BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. Federal Deposit Insurance

8 Citing cases

  1. Firstier Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    935 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013)   Cited 9 times

    Thus, Adams' Third Amended Complaint “alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim.” Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F.Supp.2d 305, 317 (D.D.C.2011); see also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P., v. FDIC, 851 F.Supp.2d 131, 138–139 (D.D.C.2012) (listing cases dismissing claims that were not first presented to the FDIC); Aljaf Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. FDIC, 879 F.Supp. 515, 518 (E.D.Pa.1995) (holding exhaustion of contract claim did not exhaust fraud claim). In Response, Adams points to the exhibits attached to its counsel's supplemental letter as evidence that it exhausted all of its breach of contract claims.

  2. Westberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    741 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2014)   Cited 22 times
    Finding that the plaintiff's claim was functionally against the FDIC and noting that "[i]t might be a different story if the FDIC had not repudiated the loan and [the acquiring institution] had instead purchased the loan from the FDIC intact and then itself repudiated or breached the agreement"

    Their reliance on Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000), is misplaced. That case deals with the failure to raise specific issues in an administrative appeal, see id. at 105–06, 120 S.Ct. 2080, whereas the Westbergs failed to press an entirely separate claim. See McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F.Supp. 15, 18–19 (D.D.C.1996) (under section 1821(d)(13)(D), plaintiffs' claims based on negligence and breach of contract not exhausted where not submitted to administrative process, despite fact that separate claim for fraudulent inducement was submitted aff'd,111 F.3d 963 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam) (mem.); see also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F.Supp.2d 131, 138–39 (D.D.C.2012) (similar, collecting cases). Because the Westbergs failed to administratively exhaust their claim for declaratory relief, the district court correctly dismissed their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and we affirm.

  3. Roggio v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    Civil Action No. 9-1733 (TJK) (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    See ECF No. 62-6 at 2-4, 20-28. Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that where "a complaint alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the new causes of action." Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F. Supp. 2d 305, 317 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Westberg, 741 F.3d at 1308-09; BHC InterimFunding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases). Roggio does not meaningfully respond to the FDIC's argument on this point.

  4. Biaggi & Biaggi, P.S.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    Civil No. 10-1671 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2018)

    remedies with respect to retaliation claim under Puerto Rico law, where proof of claim described claim as one of "discrimination in employment due to age," and did not mention or allege retaliation); Coleman v. FDIC, 826 F. Supp. 31, 32 (D. Mass. 1993) (dismissing new claims and legal theories asserted in amended complaint that had not been presented first to the FDIC through FIRREA's administrative claims process); Hibyan v. FDIC, 812 F. Supp. 271, 275 (D. Me. 1993) (dismissing claims based on one contractual provision where plaintiff had presented another contractual provision to the FDIC as basis for claim); see also Winkal Management, LLC v. FDIC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 33 (D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing claims based on theories of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel and finding that plaintiff could not sidestep FIRREA's statutory limitations by raising alternative contract claims); Westberg v. FDIC, 926 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 741 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138, n. 4 (D.D.C. 2012)) (citing cases) ("Where a FIRREA complaint alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the new causes of action."); Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F. Supp. 2d 305, 317 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing claims for civil conspiracy and conversion where only a fraudulent transfer claim was submitted to the FDIC as part of claims review process). According to the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, "[a] depositum is constituted from the time a person receives a thing belonging to another with the obligation of keeping and returning it."

  5. Robinson v. Mack

    Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-01089-JMC (D.S.C. Jun. 24, 2015)

    In consideration of the documents attached to the pleadings in this matter, the court observes that "documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference therein are not outside of the pleadings." BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012). Further, documents attached to a motion to dismiss may also be considered without conversion if they are '"integral'" to the claim.

  6. Trident Dev. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-02210-RWS (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2013)

    Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). See also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2012) for a discussion of split among circuits that have addressed the issue of whether § 1821 requires plaintiffs to submit for administrative determination claims based upon the FDIC's conduct as receiver (citing Vill. of Oakwood v. State Bank & Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373, 387 (6th Cir.2008); McCarthy v. FDIC, 348 F.3d at 1081 (joining "the majority of courts in holding that claimants ... who challenge conduct by the FDIC as receiver[ ] must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review"); Stamm v. Paul, 121 F.3d at 639-42; Home Capital Collateral, Inc. v. FDIC, 96 F.3d 760, 763-64 (5th Cir.1996); Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 F.3d 843, 848â€"49 (3d Cir.1994)). --------

  7. Westberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    926 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 9 times

    But the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies applies to each claim a plaintiff may have. “Where a FIRREA complaint alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the new causes of action.” BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F.Supp.2d 131, 138, n. 4 (D.D.C.2012) (edits and citations omitted) (dismissing declaratory judgment claim because plaintiff did not first present the claim to the receiver), citing Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F.Supp.2d 305, 317 (D.D.C.2011) (dismissing claims for civil conspiracy and conversion because only a claim for fraudulent transfer was submitted to the receiver); McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F.Supp. 15, 18–19 (D.D.C.1996) (dismissing claims for negligence and breach of contract because only a claim for fraudulent inducement was submitted to the receiver); Aljaf Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. FDIC, 879 F.Supp. 515, 517–518 (E.D.Pa.1995) (dismissing fraud claim because it was not among the claims submitted to the receiver); Brown Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 833 F.Supp. 672, 674–76 (N.D.Ill.1993) (dismissing claims for conversion and breach of contract because only a claim for breach of other agreements was submitted to the receiver); Coleman v. FDIC, 826 F.Supp. 31, 32 (D.Mass.1993) (dismissing claims in amended complaint that p

  8. Westberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

    Civil Action No. 09-1690 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2013)

    But the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies applies to each claim a plaintiff may have. "Where a FIRREA complaint alleges entirely new legal theories that are different than those reflected in the administrative proof of claim, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the new causes of action." BHC Interim Funding, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138, n.4 (D.D.C. 2012) (edits and citations omitted) (dismissing declaratory judgment claim because plaintiff did not first present the claim to the receiver), citing Jahn v. FDIC, 828 F. Supp. 2d 305, 317 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing claims for civil conspiracy and conversion because only a claim for fraudulent transfer was submitted to the receiver); McGothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1996) (dismissing claims for negligence and breach of contract because only a claim for fraudulent inducement was submitted to the receiver); Aljaf Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. FDIC, 879 F. Supp. 515, 517-518 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (dismissing fraud claim because it was not among the claims submitted to the receiver); Brown Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 833 F. Supp. 672, 674-76 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (dismissing claims for conversion and breach of contract because only a claim for breach of other agreements was submitted to the receiver); Coleman v. FDIC, 826 F. Supp. 31, 32 (D. Mass 1993) (dismissing claims in amended com