Opinion
Rehearing Granted Nov. 7, 1941.
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Norman A. Bailie, Judge pro tem.
Proceeding by Rosanna Bila against Archibald B. Young and others for a writ of mandate to compel defendants to pay petitioner through the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County monthly old age security payments. From a judgment granting peremptory writ of mandate, defendants appeal.
Reversed with directions.
COUNSEL
Earl Warren, Atty. Gen., L. G. Campbell, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Clarence A. Linn, of San Francisco, for appellants.
Joseph K. Coady and Henry K. Elder, both of Los Angeles, for respondent.
OPINION
ARCHBALD, Justice pro tem.
Rosanna Bila, respondent here, on March 14, 1939, applied to the board of supervisors of Los Angeles county for monthly Old Age Security payments. Such application was denied December 15, 1939. Mrs. Bila appealed such decision to appellants, hereinafter called State Board. Such appeal was heard by the State Board and was denied.
Thereafter, Mrs. Bila filed her petition in the superior court of Los Angeles county for a writ of mandate to compel said State Board to pay her, through the board of supervisors of Los Angeles county, monthly Old Age Security payments in the sum of forty dollars per month from March 14, 1939, the date her application for such payment was filed with the board of supervisors. Said State Board demurred to the first amended petition and the amendment filed thereto, and answered such petition. Judgment was rendered by said court January 30, 1941, granting petitioner a peremptory writ of mandate directing said State Board to pay said petitioner, through the board of supervisors of Los Angeles county, monthly Old Age Security payments in the amount of $40 per month from October 3, 1939 (the date her application was denied), and awarding petitioner her costs. From said judgment said State Board has appealed, urging that said court erred:
1. In overruling defendants’ (appellants’) objections to the introduction of any evidence on the grounds, (a), of the insufficiency of the petition to state a cause of action, and, (b), that the court had no power to review the action of said board.
2. In finding that the action of the State Board was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
It was stipulated that the cause might be heard on a transcript of the proceedings before the State Board on the appeal, subject to the objection of defendants that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. Such transcript was marked "Petitioner’s Exhibit 1", and appears on pages 43 to and including line 21 on page 105 of the Transcript on Appeal.
Such hearing was informal, as administrative hearings usually are, and consists of statements of counsel and investigators, discussions between the members of the board and with counsel. The only evidence under oath was that of Mrs. Bila, yet it appears about as clearly as it would have in a court of law that Mrs. Bila had a farm in Colorado which was sold on the open market in 1936 for $2,400; that in 1929 her husband was an invalid and that they began borrowing money from petitioner’s brother, Frank Kelley. Petitioner testified that she repaid her brother $1,500 of such purchase price for money he had advanced herself and husband up to her husband’s death in 1933, and that she used the balance of the money to live on, to pay expenses, and to make her home in Los Angeles livable. She testified she gave her brother $500 of the $1,500 in the early part of 1937, "and when the other amount came in July, 1938, he took that amount". It appears, also, that a Mr. Wheeler, who had been a friend of the family since 1929, had helped petitioner take care of Mr. Bila, loaned her money in small amounts at different times, as well as having paid the back taxes on the Colorado property. On September 28, 1939, after she was denied relief by the board of supervisors, Mrs. Bila transferred to her brother, Frank Kelley, her home in Los Angeles, the assessed value of which was $550, for a consideration of approximately $610, of which it appears $235.69 was used to pay an outstanding loan from the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, and $330 to pay Mr. Wheeler for money loaned by him in 1933, and services rendered in 1932. The inconsistencies in petitioner’s testimony could be very well due to the fact that the witnesses were not business people, and to faulty recollection of dates and events. At one time in the first hearing, a motion was made and seconded that the appeal be denied. Such motion was put after considerable discussion, with no "aye" votes. In such discussions and before the vote was taken, a suggestion was made by Mr. Schreiber, deputy director of Los Angeles County Charities, to the effect that "if the property disposed of for $2,400 could be satisfactorily settled", and if "this brother Frank would give a life estate in that property" (the house), "the records would then be cleared". Shortly after that the motion lost was put. Directly after such vote a motion was put to the effect "that the appeal be granted * * * to the amount to which she may prove eligible", which was seconded. It seems clear that the board wished more evidence with reference to the Colorado property and wanted to ascertain if the brother would give a life estate to petitioner in the home, and, after some discussion, the meeting was continued "for information".
