Opinion
No. 3:02cv0088 AS
July 31, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On January 31, 2002, pro se petitioner, Juan Cardell Blackmon-El, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison (ISP) in Michigan City, Indiana, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Response filed on behalf of the respondent by the Attorney General of Indiana on June 20, 2002, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The petitioner filed a Traverse on July 17, 2002, which this Court has carefully examined.
The petitioner is a convicted felon serving a sentence imposed by a court in the State of Indiana. The issue here involves a prison disciplinary conviction that also implicated the habitual conduct rule. The sanctions were 180 days of earned credit time and a credit class demotion from I to II. That certainly implicates Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). These proceedings were had in November, 2001 and following. There appears to be compliance with the procedural mandates of Wolff.
It is alleged in the papers filed in this case that this petitioner has been found guilty of four Class C violations of prison rules within the last six months. He was screened, entered a plea of not guilty, requested a lay advocate, requested law books which physical evidence he later waived. He did not request witnesses. No additional evidence or witness statements were requested. The Conduct Adjustment Board (CAB) based its decision on evidence, conduct reports, staff reports, and the statement of the offender, and the petitioner was found guilty as a rule violator on November 14, 2001. As indicated, the 180 days, loss of earned time credit and demotion of credit class implicated Wolff. The administrative review involved no modification of the sanctions.
There appears to be an issue raised in the administrative appeal for the first time which would appear to run afoul of Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992). His other issues can be dealt with summarily.
The focus here is not on violations of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). See also Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002). The collateral review that is envisioned by § 2254 focuses on violations of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. See Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 489 U.S. 1088 (1989).
Under the current evidentiary standards beginning with Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), and continuing with such cases as Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2000 WL 1512783 (U.S.), McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999), and Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1996), there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the CAB here. The some evidence test, certainly as interpreted in Webb has been met here.
All of the four conduct violations were separate incidents. It is not for this Court to wade through each of them and re-weigh the evidence. The weighing of the evidence is basically with the CAB. This petitioner has not made a showing of the impartiality of the CAB under Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). See also Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995). It is not required for this CAB to write an appellate court decision in the fashion of the Supreme Court of the United States, but it simply has to reports its decision in a way that can be read and understood, and that was done here.
When it is all said and done, there is no basis for relief here presented under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Such is now DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS SO ORDERED.