These choices—at least some of which counsel himself indicated were "trial strategy" decisions—were not objectively unreasonable so as to constitute deficient performance. See Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 486 (3), 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020) ("Trial tactics and strategy are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them." (citation and punctuation omitted)); Brewer v. State, 301 Ga. 819, 820 (2), 821 (3), 804 S.E.2d 410 (2017) (trial counsel’s "strategic decision" to decline a curative instruction so as "not to draw the jury’s attention" to a witness’s allegedly improper character testimony about using "jail booking information to locate" defendant, was "within the wide latitude of presumptively reasonable professional conduct" (citation and punctuation omitted))

" Here, the evidence presented at trial authorized the jury to determine that Tyler entered the CMC Recycling upper and lower warehouses without authority and for the purpose of stealing copper. See Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 484 (1), 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020). The evidence was therefore sufficient to support his conviction for burglary.

The evidence also showed that Appellant gave investigators an inconsistent version of events when asked about his involvement in Jack's killing, fled the scene, and hid evidence. See Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 482-484 (847 S.E.2d 317) (2020) (concluding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to authorize the defendant's malice murder conviction where forensic evidence linked the defendant to the victim and the crime scene and the defendant gave inconsistent statements to police about his involvement in the victim's death); Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219, 224-225 (845 S.E.2d 579) (2020) (evidence was constitutionally sufficient to establish malice murder where, among other things, the defendant fled the scene after shooting the victim); Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 389 (810 S.E.2d 515) (2018) (concluding the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to authorize a conviction for malice murder where, among other things, the defendant and his accomplices attempted to get rid of evidence of the crime). Therefore, the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support Appellant's con

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Muse, 316 Ga. at 648. See also, e.g., Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 483-484 (847 SE2d 317) (2020) (holding that evidence that the defendant was near the crime scene around the time of the victim's murder, his fingerprints were found at the scene, and he admitted to investigators that he served as a lookout while others robbed and killed the victim was constitutionally sufficient to support his convictions for malice murder and robbery).

However, Miller was not convicted or sentenced on the aggravated assault count or the felony murder count, so "his claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those counts are moot." Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 482 (1), 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020). Thus, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial is limited to the malice murder count.

Because it is clear from the record "that the trial court exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror in denying [the] motion for a new trial[, t]his claim of error fails." Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 486 (2), 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020) (punctuation omitted). 4.

Appellant also admitted to Angela and Alvin that he shot Sullivan but offered police a different version of events when questioned about what occurred. See Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 482-484, 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020) (concluding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to authorize a defendant’s malice murder conviction where a defendant gave inconsistent statements to police about involvement in a victim’s death). Forensic evidence also showed that gunshot primer residue was found on Appellant’s hands, and bullet holes were found in the bedroom mirror despite Appellant’s claim that the shooting took place in the hallway.

Burdine also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts on the other two felony murder counts of which he was found guilty, but that contention is moot because he was not sentenced on those counts. See Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 482, 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020). (a) With respect to his conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, Burdine contends that there was no evidence he had any knowledge that Love or Collins possessed a firearm when they left the duplex for Kelley's house, that Love or Collins had any plan to commit an assault on Kelley with a firearm, or that such an assault was a foreseeable possibility.

Hinkson does argue that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder based on cruelty to children in the first degree and cruelty to children in the first degree, but he was not convicted of or sentenced for those counts, and, accordingly, "his claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those counts are moot." Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 482, 847 S.E.2d 317, 321 (2020). We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020.

The reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis raised by a defendant is a question principally for the jury, and when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt, this Court will not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law. Blackshear v. State , 309 Ga. 479, 483, 847 S.E.2d 317 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, we conclude that a rational juror could find Fuller guilty of the armed robbery and associated crimes.