Opinion
Case No. 00-1119-MLB.
May 3, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This product liability action is before the court on defendant's motion for a protective order (Doc. 32). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion shall be DENIED.
Background
This product liability action concerns a "pull-pak" device, a winch designed to move a hopper car short distances on railroad tracks. Blackmore, a hopper car loader at a chemical plant in Ulysses, Kansas, was severely injured while operating the pull-pak. As the motor turned and the winch rope tightened to pull the railroad car, the rope caught Blackmore's gloves and pulled both of his hands into the machine. His right hand was severed and his left hand was crushed as the pull-pak continued to pull the railroad car. Blackmore alleges various product liability theories against FMC, including failure to warn and negligent design and manufacture. Incorporated within Blackmore's product liability theories is the contention that the pull-pak should have had a "dead-man" switch which automatically stopped the winch motor when the operator became disabled or otherwise unable to turn off the motor.
Motion For Protective Order
Blackmore served FMC with seven requests for admission concerning Jeamar Winches, Inc. (Jeamar), a company which also manufactures winch devices. The requests are relatively straightforward and ask FMC to admit or deny that during the relevant time period Jeamar produced similar winches that incorporated a dead-man switch. Contending that the requests are harassing, irrelevant, and immaterial, FMC moves for a protective order, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), excusing it from any obligation to answer. As discussed in greater detail below, FMC's arguments for a protective order are unpersuasive.
FMC also requests in a laundry list that (1) its objections be sustained, (2) the requests for admission be struck, and (3) Blackmore be enjoined from serving additional discovery requests. The court denies all relief requested by FMC.
Rule 26(c) provides, upon a showing of good cause, that the court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." The party seeking a protective order has the burden of persuasion to show good cause for the order.Sentry v. Shivers, 164, 164 F.R.D. 255, 256 (Kan. 1996). Whether to enter a protective order rests within the sound discretion of the court. Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 482 (10th Cir. 1995). Because each case and its related facts vary considerably, limitations are established on a case by case basis.
FMC argues that information about another company's safety switch for operating a winch system is irrelevant and immaterial to this case. The court does not agree. FMC has asserted the affirmative defense that "plaintiff's claims are barred because any product manufactured by FMC . . . conformed with the available technological, scientific, and industrial state of the art applicable to such products." FMC's Amended Answer, Doc. 28, p. 3, para. H. Because FMC placed the "state of the art" for winches in issue, Blackmore's request that FMC admit or deny whether FMC was familiar with another winch manufacturer's safety switch system is certainly relevant.
FMC also asserts in a cursory fashion that the requests for admissions are improper because they (1) seek to improperly establish or imply facts not in evidence, (2) involve a pure matter of law, (3) seek to coerce admissions regarding issues in dispute, and (4) are propounded for purposes of harassment. After reviewing these arguments, the court reaches two conclusions: (1) FMC's arguments are entirely without merit and (2) FMC misunderstands Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 and the proper method for responding. FMC shall comply with the provisions in Rule 36 for responding to requests for admissions and answer accordingly. Consistent with Rule 36, FMC shall admit or deny the request or explain why it is unable to admit or deny the request. If Blackmore is not satisfied with the responses, he may move to determine the sufficiency of the responses as provided for in Rule 36(a).
FMC's misunderstanding of the function served by Rule 36 requests is illustrated by FMC's objection that the "requests seek to improperly establish facts not in evidence." The purpose of a Rule 36 request is to determine whether an issue is in dispute; if the issue is not in dispute, discovery on the issue is unnecessary and the trial is narrowed to those issues which are in dispute. See, e.g., Official Comments to 1970 Amendments to Rule 36. FMC's argument that Blackmore's requests raise "facts not in evidence" misses the point. The court will not belabor this opinion with additional examples of errors in FMC's reasoning.
FMC's brief states that it has no personal knowledge of Jeamar and that this response should suffice. Rule 36 explicitly rejects the answer "lack of knowledge" and imposes an obligation of "reasonable inquiry." The court has no basis on which to determine whether FMC has made a reasonable inquiry.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that FMC's motion for a protective order (Doc. 32) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that FMC shall provide Blackmore with its response to the requests for admission within 10 days from the date of this order.