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affirming summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff failed to show that his conduct was materially the same as that of the alleged comparator
Summary of this case from Morales v. Div. of Youth & Family JusticeOpinion
No. 07-2359-cv.
November 20, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Janet C. Hall, Judge). UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: JOHN R. WILLIAMS, New Haven, CT.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: LORI B. ALEXANDER (Stephen P. Rosenberg, on the brief), Littler Mendelson, P.C., North Haven, CT.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, ROBERTD. SACK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Edward Billue appeals from a judgment of the District Court, entered on April 26, 2007, following a successful motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Praxair, Inc., plaintiff's employer. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant discriminated against him because of his race and retaliated against him because of previous complaints in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Plaintiff also alleged violations of other federal and state laws, but does not appeal the District Court's dismissal of those claims.) On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims because (a) the Court applied an "overly strict standard" in distinguishing allegedly comparable employees as part of plaintiff's discrimination claim, and (b) plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of retaliation for the claim to proceed to a jury trial. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case, which have been thoroughly explained by the District Court.
"We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo." Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Upon review of the record, we find no basis to disagree with the findings or conclusions of the District Court, which properly applied the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (outlining "burden shifting" in a workplace discrimination claim brought under Title VII). We agree with the District Court that plaintiff has not adequately established disparate treatment because his proposed "similarly situated" employee was materially distinct from plaintiff. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that, to establish an "inference of discrimination" in a prima facie case of discrimination, "[a] plaintiff may . . . show that the employer subjected him to disparate treatment, that is, treated him less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group," and that a comparable employee must be "similarly situated in all material respects" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This employee, who is white, left his delivery truck unattended for five minutes, with the rear trailer doors locked, within 100 yards of the defendant's property, and under the surveillance of defendant's security cameras. By contrast, plaintiff, who is African-American, urinated in a public parking lot along a highway, temporarily abandoned his truck for roughly 20 minutes while he shopped in a sporting goods store, and did not secure the truck pursuant to defendant's protocols. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's conduct was materially different from the conduct of his proposed "similarly situated" employee.
We further agree with the District Court that — assuming arguendo that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination — defendant has satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's suspension. However, plaintiff has not responded with evidence suggesting that defendant's explanations are pretextual, as required by McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04 (requiring that plaintiff show that defendant's "stated reason for [adverse action against plaintiff] was in fact pretext").
Regarding plaintiff's retaliation claim, the strongest basis for establishing causation is the 15-months between the alleged adverse action (plaintiff's suspension in July 2003) and the protected activity (a complaint filed with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in April 2002). We agree with the District Court that, lacking additional evidence of retaliation, the 15-month span is insufficient to sustain a retaliation claim in light of defendant's legitimate business reasons for suspending plaintiff. Plaintiff's alternative attempts to establish causation — based on (1) statements by unnamed employees that one of plaintiff's supervisors "wanted to get rid of him," and (2) statements directed at plaintiff that were made in 2001 and that contained racial epithets — are unavailing. We agree with the District Court that these statements, which are vague or which predate the protected activity in this case, cannot establish causation. We also agree with the District Court that plaintiff's allegations of being subjected to close scrutiny are not supported by competent evidence.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.