Bibiano v. Lynch

15 Citing cases

  1. Sidhu v. Wolf

    CV-20-1189-PHX-MTL (JFM) (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    Finally, Petitioner argues that transfer would be a denial of due process by denying Petitioner his counsel of choice. Reply - Respondents Reply (Doc. 22) on both the Motion and the OSC. Respondents argue that the Court should first address the loss of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir.2016) and that that the distinctions raised by Petitioner do not avoid the holding of Thuraissigiam II, and the APA does not govern immigration proceedings, nor is habeas a proper forum to raise APA claims. Respondents argue Petitioner does not avoid the jurisdictional rule of Padilla and improperly relies on venue authorities related to direct review, not habeas, and that Petitioner's venue analysis is flawed.

  2. Castillo v. Attorney Gen.

    109 F.4th 127 (3d Cir. 2024)

    Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that the court has the power to transfer a case to a circuit court "of proper jurisdiction and venue" "either under section 1631, or, if it be technically inapplicable because this Court is an improper forum due only to a want of venue rather than a want of jurisdiction, then . . . under . . . inherent or implied power"); Thiam v. Holder, 677 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that even though it was not jurisdictionally mandated to transfer the case under § 1631, "it is still our option to transfer a petition to another circuit with jurisdiction"); Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2013) ("We join other circuits that take guidance from § 1631 in assessing whether to transfer a case from one court, like ours, having jurisdiction to another that would also have proper venue."); Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[W]here a court has subject matter jurisdiction but venue is not proper, federal circuit courts have inherent transfer authority and need not rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1631."); Yang You Lee, 791 F.3d at 1266 ("Federal circuit courts have inherent power to transfer a case over which they have jurisdiction but lack venue."); Becker v. Comm'r, 852 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ("[U]nder circumstances properly justifying the exercise of our equitable powers, we may transfer an appeal to the federal court of proper venue"); Alexander v. Comm'r, 825 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that § 1631 did not "eliminate[ ] any inherent power in the courts to transfer a case to cure improper venue"). Our holding also conforms to Congress's apparent intent in codifying § 1631, which was to "rescue cases mistakenly filed in the wrong court," and to allow transfer to reach a just result.

  3. Wong v. Garland

    No. 22-60642 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024)

    Thus, the Court finds that jurisdiction remains in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 971-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that, consistent with nine other federal circuits, including the Fifth Circuit, INA § 242(b)(2), requiring petition for review of orders of removal be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the IJ completed the proceedings, is a non-jurisdictional venue provision, and thus, the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction over the applicant's claim even if venue was proper in the Eleventh Circuit). Accordingly, the Court will apply Ninth Circuit law in rendering its decision regarding [Wong's] applications for relief.

  4. Singh v. Garland

    No. 21-57 (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2023)

    1. We deny the government's request to transfer the petition to the Fifth Circuit. We need not decide whether proper venue lies here or in the Fifth Circuit, see Matter of Garcia, 28 I. &N. Dec. 693, 698-705 (BIA 2023) (interpreting where venue arises), because we decline to transfer the matter in the interests of justice, see Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2016) (outlining factors to consider when "deciding whether it is in the 'interests of justice'" to transfer venue). First, this case has been pending before the Ninth Circuit for two years, so a transfer would just further delay the matter.

  5. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch

    837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016)   Cited 88 times
    Holding that right-to-counsel claims "arise from removal proceedings" and "are bound up in and an inextricable part of the administrative process"

    See Viloria v. Lynch , 808 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2015) (“It is well established that this court's jurisdiction over removal proceedings is limited to review of final orders of removal.”); cf. Bibiano v. Lynch , 834 F.3d 966, 972-74, 2016 WL 4409351, at *5 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional, but contrasting the venue statute with other statutes in the INA that use the terms “judicial review” or “jurisdiction”).

  6. Johnson v. Phillips

    CIV. 24-00399 RT-NONE (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2024)

    Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1076-77 (D. Haw. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). In considering whether a transfer should be made in the interest of justice, the Court may consider “issues of delay, inconvenience to the parties, and waste of judicial resources” or “when procedural obstacles impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication . . . on the merits.” Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Hazel v. Lappin, 614 F.Supp.2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The Court finds that none of these factors warrant a transfer of venue to New York.

  7. B.P. v. Bostock

    No. C23-0890-KKE (W.D. Wash. Jun. 12, 2024)

    cf. Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 972-74, 2016 WL 4409351, at *5 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional, but contrasting the venue statue with other statutes in the INA that use the terms “judicial review” or “jurisdiction”).

  8. Warnicke v. Neveau

    Civ. 24-00064 HG-RT (D. Haw. Apr. 11, 2024)

    Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1076-77 (D. Haw. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). In considering whether a transfer should be made in the interest of justice, the Court may consider “issues of delay, inconvenience to the parties, and waste of judicial resources” or “when procedural obstacles impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication . . . on the merits.” Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2016); Hazel v. Lappin, 614 F.Supp.2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff's claims arise from events that occurred in Channahon, Illinois, and Defendant is a citizen of Illinois.

  9. Cornell v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs

    2:23-cv-00245-RFB-NJK (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2024)

    Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue and without subject matter jurisdiction, a court generally may not consider other aspects of a case, the Court does not address USDVA's other arguments for dismissal. Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 971 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”).

  10. Magee v. Gen. Motors

    EDCV 23-1715 JGB (SHKx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2023)

    Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the Court first addresses the motion to remand before turning to the motion to dismiss. See Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 970 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Courts should generally decide, as a threshold matter, whether they have subject matter jurisdiction before moving on to other, non-merits threshold issues.”).