Bishop v. Southern Railway

12 Citing cases

  1. Ford v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al

    169 S.C. 41 (S.C. 1932)   Cited 117 times
    Stating that the "only `possible exception to the general civil rule that a plaintiff is required to prove the allegations of the complaint by the preponderance of the evidence, or the defendant his defense by a like degree of proof' is in support of a plea of justification where the action is one based on slander or libel in which a crime is therein charged against the plaintiff"

    Messrs. Henry E. Davis, and DuRant Sneeden, for appellant, cite: As to Circuit Judge directing verdict for railroadcompany in grade crossing collision: 94 S.C. 143; 77 S.E., 868; 153 S.C. 339; 150 S.E., 769; 140 S.C. 260; 138 S.E., 803; 141 S.C. 238; 139 S.E., 459; 145 S.C. 41; 142 S.E., 801. Construction placed on statute by SupremeCourt should govern: 265 U.S. 30; 68 L.Ed., 885; 17 L.Ed., 261; 241 U.S. 419; 60 L.Ed., 1072; 249 U.S. 389; 63 L.Ed., 662; 254 U.S. 361; 65 L.Ed., 304; 263 U.S. 250; 68 L.Ed., 290; 276 U.S. 567; 72 L.Ed., 703; 238 U.S. 446; 59 L.Ed., 1400; 164 U.S. 403; 41 L.Ed., 489; 220 U.S. 61; 226 U.S. 192; 57 L.Ed., 184. Failure to give crossing signals negligence per se: 47 S.C. 375; 25 S.E., 272; 106 S.C. 123; 90 S.E., 260; 108 S.C. 390; 95 S.E., 64; 138 S.C. 82; 136 S.E., 67. Failureto give signal presumed to be proximate cause of collision: 47 S.C. 375; 25 S.E., 272; 63 S.C. 532; 41 S.E., 808; 84 S.C. 125; 65 S.C. 1031; 115 S.C. 115; 104 S.E., 541; 140 S.C. 123; 141 S.C. 238; 139 S.E., 459; 145 S.C. 41; 142 S.E., 801; 153 S.C. 339; 150 S.E., 769. Where only one witness fails to hear signals question forjury: 106 S.C. 123; 90 S.E., 260; 145 S.C. 41; 142 S.E., 801; 91 S.C. 201; 74 S.E., 473; 140 S.C. 123. As toconstitutionality of crossing statute: 153 S.C. 339; 150 S.E., 769; 141 S.C. 238; 139 S.E., 459; 144 S.C. 164; 142 S.E., 336; 145 S.C. 41; 145 S.E., 801; 279 U.S. 639; 73 L.Ed., 884; 241 U.S. 79; 60 L.Ed., 899; 219 U.S. 219; 55 L.Ed., 191; 261 S.W. 677. Proximate cause is not afact which is subject to inference or presumption: 271 U.S. 472; 70 L.Ed., 1041; 247 U.S. 367; 62 L.Ed., 1167; 179 U.S. 658; 45 L.Ed., 361; 278 U.S. 116. Must showomission of signals was proximate cause of injury: 33 Cyc., 1045; 40 So., 60; 16 S.C. 457; 34 P., 286; 54 N.E., 814; 122 A., 330; 77 N.E., 151; 61 S.E., 748; 116 N.W., 249; 152 S.W. 815; 51 So., 340; 108 N.E., 144; 54 Fed.

  2. McBride v. A.C.L. Railroad Co.

    140 S.C. 260 (S.C. 1927)   Cited 33 times

    And to prevent that result the defendant may show that, notwithstanding the failure to give the signals, the plaintiff knew of the approach of the train in time to avoid the collision, for the object of requiring the signals is to give notice of the approach of the train. Edwards v. Railway, 63 S.C. 271; 41 S.E., 458. Bishop v. Railway, 63 S.C. 532; 41 S.E., 808. Nohrden v. Railway, 59 S.C. 99; 37 S.E., 228; 82 Am. St. Rep., 826."

