The other route pursued a similar course, except that it passed through Belvidere, New Jersey, instead of through Hackettstown and Washington, New Jersey. Traffic between the Allentown-Bethlehem and Scranton districts was routed through Easton to Hackettstown and out of New Jersey and back into Pennsylvania through Easton. After these operations had been carried on for a period of nearly a year the Public Service Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania found that these operations were intrastate in their essential character and fined A. Blackmore Transportation Company, Inc., for violating the Public Service Company Law of Pennsylvania ( 66 P.S. § 1 et seq.) and issued a cease and desist order against the company and against the several Blackmores. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which sustained the decision of the Public Service Commission, as will appear upon an examination of the opinion in Blackmore v. Public Service Commission, 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused an appeal, and an attempt to litigate the matter further in the federal courts failed in the first instance by the action of this court, 12 F. Supp. 751. An appeal lodged in the Supreme Court was dismissed upon motion of the Commission, 299 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 757, 81 L.Ed. 455. Later Hackettstown, Washington and Belvidere, New Jersey, were abandoned as transfer points and in lieu thereof a garage and facilities for transfer was established at Bridgeville, New Jersey. Hackettstown is approximately twenty-five miles and Bridgeville about five miles from the Pennsylvania border.
The obvious intent of the Interstate Commerce Commission's certificate is to permit a carrier to engage in interstate commerce and regulation of such service is the extent of the Commission's jurisdiction. Moreover, interstate commerce, to be entitled to protection as such "must be real and bona fide": Blackmore et al. v. Public Service Commission, 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115. Tacking of the authority in the present case, under certificate MC 4963 to that or certificate MC 4963 Sub 7 was entirely proper in establishing through routes in interstate commerce [Cf. 49 U.S.C.A. § 316(c)] but such tacking cannot supply a carrier with authority to transport property in intrastate commerce. Service Storage Transfer Co. v.Commonwealth of Virginia, supra.
Accordingly our Public Utility Commission had jurisdiction also to determine whether the carriage of sugar across the State line in this case was a mere subterfuge to evade the regulatory authority of this State. We quoted the applicable principle in Blackmore et al. v. P.S.C., 120 Pa. Super. 437, 448, 183 A. 115, thus: "`Interstate commerce, in order to be entitled to the protection of the federal Constitution, must be real and bona fide. The question whether it is so is open to inquiry. . . . But the commerce thus protected is real commerce. It has never been held, and we believe never intended, that a mere fiction of interstate commerce may be so availed of as to deprive a state of its power to enforce sound regulation of the use of its highways in intrastate commerce': Inter-City Coach Co. v. Atwood, 21 Fed. (2d) 83, 85. (Appeal refused by Supreme Court, 278 U.S. 663.) As we have indicated, the question of subterfuge is one of fact to be determined by the commission. . . .
Klawansky v. P.S.C., 123 Pa. Super. 375, 187 A. 248. Although pure questions of fact are for the Commission and not for this court, sufficient legally competent evidence is necessary to support findings of fact by the Commission and to sustain its order. Borough of Franklin v. P.S.C., 73 Pa. Super. 294; Blackmore et al. v. P.S.C. et al., 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115; Latrobe Water Company v. P.S.C., 123 Pa. Super. 21, 27, 186 A. 294, 296": Cage v.P.S.C., 125 Pa. Super. 330, 189 A. 896. The cut-off device in operation does not restrict a subscriber to one call of six minutes with another station. It merely interrupts the service and a warning tone is sounded one minute before the cut-off.
Whether such transportation is bona fide interstate commerce or a subterfuge is primarily an administrative question involving facts to be determined by the Commission. If, as here, there is sufficient evidence to support its findings we do not interfere therewith. It is not our duty to exercise our independent judgment as no question of confiscation is involved: SolarElectric Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission etal., 137 Pa. Super. 325, 354, 9 A.2d 447. We are limited in determining whether there is any error of law or lack of evidence to support the order of the Commission or violation of any constitutional right: Public Utility Law, § 1107, Article XI, P.L. 1053, 66 P. S. § 1437; Nevin Bus Lines, Inc. et al. v. PublicService Commission et al., 120 Pa., Superior Ct. 266, 269, 182 A. 80; Blackmore et al. v. Public Service Commission et al., 120 Pa. Super. 437, 448, 183 A. 115. Appellant contends also that the transportation complained of comes under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the Pennsylvania Commission's order imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The provisional order of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing interstate commerce between certain fixed termini certainly cannot be construed as granting authority to appellant to engage in the kind of transportation here questioned nor does it interfere with the Pennsylvania Commission's jurisdiction.
