Bilodeau v. United States

13 Citing cases

  1. Soloman-Nabres Family Trust v. Chynoweth

    Case No. CV F 05-1413 OWW DLB, (Docs. 1, 7.) (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2006)

    Section 7609(b)(2)(A)'s 20-day filing requirement is jurisdictional. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Fogelson v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983); Grishman v. United States, 578 F.Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 234, 235 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 738, 741-742 (N.D. Ill. 1983). "[T]he twenty-day limit must be strictly construed because it is a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity."

  2. Serban's Background Music v. Chynoweth

    Case No. CVF 05-1476 OWW DLB (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2006)

    Section 7609(b)(2)(A)'s 20-day filing requirement is jurisdictional. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Fogelson v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983); Grishman v. United States, 578 F.Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 234, 235 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 738, 741-742 (N.D. Ill. 1983). "[T]he twenty-day limit must be strictly construed because it is a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity." Ponsford, 771 F.2d at1309.

  3. Environmental Sound Solutions v. Chynoweth

    Case No. CV F 05-1431 REC LJO, (Docs. 1, 17.) (E.D. Cal. May. 22, 2006)

    Section 7609(b)(2)(A)'s 20-day filing requirement is jurisdictional. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Fogelson v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983); Grishman v. United States, 578 F.Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 234, 235 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 738, 741-742 (N.D. Ill. 1983). "[T]he twenty-day limit must be strictly construed because it is a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity."

  4. Dame v. United States

    643 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that a petition to quash is moot when a summons has been withdrawn

    See Stringer v. United States, 776 F.2d 274, 275-76 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Internal Revenue Service, 625 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (W.D. Ky. 1985); Clark v. United States, 84-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) para. 9242 at 83,492 (D.Me. 1984) [Available on WESTLAW, DCTU database]; Cybulski v. United States of America, 84-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) para. 9566 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) [Available on WESTLAW, DCTU database]; Franklin v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.Mich. 1984); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D.Ill. 1983).See Clark v. United States, 84-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) para. 9242 (dismissing a petition to quash filed on the twenty-first day); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (dismissing a pro se petition to quash filed on the twenty-first day).

  5. Stringer v. United States

    776 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1985)   Cited 50 times
    Holding notice is "given on the date it is mailed" and noting courts "unanimously have rejected the argument" that "the requisite notice is not 'given' until its receipt" by the taxpayer

    Indeed, courts that have addressed this issue unanimously by Stringer. Franklin v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.Mich. 1984); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D.Ill. 1983). We agree.

  6. Ponsford v. United States

    771 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1985)   Cited 116 times
    Holding petitioner failed to rebut the IRS's showing that summons was issued in good faith

    We agree. Several district courts have addressed this issue and found the twenty-day limit jurisdictional. See, e.g., Fogelson v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D.Kan. 1983); Grisham v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D.N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (N.D.Ill. 1983). The essence of these decisions is that the twenty-day limit must be strictly construed because it is a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.

  7. Bonifatto v. United States

    CIVIL NO. 3:13-MC-00124-MOC-DSC (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 2013)

    If a proceeding to quash is not commenced within the twenty day period, the District Court is without jurisdiction to quash the summons. Bogue v. United States, 2007 WL 5174951, *2 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (citing Henderson v. United States, 778 F.Supp. 274, 276 (D.S.C.1991)); see also Shipley v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d 94-7713 (E.D. Cal. 1994); Brohman v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Grisham v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (N.H. 1983). Section 7609 waives the sovereign immunity of the United States.

  8. Thompson v. U.S.

    Case No. 2:06-CV-993 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 21, 2007)   Cited 3 times

    Beck v. U.S., 60 Fed. Appx. 551 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Masat v. United States, 745 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1984); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1983). Thompson has not proven that venue is proper.

  9. U.S. v. Gillum

    NO: 4:05cr00216 JFF (E.D. Ark. May. 22, 2007)

    Additionally, Chase Home Finance, LLC is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Columbus, OH. Numerous courts have found that they lacked jurisdiction to entertain suits to quash third-party summonses which were not filed in the district in which the entity to be summoned resided. See: Dennis v. U.S., 660 F.Supp. 870 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Deal v. U.S., 759 F.2d 442 (C.A. 5 (Tex) 1985); Masat v. U.S., 745 F.2d 985 (C.A.5 (Tex) 1984); Dial v. U.S., 599 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Smith v. U.S., 598 F.Supp 753, (D. Conn. 1984); Bilodeau v. U.S., 577 F. Supp. 234 (D.C.N.H. 1983) Because Chase Home Finance, LLC is an entity in Columbus, OH, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, and thus, the motion (Docket No. 13) is DENIED.

  10. Oldham v. United States, Internal Revenue Service

    No. CV-01-952-HU (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2002)

    Courts that have addressed the issue summarily conclude that they lack jurisdiction if the recordkeeper is "located," or has its principal place of business, outside the district. See, e.g., Cosme v. IRS, 708 F. Supp. 45, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (jurisdiction exists where the third party resides or does business); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D.N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire district court did not have jurisdiction to quash summons issued to Massachusetts bank). In support of the motion to dismiss the Second Amended Petition in regard to the Harley Davidson Credit and Ford Motor Credit summonses, respondent relies on McGeachy's declaration in which she states that she contacted officials at both companies and was informed that neither company's headquarters is based on Oregon and that neither company has a regular place of business in Oregon.