Opinion
No. NNH FA 00-04005681S
May 2, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
By return date of November 7, 2000, this matter came before the court on a pro se petition for custody and visitation filed by the plaintiff Ajai Bhatia, seeking a relief that is self-styled regarding access to the child of the parties, Tara Bhatia, born August 22, 1996, to the defendant mother Marlene Debek. Over time, in the four and one-half years that this matter has been in litigation, each of the parties have been pro se and represented by a variety of counsel; the pleadings have amended over time. Ultimately, this has become a protracted custody battle. The matter originated in the Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport; it was transferred to the Judicial District of Middletown, then to the Regional Family Trial Docket; and finally to the Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven for trial and disposition. The minor child is the ward of a guardian ad litem represented by legal counsel, as well. By stipulation of the parties, the guardian (through counsel) has also presented evidence through direct and cross-examination of witnesses and submittal of exhibits. Trial commenced on March 8 and proceeded on March 9, 22, 28, April 1, 5, and 6, 2005. At trial, the plaintiff, defendant and guardian have all been represented by competent and professional counsel. They have managed to zealously represent their clients in one of the most polarized and troubling cases to come before the undersigned in ten years on the bench, while maintaining the appropriate civility and the highest ethical standards. At trial, each party has claimed sole legal and physical custody of the minor child. Testimony lasted over many days with the following witnesses: the parties, the guardian ad litem, Gerard Adelman, Dr. Bruce Freedman, a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Keith Roeder, a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Sidney Horowitz, a licensed clinical psychologist, Mr. Rob Lang, Family Relations Counselor, Ms. Julianne Cioffi, a licensed clinical social worker, Dr. John Leventhal, medical director of the Yale-New Haven Hospital Sex Abuse Clinic, the child's current school teacher, violin teacher, and several lay witnesses Vina Vani and Jeffrey Hall. The court requested the guardian to call as witnesses, the defendant's brother and sister-in-law and they offered testimony as well. The exhibits before the court are voluminous; they include three family relations studies, the DCF file on this family, the minor child's clinical therapy files, Dr. Freedman's report, a letter report of Dr. Horowitz, portions of transcript from the criminal trial of State v. Bhatia, and a variety of other exhibits. During the course of this litigation the child has been appointed different guardians (one of whom also briefly served as attorney for the minor child) by court order. She also had a different guardian ad litem in the criminal proceedings.
The parties so stipulated and waived any right of appeal regarding the issue.
I.
The following facts are found.
The plaintiff, Ajai Bhatia, is a 39 years old single man. He has been married once from 1992 to 1995. He has attained various college level degrees and is trained and educated in the computer information and security field. Mr. Bhatia was raised in India and immigrated to the United States as an adult in 1989. His entire family of origin remains in India. Mr. Bhatia became a naturalized United States citizen in 1995. He is currently unemployed, having difficulty gaining and retaining employment as a result of the criminal related matters described hereinafter. In order to earn funds to cover his child support obligations and survive during this most recent period of unemployment Mr. Bhatia is shoveling sidewalks. He also lives on student loans. His physical health is good and provides no limitations for him. Mr. Bhatia is a Hindu and an active participant (both as an adherent and as a volunteer with temple activities, including children's Sunday school) in the local Hindu temple in Middletown, the community in which he resides. His home is a two bedroom "condominium style" apartment.
The defendant, Marlene Debek, is 42 years old and single, as well. She is a licensed massage therapist, working at the Bridgeport Jewish Community Center. She has a bachelor's degree and has studied some naturopathy. She is an occasional participant at her community Lutheran church. Her physical health is good. She has two siblings, one of whom lives in Connecticut with his wife and two children, who are 7 and 5 years of age.
The parties first met in 1990. At the time, both were living in the Fairfield area. The defendant moved to Florida in 1991 after her mother died. She moved there to care for her grandmother, who was legally blind.
In 1995, the plaintiff moved to Florida. In July 1996 the plaintiff bought a house and the two of them lived together. The parties dated and became engaged to be married. The defendant became pregnant. The defendant felt the plaintiff had occasional angry, raging outbursts that upset her. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the defendant's behavior and felt there were fidelity problems in their relationship. The parties experienced relationship difficulties and ultimately never married. Tara was born on August 22, 1996. From then until November 21, 1996, the three of them lived only occasionally together; the defendant often stayed with the baby at her grandmother's home. During these first three months both parents were involved in the care of the child.
