Opinion
22-CV-4210 (LTS)
06-21-2022
KALLEEM BING, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Commissioner NYS DOCCS, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Anthony Annucci, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, failed to train and supervise his staff adequately. By order dated May 24, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, but on May 23, 2022, that court transferred the action here because the events giving rise to the complaint took place at Fishkill Correctional Facility, which is located within the Southern District of New York. (See ECF 8) (decision and order transferring action). The Northern District noted that because Defendant Annucci resided within that district, the district was a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), but the “action otherwise ha[d] no apparent connection to the Northern District of New York.” (ECF 8, at 3.)
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action against the Commissioner of DOCCS regarding events that took place at Fishkill Correctional Facility on November 7 and 9, 2020. He alleges that he was falsely accused of possessing contraband and engaging in violent conduct, and that a disciplinary hearing was held, but it was not “conduct[ed] . . . properly.” (ECF 1, at 4.) He seeks money damages.
DISCUSSION
A. Personal Involvement
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how Commissioner Annucci was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. Although Plaintiff states that Annucci failed to train and supervise his staff generally, he does not allege any facts indicating Annucci's specific involvement in Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing, or the events that led to the hearing. Plaintiff's claims against Annucci are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. False Misbehavior Report
Individuals who are incarcerated do not possess a “general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). If a prisoner is “granted a hearing, and [is] afforded the opportunity to rebut the charges against him, the defendant's filing of unfounded charges d[oes] not give rise to a per se constitutional violation actionable under section 1983.” Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986). Allegations of false disciplinary charges therefore generally do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim unless a plaintiff shows something more, such as that the misbehavior report was filed in retaliation for the prisoner exercising his constitutional rights. See Boddie, 105 F.3d at 862; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951.
Plaintiff's allegation that he was falsely accused of possessing contraband and engaging in violent conduct fails to state a claim because he does not allege that correctional staff filed false reports in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercising his constitutional rights or proffer any other grounds that could support the inference that his constitutional rights were violated. The Court therefore dismisses this claim for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Disciplinary Hearing
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that his hearing was not conducted properly as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In such a claim, “a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). For an individual who has been convicted, and already deprived of his liberty, his “liberty interest is implicated by prison discipline . . . only if the discipline ‘imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). “[R]estrictive confinements of less than 101 days do not generally raise a liberty interest warranting due process protection, and thus require proof of conditions more onerous than usual.” Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009); Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103,107-08 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing factors relevant to deciding if confinement in segregated housing constitutes an atypical hardship).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding any punishment imposed during his disciplinary hearing. Nor does he allege that he suffered an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, rising to the level of the deprivation of a liberty interest. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted for a violation of the right to procedural due process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim arising from his misbehavior report and disciplinary hearing, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims as follows:
1. Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights.
2. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint, with a description, such as “John Doe #1, Hearing Officer.”
3. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the
amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a. the names and titles of all relevant people;
b. a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c. a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d. the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-4210 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims brought against Commissioner Annucci for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.