We also see no abuse of discretion in the judge's award of attorney's fees incurred through July 29, 2010, in connection with the contempt proceedings. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 400 Mass. 272, 276 (1987); Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 749, 753 (1994); Coppinger v. Coppinger, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 709, 714 (2003). The judge did not make specific findings on the issue of inability to pay.

75 in attorney's fees and costs to the wife for having prevailed on her counterclaim as such an award is allowed by G. L. c. 215, § 34A. See Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994). 4. Bias. The record does not support the husband's claim of bias on the part of the judge.

September 26, 1994Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749 (1994).

We need not reach the question whether Kenneth's appeal is frivolous under rule 25 because we conclude that Linda is entitled to fees under G. L. c. 215, § 34A, which "creates a presumption in favor of an award of reasonable fees and costs for a successful party in a contempt action." Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994). See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 180-182 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 272 (1987) ; T.M. v. L.H., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 856, 863-864 (2001).

Rather, his conduct demonstrates a clear intent to avoid his support obligations to his children. See Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753-754 (1994) (defendant's attempt to avoid alimony payments by manipulating his earning potential rejected by court). Compare Larson v. Larson, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 110 (1994) (husband's unanticipated decision to retire early, forgoing significant income, did not constitute grounds to reduce support awarded under divorce judgment based on higher income).

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 180-181 n. 3 (1986), S. C., 400 Mass. 272 (1987). Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994). This presumption "can be overcome only by specific findings supporting a reduction in a request for reasonable fees."

There is ample support in the record for the judge's detailed findings to the effect that Robert persistently disregarded clear and unambiguous orders contained in that judgment, and for the conclusion that Robert was in contempt of the 1985 modification judgment. Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994) (there must be a clear and unequivocal command and an equally clear and undoubted disobedience to support finding of civil contempt). We summarize the judge's findings, supplemented by occasional uncontroverted facts from the record where they assist to amplify the circumstances.

The contempt judgment so entered shall include reasonable attorney's fees and expenses unless the probate judge enters specific findings that such attorney's fee and expenses shall not be paid by the defendant." See Olmstead v. Murphy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 666 (1986); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 180-181 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 272 (1987);Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994). At the contempt hearing, the mother requested attorney's fees in the amount of $1,095, sheriff's fees of $25, travel costs of $210, and lost wages of $274.24.

Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 340 (1990), S.C., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 418 (1991). See Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137 (1980); Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753-754 (1994). There was no error in the trial judge's refusal to accept at face value the results of the husband's manipulation of his assets, which he undertook to appear to be divested of financial resources, hoping thereby to justify his failure to pay support.

A judge has considerable discretion in determining the necessity and the amount of attorney's fees. Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 106 (1990). Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 752-753 (1994). Such an award is "presumed to be right and ordinarily ought not to be disturbed."