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finding specific jurisdiction over a defendant regarding a negligence claim where the injury occurred outside of the forum state but the claim related to the defendant's "business activities in Texas"
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No. 4:22-cv-0200-P
2022-07-22
Rodney Dwayne BIBBS, Plaintiff, v. MOLSON COORS BEVERAGE COMPANY USA, LLC d/b/a Miller Coors, LLC, Defendant.
Levi G. McCathern, II, Noah McCathern, Salvador Jason Robles, McCathern PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff. Patrick S. Nolan, Pro Hac Vice, Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, WI, Andrew L. Franklin, Pro Hac Vice, Quarles & Brady LLP, Chicago, IL, James W. Watson, Ryan Quinn Trammell, Watson Caraway Midkiff & Luningham LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant.
Levi G. McCathern, II, Noah McCathern, Salvador Jason Robles, McCathern PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Patrick S. Nolan, Pro Hac Vice, Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, WI, Andrew L. Franklin, Pro Hac Vice, Quarles & Brady LLP, Chicago, IL, James W. Watson, Ryan Quinn Trammell, Watson Caraway Midkiff & Luningham LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant.
ORDER
Mark Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ("Motion"). ECF No. 11. Having considered the Parties’ briefing (ECF Nos. 11, 19, 21) and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the Motion for the reasons set out below.
BACKGROUND
This is a personal-injury case stemming from a trucking accident. According to Plaintiff Rodney Dwayne Bibbs, the trucking trailer he was driving overturned as a result of alleged negligence in its loading. Bibbs worked as a truck driver for High Horse Logistics, Inc. ("High Horse"). ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5. High Horse is a Texas-based transportation-services corporation. ECF No. 19 at 5.
Defendant Molson Coors Beverage Company USA, LLC f/k/a MillerCoors, LLC ("Molson Coors") is a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal office in Chicago, Illinois. ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2. Molson Coors has a facility in Fort Worth, Texas. Id. at 3 ¶ 7. Started in 1969, this facility is "the largest—and longest-operating—brewery in the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area and one of the largest in the United States." ECF No. 19 at 8 (quoting Defendant's website). From this location, Molson Coors "brew[s], package[s], and ship[s]" their cold-as-the-Rockies products. Id.
Molson Coors hired High Horse to transport a trailer of goods from its facility in Virginia to its Fort Worth brewery. ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 6. Molson Coors employees were responsible for loading the trailer and Bibbs was prohibited from opening the trailer or inspecting the load therein. Id. Bibbs picked up the trailer in Virginia to begin his route to the Fort Worth brewery. Id. at 3 ¶ 7. Not long after starting the journey, Bibbs was involved in an accident on the roads of West Virginia. ECF No. 11 at 6. Bibbs alleges that the secured load inside the trailer became loose and caused the trailer to swerve. ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 7. Bibbs then lost control over the truck, which resulted in his truck running off the road and ultimately overturning. Id.
Bibbs sued Molson Coors, claiming that Molson Coors's negligence as employer and owner of the trailer's load caused his injuries. Molson Coors moved to dismiss this case, arguing that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. ECF No. 11. The motion is now ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
"When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the party seeking to invoke the power of the court bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc. , 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006). A "plaintiff may bear his burden [of proof] by presenting a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction is proper" when the court "rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction ‘without an evidentiary hearing.’ " Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC , 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994) ). Courts may consider "the contents of the record before [it] at the time of the motion, including ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery.’ " Id. at 344 (quoting Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp. , 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985) ).
ANALYSIS
When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, this Court's authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant is governed by Texas state law. See Bulkley & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations , 1 F.4th 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2021). Texas courts evaluate personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants through a two-step inquiry, ensuring compliance with both the state's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. "Texas's long-arm statute specifically provides for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who ‘do[ ] business’ in Texas or ‘commit[ ] a tort’ in Texas." Id. (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042 ) (alterations in original). Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process, however, the two-step process " ‘collapses into one federal due process analysis.’ " Id. (quoting Sangha v. Navig8 ShipMgmt. Priv. Ltd. , 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018) ).
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits the power to exercise jurisdiction to cases when the defendant has such " ‘contacts’ with the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021) (quoting International Shoe. Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316–17, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This analysis, which focuses on the nature and extent of the defendant's relationship to the forum, recognizes two forms of personal jurisdiction: general or specific. Id.
The Court first analyzes whether it can assert general personal jurisdiction over Molson Coors. After concluding that general jurisdiction does not exist, it turns to the question of specific jurisdiction. The Court concludes that there is specific personal jurisdiction over Molson Coors on Bibbs's negligence claim.
