable misidentification, a concern also expressed in cases such as Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 ( 93 SC 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401) and Myers v. State, 236 Ga. 677, 678 ( 225 S.E.2d 53). While we do not recommend this charge for emulation, neither do we conclude that in the context of the entire charge on identification was this single exhumed portion prejudicial as amounting to a comment on the evidence. See Merritt v. State, 110 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 137 S.E.2d 917). Rather we conclude that the comment was the recognition of a proper statement of law and did no more than state a self-evident fact. Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118, 120 (4) ( 240 S.E.2d 319). In his second complaint, Milstead urges that the court erred in its charge on credibility by advising the jury that the jury could consider Milstead's interest in the outcome of the trial in weighing his credibility.
We have examined the charge in its entirety and conclude that such language, in context, was not reversible error. Blair v. State, 144 Ga. App. 118, 119 (4) ( 240 S.E.2d 319). 6. A trial judge may not judicially note a prior conviction in his own court without compliance with Code Ann. § 27-2503.