Opinion
August 21, 1951. Rehearing Denied October 18, 1951.
Petition from the Circuit Court, Sarasota County, W.T. Harrison, J.
Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Anderson, Fields Ward, Tampa, for petitioner.
Burket Burket, Sarasota, for respondents.
The governor and others constituting Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund filed a bill for declaratory decree against City of Sarasota and Bird Key Corporation. The plaintiffs claimed that a certain tract of land became a part of the sovereign lands of the state upon its admission to the union, and came under their management, control and supervision by virtue of Sec. 253.03, Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A. They alleged that by authority of Chapter 253 and in full compliance with its terms they offered the property for sale and that the petitioner, Bird Key Corporation, applied for the land, bidding $150 an acre.
The respondent, City of Sarasota, objected on the ground that the title was vested in it by Chapter 23529, Laws of Florida, Sp.Acts of 1945, the city charter, providing, in Sec. 6, paragraph 3, that the jurisdiction and powers of the city "shall extend * * * to and over all waters, waterways, streams, bays, bayous, submerged lands, water bottoms and wharves" within its boundaries; also, in paragraph 4, that the "title to all tidewater and other lands and all creek, bayou and bay bottoms, and all waters, waterways and water bottoms, and all riparian rights within and adjacent to the city limits, now owned by the State of Florida shall be vested in the City * * * for municipal purposes only."
The plaintiffs expressed "doubt" about the vesting of title in the city under Chapter 23529, supra, in view of the laws relative to sovereign lands, and the provisions of Sec. 16 of Article III of the Constitution, F.S.A., regarding the subjects and titles of legislative enactments, so the court was asked to decide whether the land in question was the trustees' or the city's.
Bird Key Corporation answered. To decide the present dispute it is not necessary to give a digest of all that pleading because the only action of the chancellor now challenged is his order striking the portion of the answer "dealing with the requirements of Section 16, Article III of the Constitution of the State of Florida." In other words, by so ruling he held there was no merit to the pleader's assertion that the city's claim was invalid on the ground that there was no expression in the title of Chapter 23529 of an intention. to disturb the title in the state to the land or riparian rights.
The petitioner thinks the law can be settled by answering the question whether the charter acts of 1927, Chapter 13403, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1927, and Chapter 23529, supra, are sufficient "to divest the State of, and vest the City with, title to the submerged lands in question."
We are immediately concerned with the constitutional injunction that "Each law * * * shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title," Sec. 16, Art. III, and its application to Chapter 23529, supra. The title to the present charter act is couched in language so familiar as to be almost stereotyped: "An Act to Abolish the Present Municipal Government of the City of Sarasota, in the County of Sarasota, in the State of Florida, and to Create, Establish and Organize a Municipality to be Known and Designated as the City of Sarasota, and to Define its Territorial Boundaries and to Provide for its Government, Jurisdiction, Powers, Franchises and Privileges." Tucked away in the body of the act is a grant of sovereign lands, although the caption would apprise a reader that nothing more was being accomplished than the simultaneous abolishment and recreation of the government of an existing city with attendant jurisdiction and powers.
We cannot reach the conclusion that an incident to the successful and complete functioning of a municipality is the receipt by it of sovereign state lands, or to particularize, that a trustee of the internal improvement fund who read the title would be advised that the property of the state under his charge was being conveyed by the legislature to the municipality.
We have often defined the constitutional provision and there is no need fully to review the decisions here. We will simply repeat our pronouncement that the title "should reasonably and fairly give notice of what one may expect to find in the body of the act," State ex rel. Grodin v. Barns, 119 Fla. 405, 161 So. 568, 571, to avoid surprise, fraud and inadvertence, State ex rel. Crump v. Sullivan, 99 Fla. 1070, 128 So. 478. Let us now apply that to the particular subject matter here.
We offer no criticism of the manner in which the legislature conducts its business; nor do we even insinuate that we have any authority in that sphere. But we do know as everyone else knows that special acts dealing with the creation and abolition of cities are matters left largely if not wholly to the desires of the representatives and the senators of the counties and districts where the particular cities are located. We recognize, too, that laws of this character reach great numbers and are enacted by the overworked legislative bodies in a speedy, almost mechanical, way.
On the other hand, we have constitutional officers charged as trustees with the management, control and administration of public lands. Could it be expected that one of them would read a title like that we have quoted, and be apprised of a provision that property for which he was responsible was being alienated by the legislature, or should it be required that all of them read all charter acts to ascertain if some such provision was incorporated as germane to the usual ones for the creation and operation of municipalities? We think not.
It is our view that the present situation is an apt illustration of the need for the protection the organic law affords the people in general and their constitutional servants in particular.
There are two reasons why we are not impressed by the suggestion that any deficiency in the later act could be supplied by a statement in the caption of the charter act it superseded, Chapter 13403, supra, with reference to vesting in the city title to foreshore and riparian rights, tidewater lands, river bottoms and so on. In the first place the title contained reference to two unrelated subject matters, the transfer of state property not being properly connected with the establishment of the city, as we have already pointed out. In the second place if one were to read the title of the earlier act, and then of the later, noting that the provision was subsequently omitted, the conclusion would be logical that the corresponding provision in the body had been eliminated also.
We hold that part of the present act invalid so the petition for certiorari is granted and the order striking the portion of the answer we have described is quashed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL, CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
ADAMS and ROBERTS, JJ., not participating.