Opinion
Case No. CV 01-01449 CBM (JWJx)
April 10, 2002
The matters before the Court, the Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District Judge presiding, are (1) Defendant UAW Local 148 — Long Beach, California's ("Local 148" or "Defendant Local 148") Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Defendant Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation's (collectively, "Boeing" or "Defendant Boeing") Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, and (3) Defendant Boeing's Evidentiary Objections. Counsel appeared before the Court on March 25, 2002. Upon consideration of the papers submitted and the arguments presented, the Court (1) grants the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and (2) declines to rule on Defendant Boeing's evidentiary objections.
JURISDICTION
This action is before the Court pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 13, 2001, Plaintiffs Tom Bingham ("Bingham"), Jim Churcich ("Churcich"), Roberto P. Estrada ("Estrada") and Leon Toyias ("Toyias") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") initiated this action against Boeing, International Union United Automobile Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the "International Union") and UAW Local 148 — Long Beach, California, ("Local 148") asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of fair representation. On March 1, 2002, Defendant International Union was dismissed with prejudice from the case.
On January 17, 2002, Defendant Local 148 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence supporting a breach of Local 148's duty of fair representation to Plaintiffs. On January 28, 2002, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. On February 4, 2002, Local 148 filed a Reply.
On January 18, 2002, Defendant Boeing filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. Boeing argues that there is no evidence of breach of contract by Boeing, nor any evidence of a breach of the duty of fair representation by Local 148. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition on January 28, 2002. Boeing filed a Reply on February 5, 2002.
Boeing filed Evidentiary Objections on February 5, 2002. Plaintiffs filed a Response on February 7, 2002.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed:
During 1999 and 2000, Boeing ceased production of three types of airplanes manufactured at the Long Beach facility, resulting in a series of layoffs. Huschka Decl., ¶ 4. Plaintiffs were all laid off by Boeing in March 2000. In the instant suit, Plaintiffs allege that Boeing breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement reached between Boeing and Local 148 ("CBA") by laying off Plaintiffs by outsourcing their jobs to third parties without retraining or reassigning Plaintiffs. Complaint, ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs Bingham, Toyias and Estrada held the K2E classification at the time of their layoff. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 3. Classification description K2E is entitled "Mechanic Maintenance — Computer Aided Manufacturing." King Decl., Exh. B. K2E-classified work involves computer-aided manufacturing power machines and equipment. King Decl., Exh. B. In addition to K2E-classified work, Plaintiffs Bingham, Toyias and Estrada all did work outside of the K2E classification. The non-K2E work which Bingham, Toyias and Estrada had previously done was outsourced by Boeing around the time of Plaintiffs' layoff. Toyias Depo., 73:3-14; Estrada Depo., 146:2-5, 148:10-13, 149:21-23, 151:11-15.
Bingham had worked on "scrubbers, blowers and belts." Bingham Depo., 75:4-8. Toyias had worked on fans, blowers, cooling towers, scrubbers, process equipment, lift equipment and aircraft jacks. Toyias Depo., 73:3-14. Estrada worked on scrubbers, lift equipment, aircraft jacks and ventilation equipment. Estrada Depo., 146:2-5, 148:10-13, 149:21-23, 151:11-15.
The CBA allows Boeing to assign work to an employee outside of his or her classification. Paragraph 6 to Appendix A to the CBA states in part:
A classification description shall not be construed so as to restrict in any manner the rights of the Company to assign work to employees nor to grant or concede an employee or group of employees any right to refuse to perform assigned work for the reason that the work is not described specifically in the classification description of their classification. . . .
Churcich held the J7M classification from 1997 until his layoff on March 31, 2000. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 9. The title for this classification is "Plumber-Pipefitter Maintenance." Dohrmann Decl., Exh. F.
Attachment 52 is part of the CBA. King Decl., Exh. E. It states in pertinent part:
[Boeing] has the sole right to outsource any and all facilities department work . . . .
No employees presently classified in any classification affected by such decision to outsource may be laid off as a result of such outsourcing. Any employees so affected will be trained for other jobs in the Bargaining Unit and/or reclassified to other classifications in accordance with their seniority, and such reclassifications will take precedence over recalls and promotions.
King Decl., Exh. E. (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs filed grievances regarding their 2000 layoffs alleging that Boeing violated the CBA. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 16. Plaintiff's union, Local 148, appears to have originally agreed with their position. However, on October 2, 2000, each plaintiff received a letter from Bill Shultz, Chairperson of Local 148's Bargaining Committee, denying their grievance. Evans Decl., Exh., 15, 16, 17, 18.
