Accordingly, the appeal is not moot.Binegar v. District Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996); Langston v. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles, 110 Nev. 342, 344, 871 P.2d 362, 363 (1994). At oral argument before this court, United stated that it is seeking a permanent injunction in district court to enforce Burkhardt's nondisclosure covenant.
Because of the statute's broad scope, that court feared that the defendant would be "forced to disclose information that he never intended to disclose at trial, some of which could be incriminating." Binegar v. District Court, 915 P.2d 889, 894 (Nev. 1996). Such a result would violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
And our jurisprudence has implicitly rejected "the same complaining party" requirement, instead focusing on whether the issues raised by the party are likely to recur under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Solid v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 118, 120, 393 P.3d 666, 670 (2017) (reviewing petitioner’s challenge to his criminal trial where, although his conviction rendered the issue moot, the same issue was likely to recur in other criminal trials); Haney v. State, 124 Nev. 408, 410-11, 185 P.3d 350, 352 (2008) ("Although our ruling in this case will not benefit Haney directly because his sentence has expired, we nonetheless address the legal questions presented because they are capable of repetition, yet evading review."); Miller v. State, 113 Nev. 722, 724 n.1, 941 P.2d 456, 458 n.1 (1997) (noting that defendants’ sentencing claims warranted review even if "moot because they challenge an activity that is capable of repetition yet evades review"); Binegar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996) (concluding that though petitioner’s claim was moot, review was appropriate because the issue of the constitutionality of the statute was capable of repetition). The dissent’s strict reliance on federal law ignores our precedent defining the contours of our mootness exception.
Because the matter of bail may be reconsidered in the district court, we deny the petition as moot. See Martinez-Hernandez v. State, 132 Nev., Op. 61, 380 P.3d 861 (2016) ("Cases presenting real controversies at the time of their institution may become moot by the happening of subsequent events."); see also Binegar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548-49, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996) (recognizing that an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases which are capable of repetition, yet evading review). Accordingly, we
We deny the petition as moot because petitioner is no longer in custody and fails to demonstrate that this issue is capable of repetition yet evading review. See Binegar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548-49, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996); see also Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Accordingly, we
We deny the petition as moot because petitioner is no longer in custody and fails to demonstrate that this issue is capable of repetition yet evading review. See Binegar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548-49, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996); see also Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Accordingly, we
Given the unique factual situation and the subsequent alteration of the statutory scheme, we decline to review this appeal under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine. See Binegar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in Docket No. 60466.
Even when an appeal is moot, however, we may consider it if it involves a matter of widespread importance that is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Traffic Control Servs. v. United Rentals, 120 Nev. 168, 171-72, 87 P.3d 1054, 1057 (2004) (recognizing that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine applies when the duration of the challenged action is "relatively short" and there is a "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future" (citingBinegar v. District Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996) (noting that the matter must be important), and Langston, 110 Nev. at 344, 871 P.2d at 363 (pointing out that facts unique to a particular party will not give rise to the mootness exception))). Appellants contend that this exception to the mootness doctrine applies to the present matter for two reasons.
Therefore, we issue this opinion to address the legal issues presented but dismiss Haney's appeal because we cannot grant him any relief. See Miller v. State, 113 Nev. 722, 724 n. 1, 941 P.2d 456, 458 n. 1 (1997); Binegar v. District Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996). But see Knight v. State, 116 Nev. 140, 143-44, 993 P.2d 67, 70 (2000) (overruling Biyan v. State, 78 Nev. 38, 368 P.2d 672 (1962); State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 201 P. 1027 (1921); State v. Pray, 30 Nev. 206, 94 P. 218 (1908)).
In reaching our decision, we note that the reciprocal discovery rule for expert rebuttal witnesses we announce today shall not compel a defendant to disclose incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, e.g., incriminating reports or physical examinations that an expert witness may have relied upon in forming an opinion. See Binegar v. District Court, 112 Nev. 544, 549-51, 915 P.2d 889, 893-94 (1996). Despite our conclusion that parties in criminal cases are constitutionally required to provide notice of expert rebuttal witnesses, we further conclude that the State's failure to do so in the proceedings below does not constitute reversible error.