Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000496-MR
01-15-2016
JERRY W. BLADES APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Meredith Krause Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky David B. Abner Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 09-CR-00197 & 09-CR-00197-001 OPINION
AFFIRMING BEFORE: J. LAMBERT, MAZE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. TAYLOR, JUDGE: Jerry W. Blades appeals from a McCracken Circuit Court order denying his post-conviction motion made pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. Blades, who was convicted of multiple drug charges and being a persistent felony offender, claims that he is entitled to a retrospective competency hearing, or to have his conviction vacated. Because his claim is procedurally barred, and substantively without merit, we affirm.
In 2009, a McCracken Circuit Court jury found Blades guilty of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He received a total sentence of forty years. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See Blades v. Com., 339 S.W.3d 450 (Ky. 2011).
Blades filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment and sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, arguing that his trial attorney had a conflict of interest and was ineffective for failing to investigate his case or to secure expert testimony. The motion was denied June 1, 2012, without an evidentiary hearing. Blades did not appeal that ruling.
Blades then filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to CR 60.02, in December of 2013, arguing that he had not been competent to stand trial. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing by order entered January 28, 2014. This appeal follows.
We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. Partin v. Com., 337 S.W.3d 639 (Ky. App. 2011). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Com. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999). A movant must demonstrate that "he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief." Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). We will affirm the trial court's decision absent a "flagrant miscarriage of justice." Id. at 858.
The factual basis for Blades' claim that he was incompetent to stand trial was a series of comments made by his attorney at his sentencing hearing. After Blades was found guilty by the jury, he dismissed his trial attorney, and a public defender was appointed to represent him during sentencing. She received the case one day prior to sentencing, and she spent thirty to forty-five minutes speaking with Blades about his case. At the sentencing hearing, she expressed doubts about his competency. She informed the court that she had discussed the implications of his convictions with Blades, but that "he was not getting it." She stated that twenty minutes after she explained something to Blades, he was unable to recall what she had said, and that there was some indication that he did not understand what the penalties would be if he were convicted. She told the court that she was not confident in his ability to understand the proceedings, and stated that, had she represented Blades from the beginning of the proceedings, she would have taken steps to have him evaluated for competency. She did not, however, formally request a competency hearing. The court did not appoint an expert to evaluate Blades, and proceeded to conduct the sentencing hearing.
Blades argues that his due process and statutory rights were violated by the trial court's failure to order a competency evaluation. He asks for a reversal of his conviction and sentence or, in the alternative, a remand of his case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a retrospective competency evaluation is possible.
In denying the CR 60.02 motion, the trial court held that the motion was procedurally barred and that, in any event, a reasonable basis did not exist to order a competency evaluation. We agree on both grounds. .
"The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and complete." Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Under this structure:
A defendant who is in custody under sentence or on probation, parole or conditional discharge, is required to avail himself of RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which he is aware, or should be aware, during the period when the remedy is available to him. Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could "reasonably have been presented" by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.McQueen v. Com., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (citation omitted).
As we have noted, Blades' case was fully reviewed on direct appeal by the Kentucky Supreme Court, and he subsequently filed an RCr 11.42 motion in which he raised several collateral attacks on the final judgment. His current claim regarding his competency could reasonably have been raised in either of these earlier actions, and he provides no explanation for why it was not, except to request leniency as a pro se litigant.
KRS 504.100(1) provides that "[i]f upon arraignment, or during any stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant's mental condition." See also RCr 8.06.
In denying Blades' CR 60.02 motion, the trial court held that the comments of his newly-appointed counsel were not sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the trial court to order a competency evaluation. The trial court presided over Blades' jury trial, and was therefore in the best position to observe his demeanor and his interactions with counsel. Additionally, Blades' own pro se pleadings in the record support the trial court's determination that a competency evaluation was not warranted. Attached to his pro se RCr 11.42 motion, for example, is a fourteen-page memorandum of law, which demonstrates his detailed grasp of the facts of his case. In the memorandum, he claims that he requested his attorney on several occasions to secure an expert in the field of manufacturing methamphetamine to testify on his behalf, spoke with his attorney about suppressing statements he made to the police allegedly while under the influence of drugs, and requested his attorney to have testing performed on several items of evidence. These are not the allegations of an individual who was unable to participate in his own defense.
A defendant is entitled to a competency hearing only when there is substantial evidence of incompetency in the record. Padgett v. Com., 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010). In Blades' case, his claim that he is entitled to such a hearing is procedurally barred by his failure to raise it on direct appeal or in his RCr 11.42 motion, and substantively barred by the absence of any significant evidence of incompetency in the record.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the CR 60.02 motion, and its order is therefore affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Meredith Krause
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky David B. Abner
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky