1. Although Campbell has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence as outlined above was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of mutiny in a penal institution, riot in a penal institution, and five counts of obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Chynoweth v. State, 331 Ga.App. 123, 125(1), 768 S.E.2d 536 (2015) (evidence that defendant swung his fist at officer was sufficient to affirm conviction for obstruction and riot in a penal institution for committing an act in a violent manner); Bierria v. State, 232 Ga.App. 622, 625(9), 502 S.E.2d 542 (1998) (evidence that defendant was in lawful custody when he assailed, opposed or resisted an officer of the law with the intent to cause serious bodily injury was sufficient to affirm conviction for mutiny in a penal institution). 2.
(Citations omitted.) Bierria v. State, 232 Ga.App. 622, 624(1), 502 S.E.2d 542 (1998). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bierria v. State, 232 Ga.App. 622, 624(1), 502 S.E.2d 542 (1998).So viewed, the evidence was that, on December 5, 2010, around 8:00 p.m., Giovanny Aponte had gotten off work and was driving on Highway 92 off Fulton Industrial Parkway in Fulton County when he came up behind a silver Taurus in the left lane going slower than he was. Aponte was pulling into the right lane when the Taurus started into that lane without signaling, forcing Aponte to slam on his brakes to avoid a collision.
Shaw v. State, 241 Ga. 308, 311 (7) ( 245 SE2d 262) (1978). See Webb v. State, 277 Ga. App. 355, 356 (1) ( 626 SE2d 545) (2006) ("[u]nless the potential for prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, Georgia law favors the admission of relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value") (citation and punctuation omitted); see also State v. Adams, 270 Ga. App. 878, 881 (2) ( 609 SE2d 378) (2004); Anderson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 866, 874-875 (6) ( 519 SE2d 463) (1999); Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 626 (7) ( 502 SE2d 542) (1998); Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 336 (4) ( 398 SE2d 395) (1990). See Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 290, 292 (1) ( 501 SE2d 523) (1998) ("the trial court retains the sound legal discretion to exclude relevant similar crimes evidence on the ground that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice") (punctuation and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Roberts v. State, 241 Ga. App. 259, 262 (3) ( 526 SE2d 597) (1999) (where defendant denied commission of the crime of cocaine possession, a past conviction involving cocaine possession and sale "would be most helpful to the jury, and therefore the [s]tate's need would have outweighed the prejudice to the defendant" from the admission of the similar transaction) (citation omitted).
"A charge of prosecutorial misconduct is a serious charge and is not to be lightly made; having raised it, appellant has the duty to prove it by the record and by legal authority [Cits]." Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 625(3) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998). The defendants have done neither.
Parrish testified that Exhibits 1 and 2 constituted fair and accurate representations of his injured arm and that Exhibit 6 constituted a fair and accurate representation of the person who shot him. See Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 626(8) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998). Davis further challenges Exhibit 6 because the witness identifying the exhibit was not present when the photograph was taken.
The admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Bierra v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 626 (7) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998). Unless the potential for prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, Georgia law favors the admission of relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value.
Rower v. State, 267 Ga. 46 ( 472 S.E.2d 297) (1996). Also, Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 625 (2) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998); State v. LeMay, 186 Ga. App. 146 (1) ( 367 S.E.2d 61) (1988). Moreover, Callahan had moved for a mistrial on behalf of Barlow, and thus Barlow cannot now complain that a mistrial was granted.
We determine only whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 624 (1) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998). So viewed, the evidence of Barber's guilt was overwhelming and clearly authorized the jury to find him guilty of armed robbery and attempted robbery.
On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). See Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 624 (1) ( 502 S.E.2d 542) (1998). Brown's justification defense in essence was that the victim attacked him and the gun discharged during the ensuing struggle.