  3. Lawrence v. Southern Railway

    169 S.C. 1 (S.C. 1933)   Cited 67 times

    Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Messrs. N.B. Barnwell and Frank G. Tompkins, for appellant, cite: Failure to observe statute is negligence per se: 44 C.J., 720; 141 S.C. 238; 139 S.E., 459; 145 S.C. 41; 142 S.E., 801; 153 S.C. 339; 150 S.E., 769; 140 S.C. 260; 138 S.E., 803. As to compensatory damages: 142 S.C. 125; 140 S.E., 443; 91 S.C. 507; 75 S.E., 45; 85 S.C. 463; 67 S.E., 568; 132 S.C. 212; 128 S.E., 423. As to contributory negligence: 73 S.C. 481; 53 S.E., 968; 56 S.C. 91; 34 S.E., 16; 142 S.C. 492; 141 S.E., 90. Duty of traveler approaching a crossing: 67 S.C. 347; 45 S.E., 18; 63 S.C. 532; 41 S.E., 808; 121 S.C. 394; 114 S.E., 500; 14 R.C.L., 795; 119 S.C. 134; 112 S.E., 78; 66 S.C. 442; 45 S.E., 8. Messrs. J.D.E. Meyer, Stoney Crosland and J.C.Long, for respondent, cite: Actionable negligence to block publicstreet or highway: 114 S.C. 262; 140 S.C. 171; 44 S.C. L., 232; 70 Am. Dec., 219; 107 S.C. 130; 92 S.E., 191; 127 S.C. 542; 112 S.C. 309; 151 S.C. 459; 127 S.C. 541; 122 S.C. 17; 145 S.C. 41; 101 S.C. 409; 45 S.C. 181; 61 S.C. 404; 72 S.C. 1; 77 S.C. 161. Duty of railroad togive crossing signal: 140 S.C. 123; 106 S.C. 131; 90 S.E., 260; 121 S.C. 401; 114 S.C. 500; 243 U.S. 308; 61 L.Ed., 740; 63 Fed., 532; 11 C.C.A., 338; 87 S.C. 328; 25 S.C. 61. As to proximate cause: 147 S.C. 184; 76 S.C. 202; 81 S.C. 333; 122 S.C. 17; 115 S.C. 177; 155 S.C. 115; 137 S.C. 359; 151 S.C. 164; 146 S.C. 28; 131 S.C. 432; 113 S.C. 636; 109 S.C. 238; 107 S.C. 216; 156 S.C. 511; 90 S.E., 281; 152 S.C. 239; 148 S.C. 161; 144 S.C. 427; 126 S.C. 450; 101 S.C. 59; 69 S.C. 356. Contributor

  4. Stabler v. Southern Railway Co. et al

    160 S.C. 191 (S.C. 1931)   Cited 8 times

    Defendant's ninth request to charge directed to be reported, appears in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Carter. Messrs. Adam H. Moss, Frank G. Tompkins and P.F.Haigler, for appellants, cite: Presumption that failure togive signals was cause of injury may be rebutted: 140 S.C. 247; 47 S.C. 271; 63 S.C. 532. If plaintiff's intestate sawand heard train failure to give signals was not proximatecause: 110 S.C. 331; 117 S.C. 516; 119 S.C. 438; 120 S.C. 374; 34 S .C., 451. Error not to charge defendant'sninth request: 34 S.C. 292; 57 S.C. 243; 98 S.C. 492. Messrs. T.P. Taylor, Jas. S. Verner, A.F. Spigner and J.C. Hiott, cite: Question for the jury: 91 S.C. 546; 93 S.C. 71; 140 S.C. 260; 121 S.C. 394. Violation of statuteis negligence per se, but only evidence of willfulness: 108 S.C. 390; 106 S.C. 123. Defendant's ninth requestwas charge on facts: 151 S.C. 433; 92 S.C. 490.

  5. Jones v. Charleston W.C. Railway Co.

    144 S.C. 212 (S.C. 1928)   Cited 25 times
    In Jones v. Charleston W.C. Ry. Company, 144 S.C. 212, 142 S.E. 516, 517, this Court stated: "The reason for this rule of exclusion is that hearsay is not subject to the ordinary tests required by law for ascertaining its truth, the author of the statements not being subject to cross-examination in the presence of a court of justice, and not speaking under the penal sanction of an oath, there being no opportunity to investigate his character and motives, and his deportment not being subject to observation.

    Messrs. Claude M. Aman, and Alfred Wallace, Jr., for respondent, cite: From the standpoint of relevancy, theadmission of testimony is largely in discretion of trialJudge: 135 S.C. 62; 140 S.C. 388; Id., 445; Id., 296. Where there is ample evidence to support the verdict itwill not be reversed because some questionable evidencegets injected into the case: 78 S.C. 73; 91 S.C. 328; 95 S.C. 466; 138 S.E., 675; 93 S.C. 295; 94 S.C. 282; 138 S.C. 241. Admission of hearsay testimony asto matters otherwise proved is not prejudicial: 120 S.C. 290; 108 S.C. 472; 140 S.C. 123. As to statutory signals: 76 S.C. 368; 99 S.C. 264. After failure to askfor further instructions to clarify any matters, cannot nowcomplain: 83 S.C. 82; 138 S.C. 421; 136 S.C. 506; 129 S.C. 200; 128 S.C. 59; 127 S.C. 426; 126 S.E., 437; 134 S.C. 67; 120 S.C. 223; 27 S.C. 268; 136 S.C. 21; 141 S.C. 245; 76 S.C. 49; 40 S.C. 134; 134 S.E., 367. Failure to give statutory signals raisesprima facie case for plaintiff: 63 S.C. 532; 84 S.C. 137. Same, raises presumption that such failure was proximatecause of the injury: 138 S.E., 675; 140 S.C. 245; 14 S.C. 245. Charge must be taken as a whole: 140 S.E., 98. An error in one part of a charge may be corrected byother parts: 84 S.C. 1; 57 S.C. 325; 105 S.C. 509; 71 S.C. 322; 141 S.C. 397; 102 S.C. 166; 72 S.C. 43; 86 S.C. 379; 84 S.C. 125; 87 S.C. 415; 141 S.E., 90. Punitive damages follow as a matter of right upon properproof of willfulness and wantonness: 91 S.C. 71; 62 S.C. 325; 65 S.C. 143; 69 S.C. 160; 75 S.C. 299; 75 S.C. 301; 69 S.C. 110; 60 S.C. 48. As to charge onnegligence: 71 S.C. 156; 76 S.C. 49; 87 S.C. 190; 94 S.C. 341; 104 S.C. 33; 91 S.C. 523; 90 S.C. 391. March 29, 1928.

  6. Miller, Administrator, v. A.C.L.R. Co.

    140 S.C. 123 (S.C. 1927)   Cited 105 times
    In Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 S.C. 123, 138 S.E. 675, 677, an action for the death of "a young man of high character with excellent prospects for the future," the published record does not indicate the earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident.

    The following cases have laid down the law substantially as the rule has been applied in the opinion of Mr. Justice Watts: Littlejohn v.Railway, 49 S.C. 12; 26 S.E., 967. Fletcher v. Railway, 57 S.C. 205; 35 S.E., 513. Mack v. Railway, 52 S.C. 323; 29 S.E., 905; 40 L.R.A., 679; 68 Am. St. Rep., 913. Nohrden v. Railroad Co., 59 S.C. 87; 37 S.E., 228; 82 Am. St. Rep., 286. Mercer v. Railway, 66 S.C. 246; 44 S.E., 750. Burns v. Railway Co., 61 S.C. 404; 39 S.E., 567. Hutto v. Railway Co., 61 S.C. 495; 39 S.E., 710. Edwards v. Railway Co., 63 S.C. 271; 41 S.E., 458. Davis v. Railway Co., 63 S.C. 370; 41 S.E., 468. Kirbyv. Railway Co., 63 S.C. 494; 41 S.E., 765. Bishop v. RailwayCo., 63 S.C. 532; 41 S.E., 808. Cooper v. RailwayCo., 65 S.C. 214; 43 S.E., 682. Mercer v. Railway Co., 66 S.C. 246; 44 S.E., 750. Gosa v. Railway Co., 67 S.C. 247; 45 S.E., 810. Osteen v. Railway Co., 76 S.C. 368; 57 S.E., 196. Sanders v. Railway Co., 93 S.C. 543; 77 S.E., 289. We refer especially to Folk v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 99 S.C. 284; 83 S.E., 452.