A. Molson Coors is not "at-home" in Texas; thus, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over it.
General personal jurisdiction allows a court to hear "all claims against the defendant, no matter their connection to the forum." In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig. , 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir. 2018). Thus, to exercise general personal jurisdiction, a defendant's contacts with the forum state must be so "continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home" there. Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
When a corporation is the defendant, the "paradigm forum[s]" where it is essentially at home are the "corporation's place of incorporation and its principal place of business." BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell , 581 U.S. 402, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017). In the "exceptional case," general jurisdiction may be asserted over a corporation in a forum different from where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, but only if its "operations ... [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that state." Id. Proving such an exceptional case is "incredibly difficult." Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter , 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014).
Bibbs's Complaint fails to allege the prima facie case for general jurisdiction over Molson Coors. First , the Complaint alleges that Molson Coors has its principal office in Illinois. Though the Complaint never alleges where the company is incorporated, Molson Coors asserts, and Bibbs does not dispute, that it is incorporated in Delaware. ECF No. 11 at 11 (citing to ECF No. 12 at 5, Aff. of Collin Johnson., Molson Coors's legal counsel). Therefore, Texas is not the "paradigm forum" where Molson Coors is at home.
Second , despite maintaining the "the largest—and longest-operating—brewery in the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area," ECF No. 19 at 8, Molson Coors's contacts do not fall into the "exceptional case" of general jurisdiction. See BNSF Ry. Co. , 137 S. Ct. at 1558. Merely engaging in "substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business" in Texas does meet the bar to create general jurisdiction. Daimler , 571 U.S. at 138–39, 134 S.Ct. 746. Therefore, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over Molson Coors.
B. The Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Molson Coors in this case.
Molson Coors is subject to specific personal jurisdiction here because it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas; Bibbs's claim relates to its contacts with Texas; and the assertion of personal jurisdiction here does not offend traditional notions of justice.
Specific jurisdiction, or case-linked jurisdiction, allows a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant only in particular instances. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1024. There must be a connection between the defendant, the forum, and the underlying controversy to establish specific jurisdiction. See id. at 1024–25. The purpose of specific jurisdiction is to "ensure that States with ‘little legitimate interest’ in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy." Id. at 1025 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. , 582 U.S. 255, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) ).
To determine if specific jurisdiction exists, courts apply a three-part test:
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state;
(2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related contacts; and,
(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
See Carmona v. Leo Ship Man., Inc. , 924 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2019). If the plaintiff establishes the first two prongs of the test, then the defendant has the burden to make a "compelling case" that jurisdiction in this case is either unfair or unreasonable. Id.
1. Molson Coors purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas.
To establish "minimum contacts" with Texas, Bibbs must allege that Molson Coors "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities" here "such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in Texas. Id. This prong of the jurisdictional test is meant to protect defendants from being "haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the lateral activity of another party or a third person." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).
Although Molson Coors disputes it purposefully availed itself of Texas law, ECF No. 11 at 14, this argument is unpersuasive. To meet this criterion, a defendant may conduct substantial business in the forum state, including actively seeking to sell into and to serve the market there. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Bibbs alleges that, as part of its regular business, Molson Coors maintains a large brewery in Texas, as well as advertises and sells its product in Texas. ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 3; see also ECF No. 12 at 5 (Molson Coors operates a "Fort Worth brewery" that employs "420 employees"). None of these Texas contacts are "random, fortuitus, or attenuated." See Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Molson Coors "reached out beyond" its home of Delaware and Illinois to intentionally "exploit a market" in Texas —one of the Supreme Court's quintessential examples of "minimum contacts." Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (cleaned up). Further, and importantly for the Court's subsequent analysis, Molson Coors contracted with High Horse, a Texas corporation, to ship its product into the state. All these activities exploit the benefits and protections of Texas laws and could lead to litigation in Texas; thus, Molson Coors could reasonably anticipate "being haled into court" here. Carmona , 924 F.3d at 193.
Unlike Molson Coors here, the defendant in Ford Motor Co. conceded the reality of their forum connections. 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
Molson Coors's argument that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts confuses the "contacts" prong with the "relatedness" prong of the specific jurisdiction test. Despite Molson Coors's insistence to the contrary, the Court concludes that maintaining a brewery in Fort Worth, employing more than 400 individuals, selling and marking its products in Texas, and contracting with Texas corporations constitutes "directing activities at the resident of the forum." ECF No. 11 at 14. Whether the litigation "arises out or relates to" these contacts is the true basis for Molson Coors's objection to jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers , 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
2. Bibbs's negligence claim relates to Molson Coors's Texas contacts.
Bibbs must also allege that his suit "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to" Molson Coors's Texas contacts to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Id. This prong ensures that there is "an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy." Id. The Supreme Court recently clarified that "arise out of" and "relate to" are two separate methods of evaluating the connection between forum and controversy. Ford Motor Co. , 141 S.Ct. at 1026. Further, the Supreme Court specifically rejected a "causal showing" requirement. Id. at 1029 ("Ford argues, the plaintiffs’ claims ‘would be precisely the same if Ford had never done anything in Montana and Minnesota.’ ... Of course, that argument merely restates Ford's demand for an exclusively causal test of connection." (quoting Petitioner's Brief)).
