Biggs v. Moats

4 Citing cases

  1. State ex rel. Judy v. Kiger

    153 W. Va. 764 (W. Va. 1970)   Cited 10 times

    In Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547, this Court awarded a writ of mandamus which required the judge of the Common Pleas Court of Cabell County to vacate and set aside an order previously entered by him which permitted a defendant to file an answer in a suit after the expiration of 15 days from the date of an order which overruled a demurrer to an amended bill of complaint. In Biggs v. Moats, 117 W. Va. 14, 183 S.E. 603, this Court held in point 2 of the syllabus that the Supreme Court of Appeals may by mandamus require a trial chancellor to enforce a decree entered by him awarding suit money to a woman to enable her to prosecute an appeal from an adverse decree in a divorce suit. In Miller v. Baer, 114 W. Va. 566, 172 S.E. 612, this Court awarded a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County, to enforce by process of contempt, its prior decree awarding attorney's fee and suit money in a divorce proceeding.

  2. Hammond v. Worrell, Judge

    107 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1959)   Cited 1 times

    The only syllabus point in State ex rel. Cooper v. Garvin, Judge, etc., 139 W. Va. 845, 82 S.E.2d 612, states: "In a divorce suit in which the female litigant suffers an adverse decree, she is entitled to reasonable allowances for suit money, costs, counsel fees and support, pending the granting or refusal of an appeal by this Court; and upon the refusal by the trial court to make such allowances, she may have a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to grant her such amounts as are reasonable and proper in the case." See also: Kittle v. Kittle, 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S.E. 799; State v. Maxwell, Judge, 89 W. Va. 31, 108 S.E. 418; State v. Isbell, 108 W. Va. 104, 150 S.E. 377; Hatfield v. Hatfield, 109 W. Va. 212, 153 S.E. 493; and Biggs v. Moats, 117 W. Va. 14, 183 S.E. 603. Thus it is clear, and we so hold, that the petitioner is entitled to an allowance of money necessary to secure a transcript of the evidence taken at the divorce hearing, for reasonable attorneys' fees for presentation of her petition to this Court for an appeal from the final decree of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County and other necessary court costs. There are two provisions relating to alimony in the final decree.

  3. State v. Garvin

    82 S.E.2d 612 (W. Va. 1954)   Cited 6 times
    In State ex rel. Cooper v. Garvin, 139 W. Va. 845, 82 S.E.2d 612 (1954), we recognized that mandamus would lie to compel a circuit court to make an award for temporary support and suit and counsel fees to a spouse who had suffered an adverse decree and wished to take an appeal. This was an extension of State ex rel. Davis v. Isbell, 108 W. Va. 104, 150 S.E. 377 (1929), in which we held that mandamus would lie to compel a circuit court to award temporary alimony.

    Though the statement in the syllabus of the Eddy case seems to follow the rule in other jurisdictions hereinabove mentioned, the practice in this state has been, and is otherwise. The Maxwell case is supported by later opinions of this Court, particularly in the case of Biggs v. Moats, 117 W. Va. 14, 183 S.E. 603, which holds that mandamus may be awarded to compel a trial chancellor to enforce a decree awarding suit money to a female litigant in a divorce suit. In State v. Isbell, 108 W. Va. 104, 150 S.E. 377, this Court held that upon refusal of a trial court to make an allowance such as that prayed for by relator here, that mandamus would lie to compel the allowance in reasonable and proper amounts. It is the duty of a trial court to make an allowance to a wife on her application for money to prosecute her suit and for her maintenance during the litigation.

  4. Crouch v. Easley

    119 W. Va. 208 (W. Va. 1937)   Cited 6 times
    In Crouch v. Easley, 119 W. Va. 208, 192 S.E. 690 (1937), this Court specified that in a divorce suit which does not involve minor children, maintenance or property rights, a decree of divorce a vinculo terminates the suit because the marital relation is the only subject before the court.

    Franklin v. Bonner, 201 Iowa 516, 207 N.W. 778. This holding is accordant with that of other states having statutes similar to ours, and also follows the tenor of our own decisions. See Kendall v. Kendall, 5 Kan. App. 688, 48 P. 940; Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465, 60 L.R.A. 294, 95 Am. St. Rep. 815; Bedolfe v. Bedolfe, 71 Wn. 60, 127 P. 594; Wald v. Wald, 168 Mo. App. 377, 151 S.W. 786; Franklin v. Bonner, supra; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 67 W. Va. 119, 67 S.E. 379, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 712; Milyanic v. Eddy, 106 W. Va. 370, 145 S.E. 643; Biggs v. Moats, 117 W. Va. 14, 183 S.E. 603. When the suit is reopened and the custody of the child taken from the mother, the circuit court has discretional authority under 48-2-13 to order the man to pay the costs of the woman's appeal.