  7. Peeples v. Seaboard Air Line Railway

    115 S.C. 115 (S.C. 1920)   Cited 29 times
    In Peeples, supra, although the ultimate beneficiaries were not shown, this issue was presented and the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed the survival action although an earlier wrongful death action had resulted in a verdict for the defendant.

    No wilfulness on which to base verdict for punitivedamages: 62 S.C. 269; 15 S.C. 412; 69 S.C. 444; 2 Suth. Damages 1093; 12 A. E. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 24. Messrs. George Warren and Holman Boulware, for respondents, cite: Judgment in an action under Lord Campbell'sAct not res adjudicata of an action under the survivalstatute: 97 S.C. 27; 81 S.E. 189. Statutory Signal requirementscumulative to any existing law: 1 Civ. Code 1912, sec. 3314; 25 S.C. 53; 47 S.C. 28; 61 S.C. 404; 74 S.C. 377. Presumption of negligence from failure to give signalat a crossing: 84 S.C. 125; 65 S.E. 1031; 59 S.C. 99; 63 S.C. 271; 63 S.C. 532; 78 S.C. 374; 84 S.C. 125; 63 S.C. 370; 83 S.C. 325. October 11, 1920.

  8. Dobbins v. S.A.L.R. Co.

    108 S.C. 254 (S.C. 1917)   Cited 14 times

    Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Mr. J. Harry Foster, for appellant, cites: As to defenseof contributory negligence: 92 S.C. 490. Conduct of trial: 70 S.C. 211; 75 S.C. 68; 67 S.C. 136; 73 S.C. 503. Charge on negligence: 42 S.C. 402; 58 S.C. 229; 52 S.C. 291; 71 S.C. 156. Sudden emergency: 82 S.C. 72; 81 S.C. 339; 60 Am. St. Rep. 705. Injuries at crossings: Civil Code, sec. 3230; 92 S.C. 302; 99 S.C. 284; 81 S.C. 71; 87 S.C. 325; 63 S.C. 532. Presumptions: 91 S.C. 203; 84 S.C. 137. Degree of care: 81 S.C. 340. Messrs. Glenn Glenn, for respondent, cite: As to operationof automobiles: Crim. Code, secs. 601, 602; 90 S.E. 756. Signals at crossings: Civil Code, secs. 3222 and 3230. Contributory negligence: 28 S.E. 638. Negligence per se: 90 S.C. 260. No collision: 39 S.C. 514. Defect in publicroad: 76 S.C. 554.

  9. Folk v. Seaboard Air Line Railway

    99 S.C. 284 (S.C. 1914)   Cited 28 times

    If a person be on a public crossing across a railroad track in a town where a gate is kept which is up, and the train approaches without giving statutory signals and he in order to avoid a collision drives down the track, or from fright from letting down the gate the horse, runs down the track and is overtaken and injured away from the crossing the railroad is liable as if the accident happened on the crossing. Bishop v. Ry., 63 S.C. 532, 41 S.E. 808. This exception is overruled.

  10. Lee v. Railroad Co.

    84 S.C. 125 (S.C. 1909)   Cited 26 times

    And to prevent that result the defendant may show that, notwithstanding the failure to give the signals, the plaintiff knew of the approach of the train in time to avoid the collision, for the object of requiring the signals is to give notice of the approach of the train. Edwards v. Ry., 63 S.C. 271, 41 S.E., 458; Bishop v. Ry., 63 S.C. 532, 41 S.E., 808; Nohrden v. Ry., 59 S.C. 99, 37 S.E., 228. The portion of the charge excepted to contains nothing but a proposition of law. We see nothing in it which justifies the complaint that it was a charge on the facts.