Opinion
No. 52641-3-I consol. with No. 49162-8-I
Filed: December 29, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 93-2-26423-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 09/24/2001.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Chris Demopolis (Appearing Pro Se), 7013 Linden Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98103.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Daniel Ross Fjelstad, Attorney at Law, One Union Sq, 600 University St. Ste 1928, Seattle, WA 98101-4115.
Jeremiah Michael McCormick, Attorney at Law, 652 NW 85th St, Seattle, WA 98117-3143.
In this consolidated appeal, Christopher Demopolis challenges several post-judgment orders entered during supplemental proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.
This is one of several appeals that have arisen from a series of transactions between appellant Demopolis and Bernice Bingham, now deceased. Between 1989 and 1991, Bingham signed eight promissory notes in favor of Demopolis. To secure payment of the notes, Bingham executed deeds of trust on her home. The convoluted history of this case is set forth in great detail in a previous appeal and will not be repeated here. See Bingham v. Lechner, 111 Wn. App. 118, 45 P.3d 562 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1018 (2003).
During supplemental proceedings, respondent Bingham, as administrator for the Estate of Bernice Bingham, attempted to execute on several prior judgments for attorney fees and costs. In March 2001, Demopolis failed to appear for supplemental proceedings in superior court, and the court eventually issued a bench warrant. Demopolis was arrested on May 10, 2001, and released after he deposited $4,400 into the court registry. Demopolis ultimately deposited approximately $39,000 into the court registry. The trial court later disbursed these funds to Bingham after Bingham executed a satisfaction of the judgments. In this appeal, Demopolis challenges the Order Disbursing Funds, an Order Upon Motion for Additional Supersedeas, and an Order Upon Motion to Vacate Supplemental Proceedings, all entered on July 24, 2001, and an order denying his motion for reconsideration, entered on September 24, 2001.
Demopolis first contends that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to file a supersedeas bond for two judgments that he did not appeal. He argues that these judgments could have been subject to an offset for the amount of the unpaid promissory notes if he prevailed in the appeal that was then pending and that the trial court should therefore have granted the supersedeas motion. But the proper method for objecting to a trial court's supersedeas decision is to file a timely motion in this court. RAP 8.1(h). Demopolis failed to file such a motion.
Moreover, this court considered and rejected the offset issue on its merits in the prior appeal. See Bingham v. Lechner, 111 Wn. App. at 131-33.
Demopolis has failed to indicate how, under these circumstances, this court could now provide any meaningful relief for the trial court's alleged error. Because the supersedeas issue is moot, we decline to consider it further.
Demopolis next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exonerate the bail amount of $4,400 that he had paid into the court registry after his arrest. But Demopolis concedes that this amount was ultimately returned to him. Brief of Appellant., at 1 n. 1. Accordingly, this issue is also moot.
Finally, Demopolis assigns error to the denial of his CR 60(b) motion to vacate the supplemental proceedings and to the disbursement of funds from the court registry to Bingham's attorney. We review a trial court's decision on a motion to vacate for an abuse of discretion. DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wn. App. 885, 894, 1 P.3d 587 (2000), review denied, 146 Wn.2d 1016 (2002).
CR 60(b) authorizes the trial court to vacate a final judgment for reasons such as mistakes, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in obtaining a judgment or order, fraud, newly discovered evidence, unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from prosecuting or defending, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. See CR 60(b)(1), (3), (4), (9), (11). But Demopolis has failed to identify any basis under CR 60(b) warranting vacation of the supplemental proceedings or any error in the disbursement of funds from the court registry. Nor has he supported these assignments of error with any legal argument or citation to authority. Accordingly, we decline to consider the alleged errors on appeal. See Howell v. Spokane Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wn.2d 619, 624, 818 P.2d 1056 (1991).
Demopolis has devoted a considerable portion of his brief to claims of insufficient notice and allegations that he was unlawfully arrested because the arrest warrant was not supported by an affidavit and was not served in accordance with RCW 6.32.140. But it is unclear what relief Demopolis is seeking in conjunction with these allegations. To the extent that he may be relying on the unlawful arrest allegations to support his motion to vacate, the arguments fail. Demopolis has made no showing that the alleged unlawful arrest invalidated the orders challenged on appeal.
In summary, Demopolis has failed to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings.
Under the terms of the promissory note and the deed of trust, Bingham is entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party on appeal. See RCW 4.84.330; Bingham v. Lechner, 111 Wn. App. at 134. Bingham's request for attorney fees on appeal is therefore granted, subject to compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.