Black v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America

10 Citing cases

  1. Adele E. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield

    CIVIL NO. 2:15-CV-01-DBH (D. Me. Jun. 30, 2016)

    Prejudgment interest shall therefore run from November 26, 2013, until the date of entry of judgment in this case, June 30, 2016. See also Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (D. Me. 2004); Curtin v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 298 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158-59 (D. Me. 2004). 2.

  2. Giroux v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co.

    353 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Me. 2005)   Cited 5 times
    Finding that because the complete administrative record was properly before the Court, evaluation of the denial of benefits claim could be resolved on the existing record through summary judgment

    Accordingly, prejudgment interest shall accrue from that date, and continue until the date of entry of judgment in this case. See Black v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (D. Me. 2004). Interest shall be calculated based on the federal prime rate for the period in question, compounded daily.Id. Historic daily prime rates are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/d/prime.txt.

  3. Adele E. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield

    183 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Me. 2016)   Cited 6 times
    In Adele E. v. Anthem Blue Cross, 183 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Me. 2016), the Court reviewed the denial of benefits under a group health plan.

    (3) An award of attorney fees and costs in this case is an important deterrent measure: first, because of the limited remedy available to ERISA plaintiffs like Adele E., insurers should not have an incentive to deny meritorious claims with the hope that some claimants will not sue; and "second, because an award of attorney fees ensures that attorneys continue to take on ERISA cases in which the potential monetary award may be limited." Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F.Supp.2d 206, 219 (D.Me.2004).(4) The success of this suit confers a benefit on plan participants generally because of my determination that discretionary clauses like the one in Anthem's Certificate of Coverage are invalid under Maine law, and thus review in federal court is de novo.

  4. Shore v. Painewebber Long Term Disability Plan

    Case No. 04-CV-4152 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    See Weiss, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 612-13 (holding that it was arbitrary for the plan administrator to look "at the broad category of 'teacher' rather than a more specific descriptive category of teachers"); Peck, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (holding that it was arbitrary for plan administrator to categorize plaintiff as a general nurse, instead of considering her duties as an operating room nurse); Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217-18 (D. Me. 2004) (requiring re-classification of DOT category where plaintiff's actual job duties required heavier work than category chosen by insurance company). Reliance is particularly critical of one line (out of many) in Plaintiff's own job description, wherein she mentions, "[d]aily transportation to and from work, subway, taxi and walking."

  5. Curran v. Camden Nat. Corp.

    497 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D. Me. 2007)

    As the fourth factor suggests, the more common scenario is where a prevailing plaintiff, often a plan beneficiary, seeks attorney's fees from the losing defendant, an insurer or plan administrator. See, e.g., Beauvais v. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc., 418 F.Supp.2d 22, 33 (D.R.I.2006) (noting that it "would be a pyrrhic victory, indeed, if [the plaintiff] were awarded the benefits that were improperly denied but was required to pay, from the benefits, the attorney's fees incurred in pursuing the appeal."); Giroux v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 353 F.Supp.2d 45, 54 (D.Me.2005); Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F.Supp.2d 206, 220 (D.Me.2004) ("Having weighed each of these factors, the Court concludes that an award of attorney's fees is proper in this case and ensures that Plaintiffs victory is not merely a Pyrrhic one."); Curtin v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 298 F.Supp.2d 149, 158 (D.Me.2004). Nevertheless, the "five factor approach allows for award of fees to defendants in proper cases."

  6. Wilson v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston

    No. CV-04-1373-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. Jul. 20, 2006)

    Id. at *19-20. See also McLeod v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 02-4295, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19242, *25 (E.D. Pa.) (awarding benefits for the twenty-four months of own occupation disability but remanding to the plan administrators the issue of whether McLeod could perform any occupation); Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 218 (D. Me. 2004) (same). Thus, it would be improper for the court to award benefits beyond the "own occupation" disability period.

  7. Boudreau v. Hartford Life Accident Insurance Company

    No. 1:04CV348 (D. Vt. Sep. 2, 2005)

    Viewed objectively, this denial of benefits, otherwise based little more than a "got cha" rationale that the plaintiff did not appear for a unilaterally scheduled examination, see Paper 11 at 21, is not rationally-based and appears to be prompted by considerations unrelated to any improvement in the plaintiff's ability to work.See, e.g., Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 (D. Me. 2004) ("In this Court's assessment, Dr. DiDonna's review is not reliable and it was unreasonable for Unum to rely on this review while ignoring (without explanation) the other medical information contained in the administrative record that overwhelmingly suggested that Black's condition had not improved to the extent that he could perform the material duties of his occupation."). Conclusion

  8. Marquez-Massas v. Squibb Mfg., Inc.

    344 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D.P.R. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    In Marquez-Massas, the fact that the contract holder was named as the administrator was irrelevant as it was clear that the insurance company performed actual claims administration.

    On the other hand, in applying a de novo standard the court will examine whether the determination was incorrect or mistaken as opposed to unreasonable. Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 324 F.Supp.2d 206, 210 (D.Me. 2004); Deal v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 222 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2002). De novo review "allows the court to substitute its decision for that of the plan administrator." Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 Am. U. L.Rev. 1083, 1084 (June, 2001).

  9. Baxter v. Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc.

    C. A. PB 11-7086 (R.I. Super. Jan. 2, 2014)

    This Court finds that WTB, as a holding company and non-party to any of the relationships from which the alleged misconduct originated, should be dismissed from the suit. See Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F.Supp.2d 206, 214-15 (D. Me. 2004) (granting summary judgment on behalf of holding company when no evidence or argument existed to prove that holding company, as opposed to subsidiary, committed wrongful acts). Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to refute WTC's evidence that WTB was not a party to any of the contractual relationships and failed to set forth any evidence to show that WTB was involved in any of the alleged negligent activity.

  10. Baxter v. Wash. Trust Bancorp, Inc.

    C.A. No. PB 11-7086 (R.I. Super. Jan. 2, 2014)

    This Court finds that WTB, as a holding company and non-party to any of the relationships from which the alleged misconduct originated, should be dismissed from the suit. See Black v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214-15 (D. Me. 2004) (granting summary judgment on behalf of holding company when no evidence or argument existed to prove that holding company, as opposed to subsidiary, committed wrongful acts). Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to refute WTC's evidence that WTB was not a party to any of the contractual relationships and failed to set forth any evidence to show that WTB was involved in any of the alleged negligent activity.