At the continued meeting a letter from the brother, Frank Kelley, was read, which, in effect, stated that he could not give his sister a deed to the home, as he had to borrow part of the money he paid her and would have to sell the home to pay it back. The following then appears in the transcript:
"Acting Chairman: In other words, they didn’t comply with the request of the Board at the last meeting in order to qualify.
"Mr. L. C. Schreiber, Deputy Director, Los Angeles County Charities: My recollection was that at the last meeting of the Board thirty days time would be allowed the appellant to obtain a life estate or else the appeal would have to be denied.
"Mrs. Barkwill (Member of State Board): I would like to make a motion that the appeal of Rosanna Bila be denied.
"Mrs. Emmons (Member of State Board): I second.
"(Motion is carried.)"
It is perfectly clear that the members of the Board did not question the honesty of petitioner.
1. Did the court err in overruling defendants’ objection to the introduction of any evidence made on either of the stated grounds?
The first amended complaint alleges the necessary facts as to age and residence; that she was not on relief or an inmate of any public home or institution; that she was a widow and childless, and that she had made no voluntary assignment or transfer of her property for the purpose of qualifying for relief, and had no real or personal property in excess of the amounts allowed by the Act; the fact of application to the board of supervisors for Old Age Relief; the denial by such board; the fact of appeal to the State Board and its denial of relief; that petitioner is dependent on friends and charity, and has supplied all the information demanded of her in such proceedings, and has no adequate remedy at law. By the amendment she filed to such amended complaint, she alleged, in effect, that the State Board in denying such appeal acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in that said State Board "made the granting of old age security to your petitioner contingent upon your petitioner securing a life estate in certain property of which she was not the owner", which contingency, it is alleged, "was not then and is not now a requirement for the securing of old age security under the Social Welfare Act".
In the Department of Social Welfare of the state there is a board of seven members, known as the Social Welfare Board, each member appointed by the Governor for a term of four years, unless appointed to fill a vacancy. Sec. 101, Welfare and Institutions Code, St.1937, p. 1009. Such Board is required to meet once a month for the purpose of transacting business, sec. 102, and is invested with all of the duties, powers, purposes, responsibilities and jurisdiction under the Welfare Code, unless otherwise in such code expressly provided. Sec. 103.
In the Old Age Security Law (secs. 2000-2228, Welfare and Institutions Code), it is provided that subject to the provisions of said code, "every person residing in the State, if in need, shall be entitled to aid in old age from the State" (sec. 2001); that verified application for aid under such law, in the form provided by the state department of social welfare shall be filed with the board of supervisors of the county in which the applicant resides (sec. 2180), which board, directly or through an investigator, shall promptly make the necessary investigation, which is required to be completed within ninety days, the board upon receipt of report of such investigator to decide upon the amount of aid, if any (Sec. 2181).
If any applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of supervisors, he shall upon filing a petition with the State Department of Social Welfare, "have the right of appeal and shall be accorded an opportunity for a fair hearing" (sec. 2182). The State Social Welfare Board shall consider the appeal, and "shall dismiss the appeal or award aid as prescribed" in such law, and the county board of supervisors shall then pay to such aged person the sum awarded, if any, payment to commence as of the first day of the month in which the application is granted, unless otherwise directed by the State Social Welfare Board in cases in which an appeal is taken, but aid shall not commence prior to date of application (Sec. 2182).