On November 21, 1996, the defendant moved with the child to Connecticut. She claims that the plaintiff was aware of the move and even helped her move some belongings. The plaintiff claimed that he found out they were gone when he came home to an empty house and made some phone calls to ascertain Ms. Debek's whereabouts. Thereafter, the plaintiff remained in Florida until July 2000, when he was able to get a job in Connecticut. From November 21, 1996 to August 1998, Mr. Bhatia came to Connecticut on five occasions to spend time with his daughter, each stay for approximately 10 days. During each stay, he was fully involved in her care and activities. During his absences, he would telephone regularly to talk with Tara and sent her gifts and notes in the mail. On some of those visits, the plaintiff stayed in the defendant's home and their old relationship problems re-emerged: the defendant would become very uncomfortable with the plaintiff's anger and assertiveness toward her. After a visit in August 1998, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from visiting, rebuffing his attempts to arrange it.
In early July 2000, the plaintiff asked to visit: he was going to be on a job interview for two days with Pitney-Bowes. The defendant allowed him to visit and he spent time with Tara at the beach. He was offered the Pitney-Bowes job and moved back to Connecticut on August 5, 2000, pleased that he now had employment that allowed him to be closer to his daughter. From August 5, 2000 to October 26, 2000, the plaintiff became increasingly frustrated with the defendant's refusal to let him see Tara despite his almost daily requests. She accused him of wanting to steal the child and take her to India. After the defendant refused to let the plaintiff take Tara to his Hindu temple for the celebration of Duvalia, the plaintiff initiated these court proceedings. In them he claimed joint legal custody, primary residence to the defendant and visitation for himself.
Duvalia is a Hindu holiday. The plaintiff compared its importance to Christmas for Christians.
On November 9 (or 10), 2000 the court (Sheedy, J.) ordered supervised visitation. The plaintiff had sought unsupervised visitation and the defendant had requested it be supervised. On November 10, 2000, the plaintiff called DCF, wishing to remain anonymous, claiming that the defendant's brother, Todd Debek, has threatened to kill him and is a drug addict and scares his daughter when he is at her home. He also claimed the home is not safe or child-proofed. When DCF investigated, the defendant guessed that the plaintiff had made the complaint. She told DCF that the plaintiff was mentally unstable and had unresolved childhood issues. She denied any substance abuse. She asserted her fitness as a parent. DCF found her home to be appropriate and not in need of any child-proofing. On January 2, 2001, DCF closed out the file, not substantiating any emotional neglect of the child by the defendant.
In early January 2001, the defendant started bringing the child to Yale Child Study Center for counseling. She told Dr. Freedman (the court appointed psychological evaluator) that she did this because, "I knew something was going to happen." Subsequently, that counseling was terminated upon the plaintiff's objections, apparently strongly phrased by the plaintiff, including threat of litigation if it continued.
In the meanwhile, the defendant then did not allow the plaintiff to see Tara until once again court ordered to do so; the first visit occurred on January 13, 2001.
On November 13, 2000, the defendant initiated a 46b-15 ex parte application in which she asserted that the plaintiff appeared at her home uninvited and was yelling. The defendant asserted that she felt in fear of physical danger for herself and the child, claiming he has threatened her and others in the past. In her application she sought a full no contact order and requested an order of temporary custody of the child Tara with restraining order relief extended to her as well. The ex parte relief granted extended to the defendant only with a no contact order except for the court-ordered supervised visitation. A hearing date was set for November 27, 2000. Two days later, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt for failure of the defendant to give him court ordered visitation. On November 27, 2000, after no service on the plaintiff, the defendant filed another ex parte 46b-15 application against the plaintiff in which she sought the same comprehensive relief she sought on November 13, 2000. The same limited ex parte order was entered by the court. On December 8, 2000, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt for failure of the defendant to allow him to have his court ordered visitation.
On January 11, 2001, the court (Owens, J.) ruled on the motion for contempt: visitation was ordered once again, with the parties to have no contact and the defendant barred from remaining present during the visitation. The visitation was to be supervised by Nick Sarno. Further, the defendant was ordered to pay $250.00 in attorney fees. The parties were each ordered to pay one-half of the cost of the supervision. A visit occurred on January 13, 2001 pursuant to this court order. At the visit, the child recognized her father despite the passage of time. The visit was videotaped.
In a self-styled statement filed with the court on January 16, 2001 (three days later), the defendant blamed the plaintiff for her loss of her life's savings, claiming, "I was afraid Ajai would hurt me and/or my grandmother and/or my daughter and I was afraid he would try to abduct my daughter so I moved to Connecticut . . ." She went on to write: "Since I left Florida and came to Connecticut in November 1996, I have struggled to get back on my feet. Before Ajai moved to Connecticut this past summer, I was doing very well in school, at work, and at home. Since Ajai moved to Connecticut, I have been very afraid of him . . . [m]y health, my work and my schoolwork is suffering because of the stress . . . Ajai continues to cause me to experience extreme stress and fear and both my daughter and I are suffering as a result of his actions . . . I feel it is in my daughter's best interest to have no contact with her biological father [emphasis added] and if the court continues to force me to take my daughter to meet with her father anyway, I strongly feel someone with experience with the mentally ill needs to be supervising these visits in a formal setting like Yale Child Study Center. I also strongly feel that any contact between my daughter and her father at this point will do more harm to her than good because I don't think Ajai will ever be mentally healthy."
