See Ex parte F.P., 857 So.2d 125 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte J.R., 896 So.2d 416 (Ala. 2004); and Ex parte T.V., 971 So.2d 1. This court has also routinely cited Beasley as stating the standard to be used in determining whether a juvenile court has properly terminated parental rights, see, e.g., A.R.E. v. E.S.W., 702 So.2d 138 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997); T.H. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 740 So.2d 1089 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998); and W.L.H. v. B.L.M., 829 So.2d 173, 174 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002), even while at least one member of the court has maintained that the statute does not require a finding of dependency. See B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109, 1120 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., dissenting). Such is the way dicta becomes entrenched as the law. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d at 958 (Maddox, J., concurring in the result).

In the present case, the juvenile court granted the parents' motion for a 14-day extension to file a postjudgment motion "and/or" a notice of appeal. The parents, however, did not file their notice of appeal within the 14-day extension granted by the juvenile court. This court has previously interpreted the supreme court's decisions in Ex parte S.W.T. and Ex parte H.F. as broadly holding that when a Rule 77(d) motion is not opposed before the trial court, any jurisdictional issue as to the timeliness of the appeal is waived and cannot be considered on appeal. See B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003);Ruzic v.State ex rel. Thornton, 866 So.2d 564 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003); and H.E.T. v. State ex rel. C.D.L., 883 So.2d 706 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (plurality opinion). However, the arguments addressed in Ex parte S.W.T. and Ex parte H.F. referred to the actual merits of the orders, i.e., the determination of whether excusable neglect — the only acceptable ground upon which an extension can be granted under Rule 77(d) — existed.

See D.M.P. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 871 So.2d 77 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (plurality opinion with two judges concurring and three judges concurring in the result). I explain the foregoing concerns in more detail in my dissent to this court's opinion in B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109, 1118 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., dissenting). Among other things, I also state in my dissent in B.J.C. my concern with the manner in which this court in A.R.E. summarized the two-pronged test to be applied in termination-of-parental-rights cases articulated in Ex parte Beasley: "In Ex parte Beasley, our Supreme Court stated:

NO OPINION. See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.; Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319; K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 653 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); C.O. v. Jefferson Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); L.T. v. W.L., 47 So. 3d 1241, 1249-50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So. 2d 1109, 1118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), overruled on other grounds, F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So. 2d 555 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); and B.M. v. State, 895 So. 2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). Thompson, P.J., and Donaldson and Hanson, JJ., concur.

" ‘[W]e note that we have previously rejected [maintenance of the status quo as a viable alternative] when grounds for termination exist and the situation is such that, in the foreseeable future, reunification will not be possible. See K.A.P. v. D.P., 11 So. 3d 812, 820 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (rejecting maintenance of the status quo when it appeared that potential reunification would be at least 10 years in the future and commenting that, in order to achieve stability and continuity for children, "appellate courts generally hold that maintaining an indefinite custody arrangement with a third party is not in the best interest of the child"); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So. 2d 1109, 1118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), overruled on other grounds, F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So. 2d 555 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (rejecting the father's argument that "maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members" was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future); A.N.S. v. K.C., 628 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (rejecting the maintenance of the status quo as an alternative to termination and noting that the father was expecting to be released from prison in seven years but that "[t]he maternal aunt and uncle were willing to adopt the children to give them a feeling of permanency and security").

NO OPINION. See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.; Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319; S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); L.T. v. W.L., 47 So. 3d 1241, 1249-50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); B.M. v. State, 895 So. 2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So. 2d 1109, 1118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); N.G. v. L.A., 790 So. 2d 262, 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); and Reuter v. Neese, 586 So. 2d 232, 235 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Donaldson, and Hanson, JJ., concur.

