Opinion
No. 11-1958
05-01-2012
EVA LYNN BLAIR, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE CORPORATION WELFARE BENEFITS PLAN; LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, a/k/a Liberty Mutual Group, Defendants - Appellees.
Denise M. Clark, Julia Roumm, CLARK LAW GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gina D. Wodarski, EDWARDS WILDMAN PALMER LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Fiona W. Ong, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:09-cv-00906-AW)
Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denise M. Clark, Julia Roumm, CLARK LAW GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gina D. Wodarski, EDWARDS WILDMAN PALMER LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Fiona W. Ong, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Eva Lynn Blair appeals the district court's orders granting summary judgment to Defendants in her civil action, and denying her motion to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Our review of the record reveals that Blair's outside work for pay understandably terminated her entitlement to the long-term disability benefits she had been receiving from her former employer's welfare benefit plan, which was covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (providing de novo review for denial of ERISA benefits, absent a grant of discretion to administrator in contested benefits plan); Bogart v. Chappell, 396 F.3d 548, 555 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that Rule 59(e) motions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Blair v. Nat'l City Mortg. Corp. Welfare Benefits Plan, No. 8:09-cv-00906-AW (D. Md. June 20, 2011 & Sept. 2, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED