Opinion
DR-03-CA-024.
November 29, 2004
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Defendant La Pryor Independent School District's Third Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 38), Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Third Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Third Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring a number of claims under federal and state law seeking declaratory and monetary relief for discriminatory actions against Plaintiffs due to the disability of one Plaintiff and the advocacy for the disabled Plaintiff by the other Plaintiff. Plaintiffs complain that Defendant violated the rights of B.H.Y., a minor with Cerebral Palsy and learning disabilities, by failing to provide the minor with a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant harassed and retaliated against Plaintiff Peggy Young, Defendant's former employee and B.H.Y.'s mother, by treating her more severely than other similarly-situated employees.
One of Plaintiffs' first steps to resolve this dispute was to file for a due process hearing pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). The Texas Education Agency appointed Lucius Bunton as the Hearing Officer. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant refused to mediate and offered to settle the issues raised in the due process hearing request. The parties executed a settlement agreement on April 30, 2001 that "fully and forever release[d], acquit[ted], and discharge[d]" the parties of and from "any and all claims" relating to the case. Plaintiffs now claim that Defendant violated terms of the agreement.
Defendant filed an initial Motion to Dismiss that was addressed by the U.S. Magistrate Judge before this matter was transferred to this Court. The U.S. Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation dismissed Plaintiffs' state law tort claims and claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), and this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in an Order signed March 9, 2004.
On March 16, 2004, Defendant filed a Second Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, asserting that Plaintiffs could not maintain a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA. Plaintiffs did not file a response. Instead, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's prior Order granting Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' subsequently filed an amended motion. The Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. The Court, however, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend. The Court advised Plaintiffs to bring a freestanding claim to enforce the settlement agreement and noted that only claims that could have been brought under the IDEA are subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. On May 25, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, and Defendant responded with its Third Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
DISCUSSION
For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all the facts plead in the complaint must be taken as true. Dismissal on this basis is a disfavored means of disposing of a case, and district courts should avoid such dismissals "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." "The question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2000).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957).
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
The IDEA bars Plaintiffs from circumventing IDEA's exhaustion requirement by taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and repackaging them as claims under some other statute. The Court holds that Plaintiffs may not circumvent the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA by bringing similar claims under the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the claims based on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are dismissed.
See Eddins v. Excelsior ISD, 1997 W L 4703 53 (E.D. Tex. 1997); see Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3rd Cir. 1996).
In contrast, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an independent basis by which Plaintiffs can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement entered pursuant to their request for an IDEA due process hearing. The IDEA was available for Plaintiffs to establish their substantive rights, and the administrative process was cut short by Defendant's settlement agreement offer that provided Plaintiffs with the rights afforded them under the IDEA. "Plaintiffs are permitted to pursue their remedy under Section 1983 for deprivation of a right secured by the laws of the United States." By asserting a deprivation of their federal rights, Plaintiffs may seek to enforce and carry out the substantive agreement between them and Defendant. This decision does not provide an avenue for Plaintiffs to circumvent the remedies available under the IDEA. Plaintiffs proceeded under the IDEA by filing for a due process hearing and by offering to mediate with Defendant. Defendant elected not to pursue that path and instead entered a settlement agreement with Plaintiffs before the Special Education Hearing Officer for the State of Texas. At the point at which the parties entered the agreement to resolve the substantive rights accorded to Plaintiffs under federal law, Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on § 1983.
Eddins v. Excelisior Independent School District, et. al., 88 F.Supp.2d 690, 693-95 (E.D.Tex. 2000) (adopting the U.S. Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation that recognized a § 1983 claim for enforcement of a IDEA settlement agreement); see Mount Leban on School Dist., 95 F.3d at 279; see Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1987); see Reid v. Board of Educ. of Lincolnshire-Prairie View, 765 F.Supp. 965, 969 (N.D.Ill. 1991); see Grace B. v. Lexington School Committee, 762 F.Supp. 416, 418 (D.Mass. 1991); see Blazejewski v. Board of Education of Allegany Central School District, 599 F.Supp. 975, 979 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d at 1274.
In sum, this holding narrows the remaining issues by dismissing all federal claims against Defendant except for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcement of the orders agreed to by the parties pursuant to their settlement. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion should be GRANTED so as to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs' direct claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act due to Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiffs' newly-asserted claims under 42 USC §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986 also should be DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant's Motion should be DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 seeking enforcement of the orders agreed to by the parties in their settlement agreement.