Thus, Adams' Third Amended Complaint “alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim.” Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F.Supp.2d 305, 317 (D.D.C.2011); see also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P., v. FDIC, 851 F.Supp.2d 131, 138–139 (D.D.C.2012) (listing cases dismissing claims that were not first presented to the FDIC); Aljaf Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. FDIC, 879 F.Supp. 515, 518 (E.D.Pa.1995) (holding exhaustion of contract claim did not exhaust fraud claim). In Response, Adams points to the exhibits attached to its counsel's supplemental letter as evidence that it exhausted all of its breach of contract claims.
Their reliance on Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000), is misplaced. That case deals with the failure to raise specific issues in an administrative appeal, see id. at 105–06, 120 S.Ct. 2080, whereas the Westbergs failed to press an entirely separate claim. See McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F.Supp. 15, 18–19 (D.D.C.1996) (under section 1821(d)(13)(D), plaintiffs' claims based on negligence and breach of contract not exhausted where not submitted to administrative process, despite fact that separate claim for fraudulent inducement was submitted aff'd,111 F.3d 963 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam) (mem.); see also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F.Supp.2d 131, 138–39 (D.D.C.2012) (similar, collecting cases). Because the Westbergs failed to administratively exhaust their claim for declaratory relief, the district court correctly dismissed their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and we affirm.