After Toyias and Bingham filed their grievance, they were told by Bobby Green, the Alternate Bargaining Committee person, that they would prevail. Toyias Depo. 27:1-7; Bingham 33:11-20. Furthermore, Churcich was told on numerous occasions by Bobby Green that his grievance would be arbitrated. Churcich 76:21. Lastly, in a letter entitled the "President's Chairman's Report," signed by Bill Shultz, Chairperson of Local 148's Bargaining Committee, and Local 148 President Kedrick Legg, Local 148 stated that Plaintiffs' layoffs violated Attachment 52. Evans Decl., Exh. 13.
Attached to each letter was each plaintiff's Type I Grievance Form. Evans Decl., Exh. 5, 6, 7, 8. Bingham's, Toyias' and Estrada's form each state:
"[a]fter further investigation the union was unable to substantiate that the grievant's work was performed by contractors; therefore, the grievance is denied."
Evans Decl., Exh. 5, 7, 8.
Churcich's grievance was likewise denied. His form explains that:
The grievant has been assessed and placed as a K2A, and has recall rights to that classification. At this time, he does not have sufficient seniority to be placed to a K2A; therefore, no violation to the CBA and grievance is denied.
Evans Decl., Exh. 6.
Local 148 conducted an investigation into Plaintiffs' grievances. Bill Shultz reviewed documents, interviewed employees and personally observed the facility's operation to determine whether outside contractors were performing K2E work. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 17; Shultz Depo. 18:7-18; 22:2-12. Furthermore, Bobby Green, another union representative, interviewed employees regarding Plaintiffs' claims. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 17; Green Depo. 30:1-22; 46:2-4. After conducting its investigation into Plaintiffs' grievances, Local 148 concluded that Boeing had not breached the CBA. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 18.
Plaintiffs dispute the accuracy of Local 148's determination, but not the fact that this was Local 148's determination.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidentiary ObjectionsBoeing filed objections to the evidence offered by Plaintiffs. The Court has concluded that consideration of all of the evidence to which Boeing objects would not alter the Court's decision to find in favor of the defendants. All of Plaintiffs' evidence has been considered for the purpose of this motion. The Court declines to rule on Boeing's objections.
II. Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
The defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of fair representation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment against a party when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Pub. Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).
B. A Union's Duty of Fair Representation
"Hybrid" cases are those in which a union member sues both its employer and its union, alleging that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and that the union failed to grieve the wrong on the union member's behalf, in breach of its duty of fair representation. In such cases, the union member must not only show that his discharge was contrary to the contract, but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the union. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976); DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983).
A breach of the duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). A union's actions can be characterized as arbitrary only if the behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be wholly irrational. Air Lines Pilot Assoc., Int'l v. O'Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991); see also Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A unions decision is arbitrary only if it lacks a rational basis"). Although a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner, an individual employee does not have an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191; see also Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 1995). A union is not liable for merely negligent conduct. United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990) (mere negligence in the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement does not constitute breach of the duty of fair representation); see also Fristoe v. Reynold Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1214-1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
C. Analysis
Plaintiffs' suit is a "hybrid" action, brought under Section 301 of the Labor Managment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Complaint, ¶ 6. Plaintiffs do not contend that Local 148's conduct was discriminatory or demonstrated bad faith. Therefore, in order to survive the defendants' summary judgment motions, Plaintiffs must offer evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Local 148 arbitrarily ignored Plaintiffs' meritorious grievances or processed them in a perfunctory manner, or otherwise made decisions which were wholly irrational or lacking in a rational basis. O'Neil, 499 U.S. at 78; see also Conkle, 73 F.3d at 916.
1. Bingham, Toyias and Estrada
Plaintiffs' argue that Local 148 acted arbitrarily by failing to arbitrate Bingham, Toyias and Estrada's grievances filed on account of their layoff. Plaintiffs assert two arguments for the proposition that these layoffs constitute violations of the CBA: (1) Attachment 52 prohibits Boeing from outsourcing any work actually being performed by union members (regardless of classification); and (2) the J6M classification, (i.e. the classification for maintenance mechanic work) was merged into the K2E classification, such that the outsourcing of J6M work in conjunction with the laying off of K2E workers violates Attachment 52. Opp. at 4-5; Exhibit 3.
Attachment 52 states that "[n]o employees presently classified in any classification affected by such decision to outsource may be laid off as a result of such outsourcing." Plaintiffs' interpretation, which focuses on the impact on the employee as opposed to the impact on the employee's classification, appears to render meaningless the language underscored above. Boeing argues, quite reasonably, that the plain language of Attachment 52 requires that the employee's classification must be affected by the decision to outsource, and outsourcing which only impacts the employee's out-of-classification work does not trigger any rights under Attachment 52. Local 148's interpretation of the CBA is perfectly rational, and hence its actions based on this interpretation of the CBA satisfy the requirement set forth in Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d at 916, that a union decision must have a rational basis.