Here, Bibbs alleges that Molson Coors's negligence caused the injury that occurred while he was transporting Molson Coors's goods. Molson Coors engaged the services of a Texas corporation to haul the trailer in question. ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 5. Molson Coors directed that trailer to be sent to Texas. Id. at 3, ¶ 7. And the trailer was en route to Texas when Bibbs's injuries occurred. Id. Molson Coors's overall business activities in Texas serve as the clear backdrop for Bibbs's claim. Therefore, the Court concludes that his claims "relate[s] to" Molson Coors's minimum contacts. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S.Ct. at 1026.
Molson Coors argues that "there is no legally recognized relationship between the forum and the litigation," i.e., Bibbs's cause of action does not arise out of or relate to Molson Coors's contacts with Texas. ECF No. 11 at 15. Molson Coors asserts that West Virginia, the site of the trailer's accident, and Virginia, where the trailer was loaded, are the only forums that relate to Bibbs's injury. See ECF No. 21 at 4. Molson Coors continues that there is no jurisdiction "[w]ithout an explanation of where [Bibbs's] injury occurred and why it is related to Molson's business activities in Texas." ECF No. 11 at 16. The nexus between Molson Coors's business activities and this case, however, is readily apparent on the face of Bibbs's Complaint. As Molson Coors itself stated, Texas was the "ultimate delivery destination" of the trailer. Id. at 6.
Molson Coors's argument fails here for similar reasons that the defendant's argument in Ford failed—personal jurisdiction does not have a causation requirement. In advancing Virginia and West Virginia as the only forums with jurisdiction, Molson Coors seeks to roll back the "relatedness" prong to its pre- Ford status. Essentially, Molson Coors argues that Bibbs's claim would be the same if the trailer was bound for any of its five other breweries. See id. at 15. But the Supreme Court in Ford rejected this exact line of reasoning. 141 S.Ct. at 1029. Further, although the accident might still have occurred if the trailer was en route to Golden, Colorado, rather than Fort Worth, the fact remains that this trailer was bound for Texas. Thus, the claim is sufficiently related to Molson Coors's Texas contacts. See id.
Molson Coors interprets the "relatedness" prong post- Ford to require the injury to occur in the forum state. See ECF No. 21 at 5. While the Court agrees that the location of the injury was crucial to asserting jurisdiction in Ford , the Court cautions that the claim at issue in Ford was products liability, rather than negligence, as it is here. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1023 ; ECF No. 1 at 4. Molson Coors could have acted "to warn [Bibbs] of any potential danger or hazardous condition of the load" at any point from West Virginia, Virginia, or Texas—where Bibbs was employed and where he was intending to take the trailer. ECF No. 1 at 4. Because the elements of these tort claims are different, the Court cannot conclude that the relation between the underlying litigation and contacts in the forum must be identical, as Molson Coors suggests.
Molson Coors also cites to Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. in support of its argument that Bibbs's injury must occur in Texas for it to be subject to specific jurisdiction here. 21 F.4th 314, 324 (5th Cir. 2021). Confusingly, Molson Coors cites to the majority opinion where the majority quotes the dissent. Id. ; see ECF No. 21 at 5. But a further inspection of Johnson reveals the pitfalls of trying to compare the relatedness of contacts to a given forum in different tort claims for jurisdictional analysis.
In Johnson , a libel case, the court concluded that there was insufficient relatedness between the defendant's website's contacts with Texas and the litigation because the website did not mention Texas, nor did it have sufficient "interactivity" with Texas. 21 F.4th at 319. There, the plaintiff was a Texas resident, thus, the libel injury was in Texas. Id. at 316. Under Molson Coors's proposed test, this fact would be sufficient to assert jurisdiction. However, it was not. Id. at 319. Rather, Johnson emphasizes that, in Ford , it was the link "between the products that injured the plaintiffs and Ford's selling those products in the forum states" that supported specific jurisdiction. Id. at 320. Here, there is a similar link between Molson Coors's activities of brewing and distributing beer in Texas and the instant litigation.
Further, Molson Coors relies on Stewart v. Marathon Petro. Co. LP , a pre- Ford case, facing a jurisdictional question with similar facts, to bolster its argument. 326 F. Supp. 3d 284 (E.D. La. 2018). But the Supreme Court expanded its understanding of the "relatedness" prong in Ford , rather than maintaining the status quo. Moreover, the court in Stewart did not evaluate the merits of specific jurisdiction over the defendant there before dismissing it as a party. See id. at 295. Thus, the Court finds this case unpersuasive.
