Opinion
No. 04-17-00406-CR No. 04-17-00407-CR
04-18-2018
Bruce Ray BLACKWELL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 5842 & 5843
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Appellant Bruce Ray Blackwell ("Blackwell") was indicted for two theft offenses in separate cause numbers. After the trial court denied his motions to suppress evidence, Blackwell pleaded no contest in both cases. On appeal, Blackwell argues the trial court erred in denying his motions. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Background
At around 2:00 a.m. on July 20, 2015, Gillespie County Sheriff's Deputies Justin Cole and Johnny Gorden (jointly, the "deputies") observed a truck towing a trailer turn onto a county road at a high rate of speed. The deputies followed the truck and found it pulled over on the side of the road. The deputies observed Blackwell standing near the truck. As the deputies pulled their vehicle behind the trailer, Blackwell walked towards them and waved a green-filtered flashlight in their direction to indicate that he was fine. Deputy Gorden testified it did not appear to him that Blackwell was waving him on, and he thought the green-filtered flashlight was suspicious because it was too dim for the circumstances.
The deputies exited their vehicle and approached Blackwell. Deputy Gorden asked Blackwell: "How's it going, sir? Everything okay?" Blackwell responded that he was checking his tires. Deputy Gorden asked Blackwell for identification, and Blackwell presented his driver's license. As they approached Blackwell, the deputies observed that the trailer contained a Kubota RTV that was not secured or strapped down. The deputies also observed loading ramps and bolt cutters in the bed of the truck.
Deputy Gorden told Blackwell he would return Blackwell's driver's license and "let [him] go on his way" after the returns came back from dispatch. Deputy Gorden then instructed Blackwell that because of the loading ramps and bolt cutters, he also would run the vehicle identification number on the Kubota RTV through dispatch. The deputies took photographs of the vehicle identification number.
While waiting on returns from dispatch, the deputies engaged in conversation with Blackwell. In a sworn affidavit admitted during the suppression hearing, Deputy Gorden testified Blackwell "kept changing his story about what he was doing and where he was coming from." Blackwell initially stated he was coming from a friend's house and had picked up the Kubota RTV from the repair shop in Fredericksburg, but then stated he was driving around on back roads because he could not sleep. Deputy Gorden also testified Blackwell appeared very nervous and was sweating profusely.
When dispatch confirmed the Kubota RTV had not been reported stolen, the deputies told Blackwell he was free to leave. The encounter lasted about twenty minutes.
Blackwell subsequently was indicted for theft of the Kubota RTV and the trailer. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, Blackwell pleaded no contest and this appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
"We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and apply a bifurcated standard of review, affording almost complete deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when those determinations are based on assessments of credibility and demeanor." Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We review de novo the specific question of whether a defendant's encounter with police was consensual or a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Where, as here, the trial court did not make express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will assume it made findings consistent with its ruling and supported by the record. Id. If the trial court's ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law, we will sustain it. Id.
Discussion
In order to determine whether the denial of the motions to suppress was an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether Blackwell's encounter with the deputies was the type of encounter that triggers Fourth Amendment analysis.
There are three types of police-citizen encounters: (1) consensual encounters, which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions, which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Which type of encounter occurred under a given set of facts is a question of law we review de novo. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241.
Here, the parties dispute whether Blackwell's encounter with the deputies was consensual or an investigative detention. The State argues the encounter either was consensual or, if it was a temporary detention, was supported by reasonable suspicion. In the alternative, the State argues any detention was appropriate pursuant to the community caretaking exception. Blackwell argues the encounter was an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion and not falling under the community caretaking exception.
A. Blackwell's encounter with the deputies initially was consensual but later became a temporary detention.
Unlike a seizure, a consensual encounter requires no objective justification. State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "[A consensual] encounter takes place when an officer approaches a citizen in a public place to ask questions, and the citizen is willing to listen and voluntarily answers." Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An encounter remains consensual so long as a reasonable citizen would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
Circumstances that might indicate an encounter is not consensual would be "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49-50 (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). "Even if the officer did not tell the citizen that the request for identification or information may be ignored, the fact that the citizen complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature of the encounter." Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466 (citing I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).
In this case, the evidence demonstrates Blackwell's encounter with the deputies began as a consensual encounter when the deputies approached Blackwell on the side of the road. Although the deputies had followed Blackwell after observing him turn on the county road at a high rate of speed, the record does not demonstrate Blackwell was aware of this fact. Only two deputies were involved in the encounter, as opposed to several, and there is no evidence either deputy drew his weapon or touched Blackwell. Neither party disputes the deputies parked their vehicle behind Blackwell's vehicle in such a way that he could have left the scene if he had chosen to do so.
The deputies' initial questions and tone of voice did not indicate they intended to compel compliance with their requests. Rather, the deputies first asked Blackwell: "How's it going, sir? Everything okay?" Blackwell answered those questions voluntarily. Deputy Gorden then asked Blackwell: "Do you have any ID on you just to establish that I made contact with you?" In response, Blackwell voluntarily handed Deputy Gorden his driver's license.
At some point, however, the encounter became a detention, as evidenced by Deputy Gorden's statement that he would return Blackwell's driver's license and "let [him] go on his way" after the returns came back from dispatch. Deputy Gorden's language made it clear that Blackwell was not free to leave. See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49-50 (holding use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled may indicate encounter is non-consensual).
Accordingly, in order to determine whether any evidence obtained during the detention was admissible, we must determine whether reasonable suspicion supported the detention. Because we conclude that it did, we need not address the State's alternative argument that the seizure falls under the community caretaking exception.
B. Reasonable suspicion supported the deputies' detention of Blackwell.
The police may not detain a citizen without reasonable suspicion. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 667. "Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists if an officer has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activities." State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). "These facts must show unusual activity, some evidence that connects the detainee to the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime." Id. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 274.
In this case, there is evidence in the record supporting a determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify Blackwell's detention. The deputies testified the following specific facts supported their suspicion that Blackwell was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activities:
(1) The deputies observed Blackwell on the side of the road at around 2:00 a.m. in an area where Deputy Gorden testified all-terrain vehicles previously had been reported stolen;
(2) The Kubota RTV Blackwell was towing was not secured or strapped down to the trailer, which Deputy Gordon testified he found suspicious because the Kubota RTV is very expensive equipment that generally would be well-secured;
(3) The deputies observed bolt cutters and loading ramps in the bed of Blackwell's truck, which Deputy Cole testified was suspicious because the trailer had attached loading ramps, so Blackwell's ramps were just taking up space in the bed of his truck;
(4) Blackwell was using a green-filtered flashlight to check his tires, which Deputy Gorden testified was suspicious because green-filtered flashlights are typically used when the intent is not to put off much light, such as while hunting; and
(5) Deputy Gorden testified Blackwell was sweating profusely and appeared nervous.
Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances reflected by the evidence before the trial court, we hold the deputies had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Blackwell, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blackwell's motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the detention.
Conclusion
While Blackwell's encounter with the deputies began as a consensual encounter, the encounter later became a temporary detention. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain Blackwell. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Blackwell's motions to suppress was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court's judgment, therefore, is affirmed.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice DO NOT PUBLISH