Opinion
2013 CA 0652
03-19-2014
HAROLD JOE BLACK v. WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTER'S ARP OFFICER, MONA HEYSE, ET AL.
Harold Joe Black Winnfield, LA Plaintiff-Appellant In Proper Person William L. Kline Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court
Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Docket No. 612,650, Section 24
Honorable R. Michael Caldwell, Judge Presiding
Harold Joe Black
Winnfield, LA
Plaintiff-Appellant
In Proper Person
William L. Kline
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellee
Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections
BEFORE: PARRO, GUI DRY, AND DRAKE, JJ.
PARRO, J.
Harold Joe Black, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC), housed at Winn Correctional Center (Winn) in Winnfield, Louisiana, appeals a judgment of the district court that dismissed his petition for judicial review without service and without prejudice. Based on our review of the record, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2012, Mr. Black filed a petition for judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (19th JDC), seeking review of Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) Number WNC-2005-86. In WNC-2005-86, he claimed that Winn's administrative screening officer, Mona Heyse, used the wrong date on ARP WNC-2004-1538, causing it to be dismissed as untimely. WNC-2005-86 was filed with prison authorities on December 30, 2004, but was placed on backlog and never proceeded to a final step response. In his petition for judicial review, Mr. Black claimed the administrative screening officer abused her position by tampering with his legal mail and interfering with the administrative process in various ways in 2003 and 2004. He sought immediate release from incarceration, as well as monetary damages.
Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:1178(A), the matter was assigned for screening to a commissioner at the 19th JDC, who submitted a report to the district court on the merits of the case. The commissioner's report determined that Mr. Black's arguments were without merit and recommended that his appeal be dismissed at his cost without service and without prejudice. After a careful de novo review, the district court adopted the commissioner's recommendation and rendered judgment on September 17, 2012. The judgment dismissed the appeal without service and without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, failure to state a cause of action for habeas relief, and failure to file a damage claim in the mandatory venue. Mr. Black filed an application for writs to this court, which was "granted for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the district court with instructions to grant the relator an appeal ... ." Black v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 12-2113 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/13/13) (unpublished writ action). On remand, on consideration of this court's order, the district court granted an appeal.
The office of commissioner of the 19th JDC was created by LSA-R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. LSA-R.S. 13:713(A). The district judge "may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings or recommendations made by the commissioner and also may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions." LSA-R.S. 13:713(C)(5); Abbott v. LeBlanc, 12-1476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/25/13), 115 So.3d 504, 505 n.1. The court performs an initial screening review of the petition to determine if it states a cognizable claim or fails to state a cause of action. See LSA-R.S. 15:1178; Plaisance v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 10-1249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/11/11), 57 So.3d 593, 594 n.2.
APPLICABLE LAW
The procedures set out in the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:1171-1179 (the Act), provide the exclusive remedy available to inmates to preserve a cause of action against DPSC or its employees, including a claim for monetary relief. LSA-R.S. 15:1171 & 1172; Blackwell v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 96-0954 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/97), 690 So.2d 137, 140-41, writ denied, 97-1158 (La. 9/5/97), 700 So.2d 507. A state court is precluded from entertaining an inmate's complaint that falls under the purview of the Act until the inmate has exhausted the remedies provided to him by the procedure. If an inmate fails to timely pursue administrative remedies through the procedure established by the statute, any petition he files must be dismissed. Id. at 143-44; LSA-R.S. 15:1172(B) & (C).
Section 325 of Title 22, Part I of the Louisiana Administrative Code (the Code) outlines the rules and procedures to be followed in formally addressing inmate complaints in adult institutions in Louisiana. The Code requires inmates to use the two-step ARP before they can proceed with a suit in federal or state court. See LSA-R.S. 15:1176; LAC 22:I.325(D)(1); Dickens v. Louisiana Corr. Inst. for Women, 11-0176 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So.3d 70, 74; Edwards v. Bunch, 07-1421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So.2d 149, 152-53. When an inmate has initiated the first step of an ARP, the warden shall respond within 40 days from the date the request is received at the first step, using the first step response. LAC 22:I.325(J)(1)(a)(ii). At each stage of decision and review, the inmate will be provided written answers that explain the information gathered or the reason for the decision reached, along with simple directions for obtaining further review. LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(vii). If an inmate submits multiple requests during the review of a previous request, they will be logged and set aside for handling at such time as the request currently in the system has been exhausted at the second step or until time limits to proceed from the first step to the second step have lapsed. LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(ix). Subsection (J)(1)(c) provides that no more than 90 days shall elapse from the initiation to completion of the process, unless an extension has been granted and that "[a]bsent such an extension, expiration of response time limits shall entitle the offender to move on to the next step in the process."
Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177 sets forth the appropriate standard for judicial review of administrative decisions of DPSC and limits judicial review to issues presented in the petition for judicial review and the administrative remedy request. McCoy v. Stalder, 99-1747 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/22/00), 770 So.2d 447, 451. A reviewing court may reverse or modify the administrative decision only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative decisions or findings are (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law, (5) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion, or (6) manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Id.; LSA-R.S. 15:1177(A)(9).
In Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, 721, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the Act were unconstitutional to the extent that they divested the district courts of original jurisdiction over tort actions filed by inmates against DPSC and its employees. Subsequent to Pope, the Legislature amended portions of the Act by 2002 La. Acts, 1st Extraordinary Session, No. 89, § 2, effective April 18, 2002, changing the applicable procedure by allowing the filing of an original civil action in district court after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Dickens, 77 So.3d at 73 n.1; Walker v. Appurao, 09-0821 (La. App 1st Cir. 10/23/09), 29 So.3d 575, 577, writ denied, 09-2822 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So.3d 1010. Pursuant to the amended version of the Act, an inmate is required to initiate administrative remedies for a delictual action for injury or damages within ninety days from the day the injury or damage is sustained. See LSA-R.S. 15:1172(B)(1). If the inmate fails to timely initiate or pursue his administrative remedy, the delictual claim is considered abandoned, and any subsequent suit asserting such a claim shall be dismissed with prejudice. LSA-R.S. 15:1172(C). Once an administrative decision regarding a delictual action is rendered, the inmate then has the right to file his claim as an original civil action in the appropriate district court. See LSA-R.S. 15:1177(C); Dickens, 77 So.3d at 73 n.1; see also Jackson v. State, 11-1716 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/23/12), 92 So.3d 391, 396, writ granted, 12-0912 (La. 6/22/12), 90 So.3d 1069; and Peterson v. Hanson, 03-1448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 32, 34. Accordingly, when an inmate fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court and the appellate court lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the claim. Dickens, 77 So.3d at 75-76; Walker, 29 So.3d at 577; see also Swanson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 01-1066 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 837 So.2d 634, 637.
However, this court has ruled that when DPSC has effectively precluded an inmate from proceeding to a review by the district court by failing to issue its decision as directed by the ARP provisions, the administrative remedies will be considered to have been pursued by the inmate to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances, and the inmate will be allowed to seek a legal remedy in the district court or to have the matter remanded for consideration by DPSC. See Sims v. Wackenhut Health Services, Inc., 97-1147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/20/98), 708 So.2d 1140, 1143, writ denied. 98-0747 (La. 5/1/98), 718 So.2d 417; see also Edwards, 985 So.2d at 155; Wallace v. GEO Group, Inc., 11-0863 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/1/12), 84 So.3d 750, 756.
DISCUSSION
The commissioner's screening report summarized this case as follows:
The Petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, filed this appeal of ARP-WNC-2005-86, seeking review in accordance with [LSA-] R.S. 15:1171 et seq. However, on the face of [the Petition for Judicial Review] form, he acknowledges
that he has not obtained a final administrative decision, and yet, he seeks relief on the merits—i.e. immediate release and damages for alleged tampering by corrections officers with his ARP complaint evidence in ARP-WNC-2004-248 (an ARP that is not the one being appealed herein). This Court's jurisdiction over administrative complaints is appellate only, and thus, an appellate record is required before any relief can be granted on the merits. There is no proof in the record that the Petitioner has completed the ARP process in WNC-[2005-86], In addition, this is a claim based on alleged delictual actions of prison personnel. Thus, even if exhausted, [LSA-] R.S. 15:1177C prohibits this court from considering the complaint in an administrative appeal. In fact, the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] requires any suit filed on this complaint be filed in the mandatory venue where the Petitioner was assigned—which would be Winn Parish.