“ ‘[W]e note that we have previously rejected [maintenance of the status quo as a viable alternative] when grounds for termination exist and the situation is such that, in the foreseeable future, reunification will not be possible. See K.A.P. v. D.P., 11 So.3d 812, 820 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (rejecting maintenance of the status quo when it appeared that potential reunification would be at least 10 years in the future and commenting that, in order to achieve stability and continuity for children, “appellate courts generally hold that maintaining an indefinite custody arrangement with a third party is not in the best interest of the child”); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109, 1118 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), overruled on other grounds, F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So.2d 555 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (rejecting the father's argument that “maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members” was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future); A.N.S. v. K.C., 628 So.2d 734, 735 (Ala.Civ.App.1993) (rejecting the maintenance of the status quo as an alternative to termination and noting that the father was expecting to be released from prison in seven years but that “[t]he maternal aunt and uncle were willing to adopt the children to give them a feeling of permanency and security”).’ ”L.R., 78 So.3d at 443 (quoting L.T. v. W.L., 47 So.3d 1241, 1249 (Ala.Civ.App.2009)).

"'[W]e note that we have previously rejected [maintenance of the status quo as a viable alternative] when grounds for termination exist and the situation is such that, in the foreseeable future, reunification will not be possible. See K.A.P. v. D.P., 11 So. 3d 812, 820 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (rejecting maintenance of the status quo when it appeared that potential reunification would be at least 10 years in the future and commenting that, in order to achieve stability and continuity for children, 'appellate courts generally hold that maintaining an indefinite custody arrangement with a third party is not in the best interest of the child'); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So. 2d 1109, 1118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), overruled on other grounds, F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So. 2d 555 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (rejecting the father's argument that "maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members" was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future); A.N.S. v. K.C., 628 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (rejecting the maintenance of the status quo as an alternative to termination and noting that the father was expecting to be released from prison in seven years but that "[t]he maternal aunt and uncle were willing to adopt the children to give them a feeling of permanency and security").'"L.R., 78 So. 3d at 443 (quoting L.T. v. W.L., 47 So. 3d 1241, 1249 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)).

“[W]e note that we have previously rejected [maintenance of the status quo as a viable alternative] when grounds for termination exist and the situation is such that, in the foreseeable future, reunification will not be possible. See K.A.P. v. D.P., 11 So.3d 812, 820 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (rejecting maintenance of the status quo when it appeared that potential reunification would be at least 10 years in the future and commenting that, in order to achieve stability and continuity for children, ‘appellate courts generally hold that maintaining an indefinite custody arrangement with a third party is not in the best interest of the child’); B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109, 1118 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), overruled on other grounds, F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So.2d 555 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (rejecting the father's argument that ‘maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members' was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future); A.N.S. v. K.C., 628 So.2d 734, 735 (Ala.Civ.App.1993) (rejecting the maintenance of the status quo as an alternative to termination and noting that the father was expecting to be released from prison in seven years but that ‘[t]he maternal aunt and uncle were willing to adopt the children to give them a feeling of permanency and security’).” L.T. v. W.L., 47 So.3d 1241, 1249 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). In a case such at this one, where the children have been placed in the permanent custody of a relative, we are not concerned wit

The custodians, who have reared this child since his birth, desire to give the child permanency and stability, and, in light of the parents' apparent lack of desire to take responsibility for the child during the first four years of his life, we cannot disagree with the juvenile court's conclusion that no viable alternative to the termination of the parents' parental rights existed in the present case. See B.J.C. v. D.E., 874 So.2d 1109, 1118 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003), over-ruled on other grounds by F.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 988 So.2d 555 (Ala. Civ.App. 2007) (noting that the custodians who sought termination of parental rights were seeking to give the child "permanency and security" and that maintaining the status quo and permitting the parent additional time to adjust his circumstances was not a viable alternative to termination). Because the custodians established grounds for termination of the parental rights of both the mother and the father, and because the juvenile court's determination that no viable alternative to termination of those rights existed is supported by the evidence at trial and is not under-mined by the maternal grandmother's last-minute offer to assume custody of the child, the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father is affirmed.