Opinion
No. CV09-4020232S
February 9, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On July 23, 2009, the plaintiff, Glenn Blackmann, initiated this action against the defendant, Martin Denihan, by way of a two-count complaint sounding in unjust enrichment and breach of a separation agreement, respectively. Specifically, the complaint alleges that: (1) the plaintiff and Lori Blackmann were parties to a separation agreement (the agreement) which was made a final judgment in their marriage dissolution action on January 12, 2000; (2) the agreement provided that Ms. Blackmann was to maintain an unencumbered life insurance policy (the policy) of at least $100,000, naming the plaintiff as trustee and their minor children as beneficiaries until they attained the age of nineteen years; (3) the agreement furthermore provided that in the event that the policy was not maintained for the benefit of the children at the time of Ms. Blackmann's death, any shortfall, or the full amount of $100,000, would be chargeable to her estate; (4) Ms. Blackmann initially complied with this term of the agreement, but later changed the beneficiary on the policy at issue to her second husband, the defendant, Martin Denihan; (5) Ms. Blackmann died intestate and in continued violation of the agreement on July 24, 2006; and (6) the plaintiff's claim against Ms. Blackmann's estate remains wholly unsatisfied. The plaintiff seeks a constructive trust on "the proceeds of any and all life insurance policies insuring the life of [Ms. Blackmann] paid to the defendant to which [the] plaintiff is entitled" and attorneys fees pursuant to the terms of the breached agreement.
Before the court is the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that he was neither unjustly enriched nor in privity of contract with the plaintiff, and therefore, could not be liable under either count.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[I]n determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 31,. 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117, 889 A.2d 810 (2006). "[I]t does [not, however,] admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
In the present case, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint should be stricken because neither count states sufficient facts to sustain a cause of action. Specifically, the defendant argues that count one is legally insufficient insofar as it fails to: (1) identify the manner in which the defendant was benefitted; and (2) demonstrate that the failure of the defendant to pay the plaintiff was unjust or to the plaintiff's detriment. Additionally, the defendant argues that count two should be stricken because he could not be liable on an agreement that he was not a party to. The plaintiff counters, arguing that a constructive trust may arise to prevent a named beneficiary on a life insurance policy from collecting death-benefits when there is already a binding Superior Court judgment vesting the interest in those proceeds to another. After careful consideration of both parties' arguments and the pertinent legal authorities, the court finds that the facts as alleged support a theory of unjust enrichment, but not a breach of separation agreement.
Significantly, the plaintiff makes no argument in his memorandum of law regarding the legal sufficiency of count two of his complaint.
Unjust Enrichment
"[W]herever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract, restitution of the value of what has been given must be allowed . . . Under such circumstances, the basis of the plaintiff's recovery is the unjust enrichment of the defendant . . . A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another . . . With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard . . . Unjust enrichment is, consistent with the principles of equity, a broad and flexible remedy . . . Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefitted, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment . . .
"This doctrine is based upon the principle that one should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another but should be required to make restitution of or for property received, retained or appropriated . . . The question is: Did [the party liable], to the detriment of someone else, obtain something of value to which [the party liable] was not entitled?" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 433, 451-52, 970 A.2d 952 (2009).
"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another should be required to make restitution of or for what was received." Franks v. Lockwood, 146 Conn. 273, 146, 150 A.2d 215 (1959). See also Restatement, Restitution 1. " The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jarvis v. Lieder, 117 Conn.App. 129, 144, 978 A.2d 106 (2009). Such is the device that the plaintiff in the present case seeks to employ, by which he can prevent what he contends to be the defendant's unjust enrichment.
"Our general standards governing the imposition of a constructive trust are well established. [A] constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy . . . Moreover, the party sought to be held liable for a constructive trust must have engaged in conduct that wrongfully harmed the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendell Corp. Trustee v. Thurston, 239 Conn. 109, 113-14, 680 A.2d 1314 (1996).
While there does not appear to be any case law at the Appellate level addressing the specific issue implicated by the present matter, the court finds the legal analysis and logic employed in Hunter v. Hunter, 41 Conn.Sup. 289, 570 A.2d 246 (1989), persuasive. In Hunter, the plaintiffs were the children of divorced parents who had a similar life insurance provision included in their dissolution of marriage agreement. As in the present case, that agreement later became the judgment of the court in the dissolution action. Sometime after the divorce, the plaintiffs' father remarried, changing the beneficiary on his life insurance policy from his children to his new spouse, the defendant. Before the plaintiffs attained the age of majority, their father died, and, in accordance with the insurance contract, the insurance company paid the defendant the policy proceeds. The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit through their mother and next friend, seeking a constructive trust on said proceeds on the ground that restitution was warranted because the defendant would otherwise be unjustly enriched.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that it was "evident that when the plaintiffs' mother and father entered into a stipulated agreement for their dissolution, which was entered as a judgment, they both furnished consideration for that agreement, which was consideration for the children being named beneficiaries of the life insurance. It [followed] therefrom that they acquired a vested equitable interest in the policy on his death, which [was] the basis for a constructive trust of the policy proceeds. In removing the children as beneficiaries of the policy, the decedent violated the judgment of the Superior Court and that constituted fraud." The court went on, stating that the "defendant should not be allowed to become unjustly enriched as a result of the decedent's violation of the dissolution decree," and finding that a constructive trust was established for the plaintiffs' benefit.
Indeed, "[t]he cases are legion in which wives or children who were removed as beneficiaries of life insurance policies in violation of the terms of separation agreements or divorce judgments have been permitted to recover the proceeds of such policies either from the improperly substituted beneficiaries or, where the proceeds had not been paid out, from the insurers. By reason of the power typically reserved by the terms of the policy to the insured to change beneficiaries, the insured has the right as against the insurer to change beneficiaries; but by virtue of a separation agreement or divorce judgment which provides that the insured shall not exercise that power, he has no such right as between himself and the parties to the agreement or judgment . . . The beneficiary, in such a case, has a vested equitable interest." (Citation omitted.) 13 Mass.App.Ct. 340, 342-43, 433 N.E.2d 92 (1982).
In the present case, the facts as pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint are almost identical to those established in Hunter, except that the .instant suit was filed by the first husband against the second, whereas in the former action the children were the primary plaintiffs and the defendant was a second wife. Accordingly, in adopting the analysis as set forth in that case, the court finds that count one, when construed in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, presents a valid claim for unjust enrichment with a resulting constructive trust arising. Any other finding would be unjust and inequitable.
Breach of Dissolution Agreement
Count two of the plaintiff's complaint essentially charges the defendant with breaching the original dissolution agreement between the plaintiff and his late wife. "It is axiomatic [however] that a party cannot be liable for breaching a contract with another party unless a contract exists between the parties that could be breached." (Emphasis added.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 411, 722 A.2d 271 (1999). Accordingly, because the defendant was not a party to the agreement, and therefore was not in privity of contract with the plaintiff, he cannot be liable for a purported breach thereof. The motion to strike count two is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint is denied as to count one and granted as to count two.