In construing a statute, it is this court's primary duty to determine the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt (1941), 139 Ohio St. 100, 22 O.O. 63, 38 N.E.2d 403; State, ex rel. Myers, v. Bd. of Edn. (1917), 95 Ohio St. 367, 116 N.E. 516. R.C. 145.02 was enacted by the General Assembly in order to prevent dual contributions. The exclusionary language is designed to prevent different kinds of public employees from having to mandatorily contribute to more than one retirement system.
It is this court's duty to begin the task of statutory construction where the legislature began: with a determination of the purpose of the legislation. See Ohio Dental Hygienists Assn. v. Ohio State Dental Bd. (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 21, 21 OBR 282, 487 N.E.2d 301 (word "rule" in R.C. 4715.39 construed as unambiguous, giving effect to legislative intent); Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt (1941), 139 Ohio St. 100, 22 O.O. 63, 38 N.E.2d 403. Only after the general scheme or purpose of the statute is discerned can the disputed terms be read in context. This preliminary analysis must occur before a specific ambiguity can be found.
{¶ 9} We remain careful, however, not to "pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context." Black–Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). We instead focus on everything within "the four corners of the enactment" in order to "determine the intent of the enacting body."
This would be contrary to the basic tenets of statutory construction requiring that intent be derived from the four corners of the statute. Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt (1941), 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 22 O.O. 63, 65, 38 N.E.2d 403, 405; Humphrys v. Winous Co. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 45, 49, 59 O.O. 65, 67, 133 N.E.2d 780, 782-783. In general terms, R.C. 1701.95 was enacted to subject a director to joint and several liability to the corporation if the director votes for, or assents to, the making or payment of a loan, dividend or distribution of a corporate asset that is either contrary to law, or contrary to the corporation's articles of incorporation.
5. Where advance payments are made by a buyer upon the purchase price of engines under construction but not completed, and where the purpose of the advance payments is to furnish working capital to the seller-manufacturer in order to facilitate the progress and efficiency of the manufacture, which advance payments are to be liquidated by the production of the engines, such advance payments may not be listed by the manufacturer as current accounts payable, under Section 5327, General Code, even though the buyer has the right to cancel the contract for the manufacture of engines, without default on the part of the manufacturer, and receive back the unliquidated portions of the advance payments. ( Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, Tax Commr., 139 Ohio St. 100, approved and followed.) 6. Where, in the above situation, the manufacturer has made advance payments to his subcontractors under similar terms and arrangements as those by which he received advance payments from his buyer, a decision by the Board of Tax Appeals that the unliquidated portions of such advance payments by the manufacturer to his subcontractors constitute current accounts receivable, under Section 5327, General Code, is unreasonable and unlawful.
Although we find no North Carolina decisions on point, two cases from the state of Ohio are pertinent. In Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941), the court construed section 5327 of the Ohio General Code. In determining the tax due under that section, taxpayers were allowed a deduction of accounts payable from the tax base. Plaintiff had received customer advances on contracts for the manufacture of machinery and sought to deduct them as accounts payable.
We remain careful "not to ‘pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context’ " but instead focus our attention on the " ‘four corners of the enactment’ " in order to determine legislative intent. Jacobson v. Kaforey , 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8, quoting Black Clawson Co. v. Evatt , 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). If a statute is unambiguous, "inquiry into legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation, or any other factors identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate."
MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 438 N.E.2d 410 (1982), quoting Black Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). {¶ 38} R.C. 4928.02 and 4928.17 were enacted by the General Assembly in 1999 in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3 ("S.B. 3"), 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7962; id. at 7998–7999, 8018–8020.
MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 438 N.E.2d 410 (1982), quoting Black Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). {¶ 38} R.C. 4928.02 and 4928.17 were enacted by the General Assembly in 1999 in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3 ("S.B. 3"), 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7962; id. at 7998–7999, 8018–8020.
When reviewing a statute, " ‘we should not pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context.’ " MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 438 N.E.2d 410 (1982), quoting Black–Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). We must look at the four corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the legislature.