Opinion
3:01-CV-1174-D
September 30, 2002
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of the District Court, the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Sharon Pipkins and Carla Stone, filed August 1, 2002, has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The conclusions and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis and pro Se, brings a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate who was confined in the Baten Intermediate Sanction Facility in Pampa, Texas when he filed this case. Defendants are employees of the Kaufman County Jail: Steve Smith, a jailer; Sharon Pipkins, a supervisor; Carla Stone, an administrative assistant; and Don Moore, Jail Administrator. Stone and Pipkins seek summary judgment on the ground that any claims Plaintiff may have against them are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff has not filed a response to the summary judgment motion.
Service was not accomplished on Defendants Steve Smith and Don Moore, according to the United States Marshal's November 9, 2002, returns. Plaintiff did not request the Court to reattempt service.
Stone and Pipkins also claim (1) they are entitled to qualified immunity, (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a physical injury with respect to the first incident, and (3) he fails to allege Stone's personal involvement in the second incident. The Court need not reach the additional grounds for summary judgment in light of its conclusion that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims.
STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST STONE AND PIPKINS
Plaintiff claims that the defendants forced him to beat other inmates and steal property from them while he was a trusty at the Kaufman County Jail, that one inmate caused him a physical injury, and that he has had "a lot of mental problems since the years [he] spent in Kaufman County Jail." His claims against Pipkins and Stone arise out of two separate incidents. Plaintiff alleges the first incident occurred at the Kaufman County jail "between January and May 1996." (Pl's Ans. to United States Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire ("Quest. Ans.") at 3). Plaintiff alleges he was compelled to use force against other inmates at the direction of the Kaufman County staff. (id.) Plaintiff alleges Stone "knew about the incident," "approved of the incident," and told us to protect the jailer." (Quest. Ans. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Pipkins "was the supervisor that night." (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges he was injured on May 25, 2001, by a black inmate, but he makes no allegation that Stone or Pipkins were involved.
Plaintiff also alleges that "between June 1996 and June 1997," he was involved in a fight with inmate Chris Howell and that Howell struck Plaintiff in the face with an aerosol can of disinfectant. (Quest. Ans. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Stone "knew that I was injured and that the incident would and did accur [sic]." (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress has not adopted a statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. In a § 1983 action, limitation periods are to be determined by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations and coordinate tolling rules. Board of Regents, Univ. of N.Y v. Tomanjo, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980). Courts apply the general personal injury limitation period of the forum state. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). The Texas general personal injury limitation period is two years. Id.; Tex.Civ.Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Under Texas law, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense on which a defendant has the burden of proof. Woods v. William M Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988). A defendant who will have the burden of proof at trial on his or her statute of limitations defense must establish "beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the . . . defense." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986).
On the other hand, a party who seeks to avoid the statute of limitations based on equitable tolling has the burden of proof on that issue. See FDIC v. Shrader York; 991 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 518) (addressing discovery rule). A plaintiff who seeks to rely upon tolling must adduce evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to equitable tolling to avoid summary judgment. See RTC v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1569 (N.D.Tex. 1995) (Fitzwater, J.) (addressing discovery rule) (citing Shrader York, 991 F.2d at 220).
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The summary judgment record undisputably establishes that the incidents allegedly involving Stone and Pipkins occurred, at the latest, in June, 1997. Plaintiff did not file his complaint until June 19, 2001. Stone and Pipkins have met their burdens of demonstrating that Plaintiff did not file his complaint until well after the limitation period expired. Plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial of demonstrating that the limitation period was tolled. To avoid summary judgment, he must introduce competent summary evidence that presents a genuine issue of material fact. In other words, he must present evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that the limitation period was tolled for a sufficient period of time to make his filing timely.
Plaintiff asserted, in response to this Court's questionnaire, that he brought this case outside the limitation period because he feared retaliation by "Kaufman County Law Officials" who have "unlimited resources." (Quest. Ans. at 3.) Plaintiff is asserting that his imprisonment in the Kaufman County jail entitled him to equitable tolling until he was released. Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). A federal court applying a state statute of limitations should give effect to the state's equitable tolling principles as well. See Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998). Texas law formerly considered imprisonment to be a disability which tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See former Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5535 (Vernon 1967) (repealed). Texas law had changed before Plaintiff filed this case. The limitation period now begins to run for prisoners when the cause of action accrues. Tex.Civ.Pract. Rem. Code § 16.001. Plaintiff's conclusory allegation, unsupported by any evidence, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to equitable tolling.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment. Little v. LiquidAir Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). In this case, Stone and Pipkins are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that the motion for summary judgment of Stone and Pipkins be granted and that Plaintiffs claims against them be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.