Opinion
NUMBER 2012 CA 0124
11-02-2012
ANGELICA C. BIMAH AND DERRICK M. BIMAH INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR CHILD VICTOR BIMAH v. LAURA A. MEZA, EMMA JAUREZ TIERRABLANCA, SILVESTRE MEZA DOMINQUEZ, AND US AGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Woody Falgoust Cassie Rodrigue Braud Thibodaux, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Angelica and Derrick Bimah, individually and on behalf of Victor Bimah Jonathan W. Duncan Jay M. Simon Baton Rouge, LA and Charles Benjamin Landry Lafayette, LA Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Laura Meza, Emma Juarez Tierrablanca, and Sylvestre Meza Dominquez Anthony M. Butler Ryan A. Creel Baton Rouge, LA and James L. Donovan, Jr. Metairie, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, USAgencies Casualty Insurance Co.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Seventeenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Lafourche, Louisiana
Docket Number 117186
Honorable Jerome J. Barbera, III, Judge Presiding
Woody Falgoust
Cassie Rodrigue Braud
Thibodaux, LA
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Angelica and Derrick Bimah, individually
and on behalf of Victor Bimah
Jonathan W. Duncan
Jay M. Simon
Baton Rouge, LA
and
Charles Benjamin Landry
Lafayette, LA
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees,
Laura Meza, Emma Juarez Tierrablanca,
and Sylvestre Meza Dominquez
Anthony M. Butler
Ryan A. Creel
Baton Rouge, LA
and
James L. Donovan, Jr.
Metairie, LA
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
USAgencies Casualty Insurance Co.
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
WHIPPLE , J.
In this automobile accident case, plaintiffs appeal the trial court's judgment, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant automobile liability insurer and dismissing plaintiffs' claims against it on the basis that the automobile liability policy issued by the insurer excluded coverage for the defendant driver. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2010, Angelica Bimah and Laura A. Meza were involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of West 5th Street and Canal Boulevard in Thibodaux, Louisiana. The vehicle being driven by Meza was owned by Meza's parents, Emma Juarez Tierrablanca and Silvestre Meza Dominquez and was insured by an automobile liability policy issued by USAgencies Casualty Insurance Company, Inc. ("USAgencies") to Dominguez. As a result of the accident, Bimah and her husband, Derrick Bimah, filed suit for damages individually and on behalf of their minor child, Victor Bimah, against Meza, Tierrablanca, Dominquez, and USAgencies, contending that Meza was at fault in causing the accident.
In response to the suit, USAgencies filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the automobile liability insurance policy it issued to Dominguez, covering the vehicle involved in this accident, contained a driver restriction endorsement, as authorized by LSA-R.S. 32:900(L), excluding coverage for Meza under the policy. In support of its motion, USAgencies filed the insurance policy together with the declarations page and named driver exclusion endorsement. On both the declarations page and named driver exclusion endorsement, Meza was listed as an excluded operator for whom coverage was not afforded under the policy.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs contended that the named driver exclusion endorsement is unenforceable because Louisiana law and public policy do not allow insurance companies to exclude minor drivers from their parents' insurance policies. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted USAgencies's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against it with prejudice. From this judgment, plaintiffs appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, LSA-R.S. 32:851 through 32:1043, provides a mandatory, comprehensive scheme for the protection of the public from damage caused by motor vehicles. The law requires that the owner of every motor vehicle registered in this state, with limited exception, obtain proof of security prior to registration, application for an inspection certificate, and/or the issuance of a driver's license. LSA-R.S. 32:861(A)(1) & (2); LSA-R.S. 32:862(C) & (D); Bryant v. United Services Automobile Association, 2003-3491 (La. 9/9/04), 881 So. 2d 1214, 1218. One method of complying with this requirement is to obtain an automobile liability policy. LSA-R.S. 32:861(A)(1).
The statutory scheme provided by the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law is intended to attach financial protection to the vehicle rather than the operator. Accordingly, Louisiana's automobile insurance law requires omnibus coverage in favor of any person using an insured vehicle with the permission or consent of the named insured. LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2); Bryant, 881 So. 2d at 1218.
However, in 1992, the legislature created an exception to the general rule of omnibus coverage in enacting section (L) of LSA-R.S. 32:900, which permits a named insured to exclude from coverage a resident of his household. The purpose of this provision is to allow the named insured the option of paying a reduced premium in exchange for insurance that affords no coverage to the excluded driver. Joseph v. Dickerson, 99-1046 (La. 1/19/00), 754 So. 2d 912, 917.
