Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-CV-9061
May 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Bibby Financial Services, Inc. ("Bibby") and a Cross-Motion for Sanctions filed by Plaintiff Bizzare Foods, Inc., d/b/a Trooper Foods, Inc. ("Bizzare"). Bibby requests an order to strike portions of an affidavit presented by Bizzare in opposition to Bibby's motion to dismiss. Bizzare, in response, contends that Bibby's request to strike seeks to increase litigation costs unnecessarily and unreasonably and, thus, requests that this Court impose sanctions. We discuss each request in turn.
Bibby requests that we strike paragraphs 12 and 14 of the affidavit of Bizzare President Anthony DeMarinis ("DeMarinis"), in which DeMarinis states that Bibby "surreptitiously" entered into an agreement with co-defendants Premium Foods, Inc. and Hezekiah Cooper, Jr. (collectively, "Premium Foods") that assigned "without right" account receivables and "wrongfully diverted" payments to Bibby that are rightfully owed to Bizzare. (Bizzare's Resp. Ex. A.) Bibby claims that DeMarinis' comments are "opinion, legal conclusions, conjecture, and speculation . . . [that] are irrelevant to any fact currently at issue," and should be disregarded by this Court in adjudicating Bibby's Motion to Dismiss. (Bibby's Mot. to Strike p. 2.) Since this Court, on May 14, 2002, denied Bibby's Motion to Dismiss, we find Bibby's request to strike as untimely and dismiss its motion as moot.
Responding to Bibby's motion to strike, Bizzare included a cross-claim for sanctions alleging that Bibby's motion is vexatious and seeks to increase litigation costs unreasonably. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a court, within its discretion, may order that:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.28 U.S.C. § 1927. These sanctions "are intended to deter an attorney from intentionally and unnecessarily delaying judicial proceedings."LaSalle National Bank v. First Connecticut Holding Group, L.L.C., 287 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2001). However, a court must exercise great caution and impose sanctions only "in instances of a serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice." Ford v. Temple Hospital, 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1986). Although we dismiss Bibby's Motion to Strike as moot, we are not presented with sufficient evidence demonstrating that Bibby intentionally acted to disrupt or delay this litigation. Thus, we do not find that sanctions are warranted.
Accordingly, based on the reasons set forth above, Bibby's Motion to Strike is DISMISSED AS MOOT and Bizzare's Cross-Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.