Opinion
C.A. No. 04A-04-003.
Submitted: October 25, 2004.
Decided: January 31, 2005.
Upon Consideration of Appellant's Appeal From Decision of Industrial Accident Board. Affirmed.
Andrea G. Green, Esq., Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel Bhaya, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Appellant.
Francis X. Nardo, Esq., Tybout, Redfearn Pell, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION
John Biddle ("the claimant") appeals a decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("the Board"). The appeal is limited solely to the Board's determination of the claimant's wage rate for purposes of calculating benefits.
I. FACTS
The claimant was employed as a mixer operator at Kraft Foods ("Kraft"). He earned $16.7030 per hour pursuant to the union agreement in force at the time of the accident. His position was a labor grade nine position. On October 28, 2001, a Sunday, the claimant started working a twelve hour shift at 7:00 p.m. During that shift, he was paid double-time for the first four hours, basic time for the next six, and double-time for the last two. The claimant was injured during the first hour of his shift, when he was on double-time. The double-time for the "seven to eleven" portion of the shift was paid pursuant to a grievance settlement.
The claimant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due and the employer filed a Petition for Review seeking to terminate the claimant's total disability benefits. The parties settled all issues except for the claimant's wage rate to be used in calculating benefits.
The Board heard the testimony of Robert Creamer, the Safety Manager at Kraft who testified as to Kraft's average work week, the claimant's wage rate, and Kraft's policies for overtime and double-time compensation. They also reviewed the claimant's pay stubs and spreadsheets reflecting hours worked by Kraft employees for the time period coinciding with the claimant's injury. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Board found that the claimant's wage rate for calculation of benefits was $16.7030 per hour. Applying this figure to Kraft's average work week of 44.9 hours per week, the Board determined the claimant's weekly wages as calculated under 19 Del. C. § 2302(b) were $749.96 per week.
II. PARTIES CONTENTIONS
Counsel for the claimant argues that pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2302 the claimant's wage rate for calculating benefits is $33.4060 ($16.7030 × 2) on the ground that $33.4060 was the rate of payment during the "seven to eleven" portion of the shift during which he was injured. Kraft responds by arguing the claimant's wage rate under the contract of hiring at the time of the accident was $16.7030. The claimant responds that the contract in force includes a grievance settlement requiring double the rate of pay for the hour in which the claimant was injured.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of review for appeal of a board decision is limited to examining the record for errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence is present on the record to support the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law. "Substantial evidence" is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. On appeal, the court does not "weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings." The court is simply reviewing the case to determine if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. The court must give "due account of the experience and specialized competence of the Board and of the purpose of our workers' compensation law." When reviewing the Board's findings, the reviewing court should accept those findings, even if acting independently, the reviewing court would reach contrary conclusions. Absent an error of law, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises only where the Board's decision has "exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances." Only where no satisfactory proof exists to support the factual finding of the Board may the Superior Court overturn it.
Robinson v. Metal Masters, Inc., 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 264; Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
ILC of Dover, Inc. v. Kelley, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 573, at *3.
Histed, 621 A.2d at 342.
HH Poultry v. Whaley, 408 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 1979).
Digiacomo v. Bd. of Publ. Educ., 507 A.2d 542, 546 (Del. 1986).
Floundiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Del. 1999); Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 64.
IV. DISCUSSION
A claimant's wage rate for purposes of the workers' compensation law is governed by 19 Del. C. § 2302(a). Section 2302(b) describes how that rate is used to calculate the employee's weekly wages. These provisions read in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The term "wages" means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident.
(b) If the rate of wages if fixed by the day or hour, the employee's weekly wages shall be taken to be that rate times the number of days or hours in an average work week of the employee's employer at the time of the injury.
While the claimant emphasizes cases which recognize that the wage rate at the time of the injury is the relevant rate, neither party has been able to provide authority which specifically addresses a situation where, as here, the employee is injured during a part of a shift when he is receiving a multiple of his basic rate. Nor has the court found any such authority.
Rubick v. Security Instruments Corp., 766 A.2d 15 (Del. 2000); May v. Georgia Pacific, Del. Super., C.A. No. 01A-06-009, Witham, J. (March 28, 2002) (ORDER).
After carefully considering the issue, I agree with the Board that the basic rate of $16.7030 is the proper "money rate" under 19 Del. C. § 2302 for use in calculating workers' compensation benefits. The double-time pay for the seven to eleven portion of the shift does not, in my opinion, create a second money rate. It is a method of providing extra pay for that portion of the shift.
The claimant relies on Rubick v. Security Instrument Corp. and May v. Georgia Pacific. In Rubic, the Board and the trial court based the claimant's compensation on a six month average as opposed to the hourly rate under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the incident. The Delaware Supreme Court found that this ran contrary to the plain language of the statute and the six-month average was only to be used in cases of exceptional circumstances for output employees. The case is distinguishable. It involved a different question. Overtime pay versus base pay was not the issue there. May is also distinguishable. In that case, the court stated that it did "not need to address whether the elements of § 2302(b) capture the true earning capacity of an employee when overtime wages are involved, because there is no substantial evidence on the record that Claimant had overtime wages at the time of the accident in this case." The court, therefore, left open the question of wage rate when an employee is earning overtime or double-time at the time of the accident.
766 A.2d 15 (Del. 2000).
Del. Super., C.A. No. 01A-06-009, Witham J. (March 28, 2002) (ORDER).
Id. at 7.
The decision of the Board is affirmed.