Section (L) of LSA-R.S. 32:900 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (B)(2) of this Section, an insurer and an insured may by written agreement exclude from coverage the named insured and the spouse of the named insured. The insurer and an insured may also exclude from coverage any other named person who is a resident of the same household as the named insured at the time that the written agreement is entered into, and the exclusion shall be effective, regardless of whether the excluded person continues to remain a resident of the same household subsequent to the execution of the written agreement. It shall not be necessary for the person being excluded from coverage to execute or be a party to the written agreement.
In the instant case, plaintiffs do not dispute that the USAgencies policy at issue contained a "Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement," which was signed by the named insured, Dominguez, and which provided that no coverage was afforded by the policy when a covered vehicle was being driven by Meza. Rather, they assert that the trial court erred in finding the endorsement to be enforceable in the instant case. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the policy's named driver exclusion endorsement cannot be applied legally to a minor. They argue that pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:863.1, a vehicle owner must obtain automobile liability insurance, but that a minor cannot purchase insurance because the minor lacks the contractual capacity to do so under LSA-C.C. art. 1918. Plaintiffs further note that in the case where the driver is a minor child, section (F) of LSA-R.S. 32:863.1 places the responsibility of coverage on the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, plaintiffs assert that "the only way for a minor to become a legally compliant, insured driver is to receive coverage from her parents' policy."
The "Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement" provides, in pertinent part:
In consideration of the premium charged, the Named Insured agrees that no coverage provided by the Company is afforded while any vehicle listed on this policy is being used, driven, operated or manipulated by, or under the care of... Laura Meza ....
Although not clearly established in the record, the parties do not dispute that Meza was a minor at the time of the accident in question.
Louisiana Revised Statute 32:863.1 provides that an owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state shall not "operate or allow the operation" of his vehicle on any public road unless, among other things, a certificate of insurance is contained within the vehicle. LSA-R.S. 32:863.1(A)(1). Section (F) of the statute further provides that ';[i]n the case where the driver is a minor child, the owner of the vehicle shall be responsible under this Section" and that "[i]f the owner of the vehicle is the minor child, the parents of the minor child shall be jointly subject to the provisions of this Section along with the minor child."
Plaintiffs also note that LSA-C.C. art. 2318 renders parents vicariously liable for the negligence of their child who resides with them. Moreover, they contend that LSA-R.S. 32:900(L), which allows for a named driver exclusion, does not mention the word "minor" and "does not claim to deny coverage for a named insured's vicarious liability."
On the issue of vicarious liability, we note that Meza's parents, Tierrablanca and Dominquez, filed peremptory exceptions of no right and no cause of action in response to plaintiffs' original petition, filed by Angelica Bimah in proper person, contending that plaintiffs had not alleged a factual basis for any liability against them. By judgment dated July 5, 2011, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Tierrablanca and Dominquez with prejudice "in the event that plaintiffs fail to amend their petition for damages, within 15 days from the date of this order, to allege a viable cause of action" against these defendants.
Thereafter, on August 15. 2011, through counsel, plaintiffs sought to file an amending petition, alleging that Tierrablanca and Dominquez were vicariously liable for the negligence of their minor daughter. Despite the passage of more than fifteen days from the date of the judgment of dismissal, the trial court signed an order granting plaintiffs leave to file the amending petition. However, the effect, if any, of this amended pleading is not before us.
Thus, plaintiffs maintain that reading these statutes and articles together in a manner that harmonizes them requires a finding that LSA-R.S. 32:900(L) cannot be applied to exclude minor drivers from their parents' automobile liability policies. According to plaintiffs, any other reading of LSA-R.S. 32:900(L) would defeat the purpose of the compulsory insurance law of "providing] compensation for persons injured by the operation of insured vehicles" and the purpose of the tutorship and other child-advocacy laws of "protection of the minor's interest." We disagree.
At the outset, we note that both this court and the Louisiana Supreme Court have upheld named driver exclusions that have excluded coverage for accidents involving a minor driver. See Williams v. Watson, 2001-0495 (La. 10/16/01), 798 So. 2d 55, and Aikman v. Thomas, 2003-2241 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 887 So. 2d 86; see also Bryant 881 So. 2d at 1220-1224 (interpreting the "no pay, no play" law, LSA-R.S. 32:866, together with LSA-R.S. 32:900(L)). In Williams, the defendant driver, who was an excluded driver under his mother's automobile liability insurance policy, was seventeen years old at the time of the accident. Similarly, in Aikman, the minor driver who had been excluded from coverage under his stepfather's policy was seventeen years old at the time of the accident therein. While the precise issue presented in Williams (i.e., whether the named driver exclusion remains valid when the excluded driver is no longer a resident of the insured's household) is not present in the instant case, the Supreme Court's analysis therein is helpful in addressing the arguments raised by plaintiffs herein.
The opinion in Williams reveals that the son's date of birth was January 31, 1978, and the accident at issue therein occurred on October 16, 1995. Williams, 798 So. 2d at 56.