Further, Molson Coors tries to deny the applicability of Breathwit Marine Conts., Ltd. v. Deloach Marine Servs., LLC , because it was issued pre- Ford . ECF No. 21 at 7 (citing 994 F. Supp. 2d 845 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ). However, the court there exercised personal jurisdiction under a more stringent "but-for-plus" approach to the relatedness of contacts to the litigation. 994 F. Supp. 2d at 853. There, "picking up a barge and cargo from a Houston-based client and towing them through the Texas waters until reaching Louisiana" gave rise for Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims arising out of the subsequent collision in Louisiana. Id. Similarly here, employing a Texas company to go to Virginia and deliver a trailer to Texas gives rise to personal jurisdiction over Molson Coors for an accident along the route. If under a stricter causal test, such contacts met any due process requirements, then surely this case meets those same requirements under a lesser "relatedness" test. Accordingly, Molson Coors's contacts with Texas give rise to or relate to Bibbs's claim.
3. The exercise of jurisdiction over Molson Coors does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice.
If the first two elements are met, the Court then asks the defendant to make a "compelling case" that the assertion of jurisdiction would not be fair or reasonable. Carmona , 924 F.3d at 193. In making this determination, the Court considers the following factors: "(1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 647 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ).
Molson Coors argues that jurisdiction here would not be fair or reasonable because "Texas is not the most natural state to litigate this dispute." ECF No. 21 at 9. It further argues that "Texas negligence law will not apply" and its Fort Worth brewery employees "would be unable to provide any information relevant to this lawsuit." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). These factors, however, are more relevant to motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 than to showing that jurisdiction is unfair or unjust. See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. , 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (listing "the relative ease of access to sources of proof" and "familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case" as among those factors to be considered in a motion to transfer venue).
First , while Molson Coors correctly states that most likely witnesses and deponents are in Virginia and West Virginia, ECF No. 21 at 10, it fails entirely to show how or why litigating here poses a burden. Presumably, travel from its principal place of business in Illinois poses an equal burden, whether the final destination is near its brewery in Texas or Virginia. The fact that relevant evidence is in Virginia or West Virginia does not preclude jurisdiction here.
Second , Molson Coors fails to persuade the Court that jurisdiction automatically would fail simply because Texas negligence law may not apply. Courts routinely apply the law of states other than those where they sit. And the application of a state's law other than the forum to a controversy does not mean that the forum has no interest in the litigation. A Texas resident was injured while driving towards Texas, while engaging in a commercial activity meant to benefit a Texas employer and produce further commerce in Texas. The Court therefore concludes that this forum has a substantial interest in the litigation, even though Texas law may not apply.
If the applicability of another state's law to litigation foreclosed the exercise of jurisdiction by a forum, then the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws would likely be much more concise—much to the joy of law students everywhere.
Finally , the Court views the remaining factors as either neutral or favoring jurisdiction. Thus, Molson Coors has not made a "compelling case" that personal jurisdiction here is not unfair or unreasonable.
4. Texas's long-arm statute supports the exercise of jurisdiction.
Finally, Molson Coors relies on the specific language of Texas's long-arm statute to argue this Court may not assert jurisdiction. Specifically, it argues that "the Texas long-arm statute states, in relevant part, that "a nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident ... commits a tort in whole or in part in this state." " ECF No. 21 at 2–3 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN . § 17.042 ). However, this argument remains unconvincing. First , Texas's long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process. Bulkley & Assocs. , 1 F.4th at 351. Thus, there is no separate inquiry or analysis; if the Due Process Clause permits personal jurisdiction, then so too does Texas's long-arm statute. Id. Molson Coors conceded in its Motion that "Texas’[s] long-arm statute is satisfied if jurisdiction comports with due process," ECF No. 11 at 3–4; yet it still tries to distinguish between the two in its reply. ECF No. 21 at 2.
Second , the long-arm statute also extends jurisdiction over nonresidents that "contract [ ] by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state " and over nonresidents that "recruit[ ] Texas residents directly or through an intermediary located in this state , for employment inside or outside of this state. " TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE . § 17.042 (emphasis added). Here, Molson Coors contracted with High Horse, a Texas corporation, for the shipment of its goods into Texas. As part of this business interaction, High Horse employed Bibbs for a job that extended from Virginia to Texas. Thus, the Court concludes that Texas's long-arm statute is satisfied, even if it were its own separate inquiry.
The Court notes this interaction as likely sufficient on its own to give rise to jurisdiction over Bibbs's claims, regardless of the location of Molson Coors's breweries. Molson Coors reached into Texas and dealt with a Texas business to arrange for a Texas resident to deliver goods to Texas. The resulting accident clearly meets all three prongs for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it may assert personal jurisdiction over Bibbs's negligence claim against Molson Coors.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) should be, and is hereby, DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 22nd day of July, 2022.