Although Family Court did not explicitly find that a change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the prior custody and visitation order, our independent review of the record reveals that, since entry thereof, the father has been determined to have committed a family offense against the mother, he has been adjudicated to have neglected the subject child and ordered to engage in various services, and his visitation has been reduced from unsupervised to supervised. Based on the foregoing, we are satisfied that the requisite change in circumstances was demonstrated (see Matter ofKathleen K. v. Daniel L., 177 A.D.3d 1130, 1132, 115 N.Y.S.3d 117 [2019] ; Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602–1603 [2012], 944 N.Y.S.2d 808 ). Turning to the best interests of the child, the father's sole contention on appeal is that Family Court's determination to impose continued supervised visitation between him and the child was not supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record.

Finally, given the mother's demonstrated animosity toward the father and her failure to indicate that, in the future, she would be willing to cooperate with him to ensure a continued relationship between him and the child (see Matter of Patricia Y. v Justin X., 219 A.D.3d 1586, 1587-1590 [3d Dept 2023]; Matter of Mark RR. v Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602-1603 [3d Dept 2012]; compare Matter of Thomas BB. v Jessica YY., 219 A.D.3d 1578, 1581 [3d Dept 2023]; cf. Matter of Carl v McEver, 88 A.D.3d 1089, 1090 [3d Dept 2011]), we discern no basis upon which to disturb Family Court's custody decision. Garry, P.J., Lynch, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ., concur.

Additionally, although not determinative (see Matter of Erick RR. v Victoria SS., 206 A.D.3d at 1526), we note that the attorney for the child (hereinafter AFC) continues to support the father having primary physical custody. Deferring to the court's factual findings and credibility assessments (see Matter of Cecelia BB. v Frank CC., 200 A.D.3d 1411, 1414 [3d Dept 2021]), we find that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record to support the custody determination (see Matter of Mark RR. v Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602-1603 [3d Dept 2012]; Matter of Christopher T. v Jessica U., 90 A.D.3d 1092, 1095 [3d Dept 2011]; Munson v Lippman, 2 A.D.3d 1252, 1253 [3d Dept 2003]; cf. Matter of Carl v McEver, 88 A.D.3d 1089, 1090 [3d Dept 2011]; compare Matter of Thomas BB. v Jessica YY., 219 A.D.3d 1578 [3d Dept 2023]; Matter of Mariah K. [Rachael K.-Jay L.], 165 A.D.3d 1379, 1379-1384 [3d Dept 2018]), and it will therefore not be disturbed.

Family Court also appropriately determined that, given the child's corroborated allegations against the fiance´e, and the fact that the father and the fiance´e reside together, are engaged to be married and intend to continue residing together following their marriage, a change in circumstances occurred since entry of the prior order warranting inquiry into the best interests of the child (seeMatter of Andrew S. v. Robin T., 145 A.D.3d 1209, 1211–1212, 44 N.Y.S.3d 557 [2016] ; Matter of Mary BB. v. George CC., 141 A.D.3d 759, 761, 34 N.Y.S.3d 736 [2016] ; Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602–1603, 944 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2012] ). Turning to the best interests analysis, Family Court appropriately determined that it was in the child's best interests to modify the parties' visitation schedule.

That said, the mother bore the initial burden of demonstrating a change in circumstances since the entry of the prior custody order so as to trigger an analysis of the best interests of the child (seeMatter of Lionel PP. v. Sherry QQ. , 170 A.D.3d 1460, 1461, 96 N.Y.S.3d 733 [2019] ; Matter of Normile v. Stalker , 140 A.D.3d 1233, 1234, 33 N.Y.S.3d 506 [2016] ). In view of the father's neglect admission, the record discloses the requisite change in circumstances (seeMatter of Mariah K. [Rachael K.–Jay L.] , 165 A.D.3d at 1381, 86 N.Y.S.3d 282 ; Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1603, 944 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2012] ).

"The threshold inquiry in a custody modification proceeding is whether there has been a change in circumstances since the prior custody order warranting a review of the issue of custody to ensure the continued best interests of the child" (Matter of Joseph Q. v. Jessica R., 144 A.D.3d 1421, 1422, 42 N.Y.S.3d 394 ). Here, the allegations of neglect by DSS constitute the requisite change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry into the best interests of the child (see generally Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602–1603, 944 N.Y.S.2d 808 ; Matter of Jeremy J.A. v. Carley A., 48 A.D.3d 1035, 1036, 851 N.Y.S.2d 751 ). In making a best interests determination, a court must consider, among other factors, " ‘the relative fitness, stability, past performance, and home environment of the parents, as well as their ability to guide and nurture the child[ ] and foster a relationship with the other parent’ " (Matter of Parchinsky v. Parchinsky, 114 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 980 N.Y.S.2d 614 ; see Matter of Blagg v. Downey, 132 A.D.3d 1078, 1079–1080, 18 N.Y.S.3d 219 ).

The mother now appeals, contending that Family Court's custody determination lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record. As a starting point, there is no question that the finding of neglect against the mother—based upon her admission that she repeatedly “drugged” her child with over-the-counter medication, for no medical purpose and in a dosage far exceeding what was recommended for the child's age, over the course of three months—was more than sufficient to meet the father's initial burden of demonstrating a change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry into whether the best interests of the child would be served by modifying the existing custody arrangement (see Matter of Ze'Nya G. [Nina W.], 126 A.D.3d 566, 566, 3 N.Y.S.3d 577 [2015] ; Matter of Christy S. v. Phonesavanh S., 108 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 970 N.Y.S.2d 340 [2013] ; Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602–1603, 944 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2012] ). Relevant factors to consider in the best interests analysis include, among other things, “each parent's ability to furnish and maintain a suitable and stable home environment for the child, past performance, relative fitness, ability to guide and provide for the child's overall well-being and willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent” (Matter of Zahuranec v. Zahuranec, 132 A.D.3d 1175, 1176, 18 N.Y.S.3d 762 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Lodge v. Lodge, 127 A.D.3d 1521, 1524, 7 N.Y.S.3d 713 [2015] ; see Matter of Tod ZZ. v. Paula ZZ., 113 A.D.3d 1005, 1006, 979 N.Y.S.2d 710 [2014] ). While the record reflects that, prior to December 2013, the mother was the child's primary caregiver, the record also makes clear that the father was a consistent presence in the child's life.

The evidence established that the child's emotional condition has been impaired as a result of the father's “bizarre and paranoid behavior,” which resulted in the child being frightened and depressed ( Matter of Faith J., 47 A.D.3d 630, 630, 848 N.Y.S.2d 545;see generally Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 371–372, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840). The child's out-of-court statements were adequately corroborated by the father's statements to the DSS caseworker ( see Matter of Karl L., 224 A.D.2d 841, 842–843, 637 N.Y.S.2d 814) and the child's testimony ( see generally Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532, 536–537, 549 N.Y.S.2d 643, 548 N.E.2d 1294). With respect to appeal No. 1, the adjudication of neglect constituted a change in circumstances that warranted a determination whether a modification of the custody arrangement set forth in the 2008 joint custody order was in the best interests of the child ( see Matter of Mark RR. v. Billie RR., 95 A.D.3d 1602, 1602–1603, 944 N.Y.S.2d 808;Matter of Jeremy J.A. v. Carley A., 48 A.D.3d 1035, 1036, 851 N.Y.S.2d 751), and we conclude that the court properly determined that it was in the child's best interests for the mother to have sole custody. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.