First, the Court looked to the statutory language itself. Williams. 798 So. 2d at 59. Using this approach herein, we note that subsection (L)(l) of LSA-R.S. 32:900 allows the insurer and an insured to "exclude from coverage any other named person who is a resident of the same household as the named insured at the time that the written agreement is entered into." (Emphasis added). Thus, the statutory language at issue clearly allows the insured and insurer to exclude from coverage any person the parties specifically name in the exclusion and does not limit or restrict the ability of the parties to the contract to exclude coverage for a named person based on the age of the driver.
Moreover, the Court in Williams noted that the sole purpose for this type of exclusion is premium reduction. Williams, 798 So. 2d at 59. An excluded driver endorsement can enable an insured, who would otherwise have difficulty obtaining insurance coverage for a vehicle, to obtain insurance at a reasonable rate. While it may be economically unfeasible for a person whose teenager is a young, inexperienced driver living in his household to obtain the liability insurance mandated by law, an excluded driver endorsement naming the high-risk driver could result in a premium reduction that would enable the insured to obtain the required coverage at an affordable price. See Medina v. Woods, 2005-1303 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/31/06), 944 So. 2d 697, 702. Although a parent may be vicariously liable for the negligence of his minor child residing with him pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 2318, where an insured parent chooses to execute an excluded driver endorsement to reduce his insurance premium, he obligates himself to abide by the terms of the exclusion and the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law by preventing his excluded minor child from driving any vehicle covered under the relevant policy to which the endorsement applies. Where such an excluded driver endorsement has been validly executed, refusing to recognize the validity of the exclusion would result in imposing on the insurer a coverage obligation that is not commensurate with the premium paid and, thus, would defeat the purpose of the omnibus coverage exception provided for in LSA-R.S. 32:900(L). See Williams, 798 So. 2d at 59.
We note that in Joseph, the Louisiana Supreme Court pointed out (but did not resolve) that if a named insured were deemed vicariously liable for the excluded driver's negligent conduct, "then an important public policy question would arise regarding an insurance policy covering the insured, but nonetheless denying coverage to the insured for vicarious liability." Joseph. 754 So. 2d at 917. However, we believe that the same public policy considerations discussed in Williams would apply to any alleged vicarious liability of the parents for the negligence of their minor child. To allow the insured the benefit of a reduced premium by specifically excluding his minor child from coverage, but to then force the insurer to provide coverage for the parent/insured's vicarious liability for the excluded minor child's negligence would likewise impose on the insurer a coverage obligation that is not commensurate with the premium paid. See Williams, 798 So. 2d at 59; see also Manlev v. Alphonso, 97-2334 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/3/99), 729 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (holding that LSA-R.S. 32:900(L) permits a specified driver exclusion that excludes coverage not only for the specified driver, but also for an insured sued under a negligent entrustment theory).
It is unfortunate that, at times, either the excluded driver or the insured owner of the vehicle, or both, would choose to disregard the named driver exclusion and, thus, violate the law by operating, or allowing the operation of, the vehicle without insurance coverage, thereby putting other motorists at risk of being involved in an accident wherein insurance coverage will not be provided. However, we note that the legislature has enacted statutes to penalize those who drive without proper insurance for the sake of the public safety, LSA-R.S. 32:861, et seq. Cochran v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2006-0811 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/07)(unpublished).
Moreover, as noted by the Supreme Court in Adams v. Thomas, 98-2003, 98-2005 (La. 4/13/99), 729 So. 2d 1041, 1044, "[t]he determination of what is an acceptable exclusion in an insurance policy is up to the legislature." By enacting LSA-R.S. 32:900(L), the legislature has permitted the exclusion of high-risk drivers from coverage in exchange for a reduced premium. Medina, 944 So. 2d at 702. While the result may seem harsh in the circumstances, we cannot overturn that legislative declaration. Accordingly, we are unable to find error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the October 31, 2011 judgment, granting USAgencies's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' claims against it with prejudice, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiffs, Angelica and Derrick Bimah.
AFFIRMED.
2012 CA 0124
ANGELICA C. BIMAH AND DERRICK M. BIMAH
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR CHILD
VICTOR BIMAH
VERSUS
LAURA A. MEZA, EMMA JAUREZ TIERRABLANCA, SILVESTRE MEZA
DOMINQUEZ, AND US AGENCIES CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY
McCLENDON, J., agrees and assigns additional reasons.
This case raises serious public policy issues. However, the clear language of LSA-R.S. 32:900L allows an insured to "exclude from coverage any other named person who is a resident of the same household as the named insured at the time that the written agreement is entered into." The statute provides no exceptions for minor children. Therefore, these policy concerns are best addressed by the legislature.