It will be seen from the foregoing that the entire administration of the law is vested in the State Social Welfare Board, with the exception of the first application and action thereon, which is vested in the board of supervisors of the county of residence, subject to right of appeal to be heard by the State Social Welfare Board.
In our opinion the legislature has invested in the State Board a large measure of discretion, to be exercised under the rules presented in the Welfare and Institutions Code. That the legislature may do so without violating any principle of the Constitution is the settled law of this state. See People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 558, 234 P. 398, 38 A.L.R. 1186; Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Zellerbach, 200 Cal. 276, 252 P. 1038,--Fish & Game Commission; McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746, 91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205,--State Insurance Commission.
Such discretion "may not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, * * * or without a factual basis sufficient to justify" the action taken. McDonough v. Goodcell, supra.
In our opinion petitioner’s complaint stated a cause of action that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce by mandamus, at least to the extent of deciding whether or not the State Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or without a factual basis to justify such action, and that it did not err in overruling defendants’ objection to the introduction of evidence under such complaint, or in awarding petitioner her costs.
There is no provision in the act involved here for a review of the action of the board in the Superior Court as is provided in Deering’s General Laws of California, 1937, Act 3796, section 46, in the case of certain decisions of the Board of Equalization under such Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. In the absence of such a method of review, mandate is the only possible remedy to correct administrative abuse of discretion. Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 13 Cal.2d 75, 82, 87 P.2d 848.
In this case the State Board is invested with certain fact-finding powers on appeal, viz., to "consider the appeal" and having done that to either, first, "dismiss the appeal" or "award aid as prescribed in this chapter" (sec. 2182, Welfare and Institutions Code). The State Board, in effect, dismissed the appeal.
Did such board act arbitrarily and "without a factual basis sufficient to justify" the action taken?
So far as the Colorado property is concerned, if petitioner had had such property at the time of her application, the value thereof, combined with the apparent value of the home she then owned, might possibly have been sufficient to have disqualified her. The evidence in the transcript shows, however, that she had disposed of such Colorado property approximately three years before that, and that the last of the purchase price was paid in 1938 and that none of it remained in her hands, or under her control, at the time of the application. She had her home place at the time the application was made, but clearly its value was far less than the maximum value of real estate she could possess under the law and still qualify. Mrs. Bila testified, in effect, that she went to the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and told them she "was unable to make any more payment. They told me briefly they would have to have their money. Mr. Wheeler made the payments." After she sold her home to her brother, Mrs. Bila continued to live in it, paying $10 per month rent. A tenant in the home paid $12 per month. The value of the use of the house was not income, and the rent paid by the tenant was not enough to affect the amount of her aid. The sale of the home was made after her application was filed and we fail to see how the transfer of the home could have affected her eligibility at all, and she could not possibly have made the transfer of her Colorado property two years before she applied for aid "for the purpose of qualifying for such aid". Sec. 2160(g), Welfare and Institutions Code.
The record before us shows no factual basis for the denial by the board of petitioner’s appeal, and furthermore, to make the granting of aid contingent on petitioner’s obtaining either a transfer of the home back to her from her brother, or contingent on his granting petitioner a life estate in the home, was an abuse of the discretion vested in the board, something beyond their jurisdiction, and was an arbitrary action on the part of the board.
We are further of the opinion that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to fix the amount of the aid to be given, and in fixing the date when payments should commence. In our opinion the legislature has vested in the board the exclusive jurisdiction to award aid, determine the amount thereof to be paid within the limits fixed, and to determine when payments should begin, and that in assuming such jurisdiction the trial court erred. The judgment is reversed with directions to quash the writ of mandate issued and to issue another writ directing said State Board to grant petitioner’s appeal and to determine the amount of aid to which she is entitled and the date payments thereof are to commence.
YORK, P. J., concurred.
DORAN, Justice (concurring).
I concur only in the judgment of reversal and direction to quash the writ. In my opinion the courts are without power to interfere with the action of the board in the circumstances here presented.