Pursuant to the screening requirements of law, and in accordance with [LSA-] R.S. 1172C and [LSA-] R.S. 15:1176, the petition has been reviewed and found to be premature. Both statutes require dismissal of any complaint that has not been completed through the administrative process. This report is issued for the Court's de novo review of the petition and attachments, recommending dismissal without service based on a failure to exhaust, resulting in a lack of subject matter (appellate) jurisdiction.
* * *
At this juncture in the proceedings, this Court has no authority to consider merits of this complaint, nor to authorize immediate release or monetary damages, even if the Petitioner could state a cause of action for such, which he does not in this petition. ... [T]he Petitioner is required to file a claim for damages as an ordinary suit in the original jurisdiction of the Winn Parish district court. (Footnote omitted.)
The record includes an affidavit from a DPSC paralegal, certifying that attached copies of ARP Nos. WNC-2004-1538 (rejected on 10/25/04, as being submitted untimely), WNC-2005-86 (placed on backlog 12/30/04), and a related disciplinary board appeal of WNC-2004-284, were true and correct copies of the administrative proceedings of the DPSC. These documents demonstrate that WNC-2005-86 did not proceed to a final administrative decision, because it was "placed on backlog."
In this appeal, Black argues that because DPSC did not respond to his ARP within the time required by its rules, the ninety days elapsed, and the district court erred in dismissing his petition for judicial review for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Black also made other arguments concerning his failure to state causes of action for habeas corpus relief and for damages. Because we agree with his argument concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies, we pretermit his other assignments of error. We note for Black's benefit, however, that if and when he tries to raise those claims again, the grounds for such relief must be clearly stated in the ARP and in the petition for judicial review, not just in his memorandum, and those grounds must directly relate to the single ARP that is being reviewed, not to other ARPs that have been ruled on in the past. Inmates may not challenge multiple ARPs in one petition for judicial review. Lightfoot v. Stalder, 97-2626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/98), 727 So.2d 553, 555.
Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with Black. DPSC did not follow its guidelines requiring it to advise him that his ARP was being processed or denied. The prison records show that WNC-2005-86 was placed on backlog, presumably under the authority of LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(ix), which allows an ARP to be logged and set aside if an inmate submits multiple requests during the review of a previous request. However, WNC-2005-86 apparently was never put back into the system for a response. Black states that his signature on a copy of a log book kept by Ash Unit's manager, Ms. Booker, shows that his ARP was formally received by DPSC on January 26, 2005, and therefore, the ninety days commenced on that date. However, this signature page from the log book is not labeled; there is nothing in the way of a title or description to show that it relates to the dates on which various inmates' ARPs were received. More importantly, there is no indication on this form or anywhere else in the record that WNC-2005-86 was ever assigned to a staff member for handling, as required by LAC 22:I.325(I)(1). Under that provision, the time limits for responses begin on the date the request is assigned to a staff member for a first step response. Nevertheless, since WNC-2005-86 concerns an incident date of October 25, 2004, and was filed on December 30, 2004, it is obvious that all the time limits described in the DPSC rules have lapsed with no action from DPSC on Black's ARP. The record does not show any extension of the time limits. Therefore, since the response time limits have long ago expired, Black is entitled to move on to the next step in the process, under the authority of LAC 22:I.325(J)(1)(c). We conclude that Black's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the administrative process was thwarted by DPSC's failure to follow its own rules.
Ash Unit is one of the dormitories at Winn.
If this court had a complete record of action taken by DPSC at each step of the ARP, we would have a basis for judicial review of that process. However, there is no such record for this court to review. Arguments made to this court in briefs are not evidence, and this court cannot take new evidence from attachments to briefs. All evidence on which WNC-2005-86 is based must be presented to DPSC at some step in the administrative review process. Therefore, in order to allow Black to present all relevant evidence, including whatever grounds he beiieves he has for habeas relief and monetary damages, we must vacate the district court's judgment and order the remand of this matter for DPSC to complete the ARP regarding WNC-2005-86. If Black is not satisfied upon completion of that process, he will have the right to file his claims for habeas corpus relief and for damages in the appropriate district court.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the September 17, 2012 judgment is vacated. We remand this matter to the district court with instructions to remand the case to DPSC in accordance with LSA-R.S. 15:1177(A)(8), for the processing of Black's complaints in accordance with the appropriate administrative procedures. No cost assessment is made at this time.
JUDGMENT VACATED; CASE REMANDED.