The liquor was not being transported into or through Pennsylvania for the purpose of delivery in New Jersey. Appellee testified that it was bought in New Jersey for delivery and use in New Jersey. He brought it into Pennsylvania, according to his story, not for the purpose of a more convenient delivery to some point in New Jersey, but to meet and pick up his wife, and when he had done so, it was his intention to go back to Camden and thence to Millville, which is almost due south of Camden and most conveniently reached from central Philadelphia by way of that city. See Blackmore v.P.S.C., 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115; Waer Bus Co. v.P.S.C., 117 Pa. Super. 514, 517, 178 A. 157. His legal conclusion is likewise unsound. In support of it he cites an excerpt from our opinion in Com. v. One Dodge Motor Truck, 123 Pa. Super. 311, 330, 331, 187 A. 461, affirmed in 326 Pa. 120, 191 A. 590, where we said: "As nothing to the contrary appears in the case we may take it for granted that Transcontinental Carriers, Inc. [which transported the five cartons in question from Louisville, Ky. to Pittsburgh, Pa.] was legally authorized to transport these liquors from Louisville, Kentucky, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Had it continued their transportation from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to Baltimore, Maryland — without such detention at Pittsburgh, for the use and profit of the owners, as to subject it to the police power of this Commonwealth (General Oil Co. v. Crain, supra, [ 209 U.S. 211]) — it would not have been in violation of any law of this Commonwealth and the whiskey would not have been subject to seizure, co
Klawanskyv. P.S.C., 123 Pa. Super. 375, 187 A. 248. Although pure questions of fact are for the commission and not for this court, sufficient legally competent evidence is necessary to support findings of fact by the commission and to sustain its order. Borough ofFranklin v. P.S.C., 73 Pa. Super. 294; Blackmore et al. v.P.S.C. et al., 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115; LatrobeWater Company v. P.S.C., 123 Pa. Super. 21, 27, 186 A. 294, 296. We have frequently stated that the extent of competition in intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy which the Legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission; that this question is primarily an administrative one which must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; that its determination or order, if based on competent and relevant evidence, should not, and will not, be disturbed by this court, except where the order appealed from is clearly unreasonable or not in conformity with law, or shows an abuse of discretion. Hubert et al v.P.S.C., 118 Pa. Super. 128, 180 A. 23; Beaver ValleyService Co. v. P.S.C. et al., 122 Pa. Super. 221, 186 A. 304; York Motor Express Co. et al. v. P.S.C., 111 Pa. Super. 169, 169 A. 396; Steward v. P.S.C., 119 Pa. Super. 353, 181 A. 329; Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al. v. P.S.C., 124 Pa. Supe
. . . Although a shipment does not lose its character as interstate commerce when, for reasons of necessity or convenience, the course of the shipment is interrupted, delivery of a product into a state ceases being in interstate commerce when it has come to rest at a given point. Blackmore v. Public Service Commission, 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115 (1935).National Retail Transportation, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 109 Pa. Commw. 72, 82-83, 530 A.2d 987, 992 (1987).
Although a shipment does not lose its character as interstate commerce when, for reasons of necessity or convenience, the course of the shipment is interrupted, delivery of a product into a state ceases being in interstate commerce when it has to come to rest at a given point. Blackmore v. Puzerc Service Commission, 120 Pa. Super. 437, 183 A. 115 (1935). Here, the manufacturing process employed under the direction of the shipper, evidences the fact that the rolls of materials came to rest in Pennsylvania thereby destroying the continuity required to sustain a finding of interstate commerce.