However, we conclude that, in proper circumstances, the presumption is a rebuttable one[.]” The court recognizing presumption of imputed knowledge in the context of government attorneys, which presumption could be rebutted by proper ethical screening); cf. also Billings v. State, 441 S.E.2d 262, 266 (Ga. 1994) (because individual government lawyer at issue “should be screened from any direct or indirect participation in the matter,” vicarious disqualification of entire office denied); cf. also Calhoun v. Area Agency on Aging of Se. Arkansas, 618 S.W.3d 137, 137 (Ark. 2021) (individual lawyer disqualified when joining prosecutors' office but “the entire office in which that attorney works is not disqualified as long as the disqualified attorney is appropriately screened. Disqualification of the entire prosecuting office is not necessary absent special facts, such as a showing of actual prejudice; or, perhaps the screening procedures are ineffective.”

Our opinions in Head v. State, 253 Ga.App. 757 (560 S.E.2d 536) (2002), Billings v. State, 212 Ga.App. 125 (441 S.E.2d 262) (1994), and Whitworth v. State, 275 Ga.App. 790 (622 S.E.2d 21) (2005), are distinguishable. In Head, we addressed an appearance of impropriety based upon status alone where the investigator with the alleged status conflict took no part in the investigation or prosecution of the case.

We note that a number of appellate decisions have recognized that when one assistant district attorney in an office is disqualified from acting, certain procedures may be employed to screen that assistant from the prosecution and it is not necessary that the entire district attorney's office be disqualified from prosecuting the case. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 294 Ga. 484, 485(2), 754 S.E.2d 76 (2014) ; Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 619(4), 593 S.E.2d 335 (2004) ; Billings v. State, 212 Ga.App. 125, 128 –129(4), 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994). Nonetheless, the habeas court found that McDade had a personal interest in the case that disqualified him from participating in the prosecution of the case at all, not just from serving as trial counsel.

Rather, the other lawyers on the district attorney's staff may continue with the case so long as the attorney who previously represented the defendant (i) did so in an unrelated proceeding; and (ii) is properly "screened from any direct or indirect participation" in the current prosecution. Id. See also Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 129 (4) ( 441 SE2d 262) (1994) ("Vicarious disqualification of a government department is not necessary or wise, and the individual lawyer should be screened from any direct or indirect participation in the matter, and discussion with colleagues concerning the case should be prohibited. [Cit.]"). Both of these requirements were met by Patterson.

ANDREWS, P.J., and ELDRIDGE, J., concur. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 128-129(4) ( 441 S.E.2d 262) (1994). Id. at 129(4).

Contrary to the State's contentions, imputed or vicarious disqualification of a government employee is not at issue here. See Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 694 (9) ( 362 S.E.2d 351) (1987); Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 128-129 (4) ( 441 S.E.2d 262) (1994). In this case, the imputed disqualification, from Bruce to Ben Kirbo, is within a private firm.

4. For the reasons stated in Division 3, the trial court did not err when it denied Brice's motion for a mistrial based upon the trial court's decision to allow Snell and Kight to testify. 5. The trial court did not err when it allowed the solicitor to lay the foundation for calling Sheriff Kight to impeach Snell by stating in his place the prior inconsistent statement made by Snell in the presence of Sheriff Kight. See OCGA § 24-9-81; Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 129 (5) ( 441 S.E.2d 262) (1994). 6. Brice contends the trial court should have granted her amended motion for new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct.

Ample evidence existed authorizing the trial court to find that Snyder freely and voluntarily made his statement. See Barrs v. State, 202 Ga. App. 520, 521 (3) ( 414 S.E.2d 733) (1992); See Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 127 (2) ( 441 S.E.2d 262) (1994). 2.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 128 ( 441 S.E.2d 262) (1994). Farley asserts that because Agent Hull's written summary of her interview with Farley did not indicate that Farley initiated the conversation, but only stated that "Agent Hull and Farley began a conversation on the trafficking of narcotics," the State failed to meet its requisite evidentiary burden under the totality of the circumstances.

" In Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 314 ( 369 S.E.2d 232); Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 693 (1) ( 362 S.E.2d 351), and Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125 ( 441 S.E.2d 262) the appellants complained of the prosecutor's failure to disqualify itself for having hired appellants' defense counsel. Reference was made to Ethical Consideration 7-13, which states: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate. . . ."