Plaintiffs' second argument stems from the fact that in September 1993 all of the J6M maintenance mechanics were promoted to the K2E classification. Mason Depo. 36:2-6. Since that time, there have been no J6M-classified workers at Boeing. Mason Depo. 34:20-35:5. This, in combination with the fact that Bingham's, Estrada's and Toyias' non-K2E work was formally assigned to them, constitutes the factual basis for Plaintiffs' contention that, for all practical purposes the J6M classification was absorbed into the K2E classification, such that the outsourcing of J6M work combined with the laying off of K2E workers violates Attachment 52. Opp. at 9.
While Plaintiffs' "merger" argument may be plausible, defendants have a rational basis for believing that the classifications were not merged. The CBA specifically lists all combined classifications, and these classifications are not so listed. King Decl., Exh. C; Estrada Depo. 153:3-5 ("[the J6M classification is] still in the books"). Local 148 determined that the J6M classification was not merged, and after concluding that no K2E work was outsourced, refused to proceed to arbitration on Bingham's, Estrada's and Toyias' claims that their layoff violated Attachment 52. This determination is certainly rational, and not arbitrary.
2. Churcich
Unlike the other plaintiffs, Churcich had previously received reassessment under Attachment 52. After Churcich's layoff in March 2000, Local 148 denied Churcich's grievance on the ground that a union member is only entitled to one reassessment under Attachment 52. The Plaintiffs fail to create a genuine issue of triable fact with respect to their contention that the "one-reassessment rule" is arbitrary. Local 148 has interpreted the CBA to contain a "one-reassessment" rule because the alternative — that Attachment 52 provides for an unlimited number of assessments for each employee — is unrealistic. Such a reading of Attachment 52 would prohibit Boeing from downsizing to meet economic needs. Huschka Decl., ¶ 5; Reply at 5. Plaintiffs fail to offer an interpretation of the CBA which would provide relief to Churcich without guaranteeing every potentially downsized employee a "job for life." Therefore, Local 148, in denying Churcichs' grievance pursuant to the "one-reassessment" rule, acted within the "wide range of reasonableness" which unions are permitted. O'Neil, 499 U.S. at 78; King Decl., Exh. H.
In 1995, Boeing had outsourced work belonging to Churcich's J7M classification. Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 13. As a result of his 1995 layoff, Boeing offered and Churcich accepted a reassessment to the position of aircraft assembly mechanic, classification K2A. Churcich worked as a J7M from 1997 until his layoff on March 31, 2000.
After his March 2000 layoff, Local 148 denied Churcich's grievance, saying,
The grievant has been assessed and placed as a K2A, and has recall rights to that classification. At this time, he does not have sufficient seniority to be placed to a K2A; therefore, no violation to the CBA and grievance is denied.
Evans Decl., Exh. 6.
Furthermore, a document distributed to Boeing employees entitled "Facilities Services Outsourcing Questions Answers" is part of the court record. King Decl., Exh. H. It states:
2. What happens if an employee is assessed, then reclassified, and later is recalled back to facilities and subsequently layed off?
In accordance with Article VII, this employee would have placement rights back to the classification he/she was placed in provided their seniority would hold.
3. Local 148's Change of Position Based on Investigation
Plaintiffs ask the Court to infer that Local 148's conduct was arbitrary because Local 148 officials initially stated that they believed that Plaintiffs' grievances were meritorious. Toyias Depo. 27:1-7; Bingham Depo. 33:11-20; Churcich Depo. 76:21; Evans Decl., Exh. 13. Local 148 concluded that Plaintiffs' grievances were not meritorious after Bill Shultz and Bobby Green made reasonable efforts to research the validity of Plaintiff's claims (e.g. interview employees, review documents and personally observe facility operations). Boeing Uncontroverted Fact No. 17; Shultz Depo. 18:7-18; 22:2-12; Green Depo. 30:1-22; 46:2-4. A change of position, based on inquiry and research, is evidence of reasoned decisionmaking, not arbitrariness.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs failed to put forward any evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Local 148 arbitrarily ignored Plaintiffs' meritorious grievances or processed them in a perfunctory manner, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191 or otherwise made decisions which were "wholly irrational." O'Neil, 499 U.S. at 78. Defendants put forward abundant evidence that Local 148's decisions were reasoned and proper.
The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Local 148 did not violate its statutory duty of fair representation to Plaintiffs. Both defendants prevail on their Summary Judgment Motions considering all evidence offered by Plaintiffs. It is therefore not necessary to rule on Boeing's objections to the evidence.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
SO ORDERED.