( E.g., Dupee v. Blake (1893), 148 Ill. 453; Mueller v. Dobschuetz.) Although the Albee opinion has been cited in later decisions, it has never been relied upon for the proposition that Peabody and Federal urge. (See, e.g., Metz v. Dionne (1928), 250 Ill. App. 369; Douglass v. Ullsperger (1929), 251 Ill. App. 145; Binga v. Bell (1930), 259 Ill. App. 361; Farmers Merchants Bank v. Narvid (1931), 259 Ill. App. 554; see also Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Bass (1934), 357 Ill. 72, 191 N.E. 284, aff'd (1934), 274 Ill. App. 76 ( Albee found controlling by appellate court, but not cited by the supreme court).) Thus, we cannot accept Federal's and Peabody's contention that the Albee decision is controlling in this case.
The theory of the author seems to be that these far reaching results arise solely out of the fact of the assumption of the mortgage debt by the grantee. That this theory prevails in the law of this State plaintiff cites cases such as Scholten v. Barber, 217 Ill. 148; Albee v. Gross, 250 Ill. App. 98; Douglass v. Ullsperger, 251 Ill. App. 145; Binga v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361, and other cases. We will allow the plaintiff to state his contention in his own words; he says:
We therefore conclude that the Albee case settles the controverted question in this case in accordance with the contention of the appellees. The Albee case has been followed by the Appellate Courts in this State in Metz v. Dionne, 250 Ill. App. 369; Douglass v. Ullsperger, 251 Ill. App. 145; Binga v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361; Farmers Merchants Bank v. Narvid, 259 Ill. App. 554. For the reasons stated the decree is affirmed.
Defendants contend that this ruling was erroneous and prejudicial and we think the contention must be sustained. If the time of payment had been extended by plaintiff with the subsequent owner or owners of the farm by agreement, for a consideration, so that it might be held that such owner or owners had agreed to pay the mortgage but without defendants' assent, this would discharge the defendants from personal liability for the debt for the reason that the relation of the grantee and grantor towards the mortgagee is that of principal and surety. Albee v. Gross, 250 Ill. App. 98; Douglass v. Ullsperger, 251 Ill. App. 145; and cases therein cited; Binga v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361. ( Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U.S. 187; Spencer v. Spencer, 95 N.Y. 353.)