On January 20, 2001, the defendant failed to bring the child for the next court ordered visitation, stating the child was ill. Subsequent to that, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt and also a motion to modify the visitation to unsupervised, claiming that three supervised visits had occurred and the plaintiff's relationship with the child was observed to be appropriate.
On February 2, 2001, the defendant once again filed an ex parte 46b-15 application in which she sought an order essentially the same as the order granted to her in November 2001, which by operation of law was still in effect. The statements were similar to those made in previous applications, with additions of comments that the plaintiff believed the defendant to be a racist, prostitute and substance abuser, and others to be racist. The defendant stated that she also believed the plaintiff was calling her house nightly at midnight. She also filled out an application form to keep her location information private; though, her residence and employment had not changed and were already available known addresses. On February 16, 2001, the court (Sheedy J.) issued the six month 46b-15 order in favor of the defendant which was, once again a no contact order except during visitation exchanges.
On February 8, 2001, after a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, in which the court viewed the video of the court ordered visitation and reviewed the defendant's exhibits which included many Florida police incident reports from 1996 to 1999, the court (Owens, J.) ordered that the plaintiff would have unsupervised visitation every other weekend from Fridays at 4 p.m. to Sundays at 5 p.m., and on Tuesdays from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. on the off weeks, with pickup and drop off at the Trumbull police station.
One week later, on February 15, 2001, the mother contacted the Child Guidance Center, seeking help because she said Tara was having a difficult time adjusting to being alone with her father at his home; the mother reported the father is mentally ill and that the child is clinging and crying at the time of visits and when she returns she appears tired and exhausted. By the very terms and timing of Judge Owens's order, only one weekend of unsupervised visitation, or in the alternative but not cumulatively, one Tuesday two hour unsupervised visitation could have occurred before the mother called Child Guidance Clinic with these presenting problems. Essentially, the court finds, she never gave it a chance. One week later on the 21st of February 2001, the mother called the clinic again reporting the child seems clingy and the mother thinks the father is keeping the child up late at night at visits. In this phone call she called Mr. Bhatia a raging person who accused neighbors of being racist. At that time, the Child Guidance Center was not ready to take Tara on as a patient and did not do so for several months.
On February 26, 2001, the first of three Family Relations evaluation reports was submitted to the court. That report recommended that the parties have joint legal custody; that the physical residence of the child be with her mother and the father have every other weekend with a midweek visit. Both parents were recommended to engage in individual therapy. The father's therapy was to deal with issues surrounding his perception of cultural bias. The mother's therapy would have been to deal with her "anger, fears, and what is appropriate behavior in the presence of her daughter." The father was also recommended to take parenting classes. In that study, the defendant had urged the plaintiff's contact with his daughter be only supervised, claiming he has a violent nature that he might take out on his daughter, that he is emotionally unstable and depressed, and, that he will kidnap Tara to India. The evaluator found the flee fear without basis. The plaintiff argued to the evaluator that the defendant has a substance abuse problem. That too was found groundless. The evaluator found groundless the fear of violence by the father against his daughter. The evaluator also found that the plaintiff did not actively suffer from depression having experienced some depression before he moved to Connecticut, but his treatment at the time found no thought disorder or ideation that interfered with his functioning.
The plaintiff's only expressed anger had been the behavior of the defendant and those who support her in it; his perception was that the cause of this was racism against him. It is upon that perception that the counselor based his recommendation for therapy for the plaintiff. The court observed a similar anger in the plaintiff in his testimony, and, in that anger before the court, racism as a cause was verbalized by the plaintiff. Racism and cultural biases are pernicious evils that permeate an individual's thought process, often unconsciously. This court cannot determine whether these ills have been unconsciously engrained in any of those people the plaintiff has interacted with in these many court and associated proceedings. The court concludes that Mr. Bhatia's anger and frustration at his circumstance is the basis of his need for counseling, so he can once again cope with his life's challenges without having them overwhelm his resources. The evaluator was also insightful in noting that the feelings of persecution of Mr. Bhatia's must be addressed so that he can best interact with the child's service providers.
In the process of the first evaluation, the defendant refused to allow a home visit between the plaintiff and the child, once again stating she feared he would take the child and flee to India. When the evaluator did observe the father and child together at the Fairfield Visitation Center (where Sarno works), the child was thrilled to be with her father, running into his arms. The evaluator also noted that the supervisor of the plaintiff's visits with his daughter saw no reason for the supervision to continue.
In conclusion, the evaluator found the defendant harboring "extreme, exaggerated fears" about the plaintiff and that she is "consumed by anger towards the father and has gone to some length to discredit him." Even in the face of the parties' inability to communicate, the evaluator recommended joint legal custody because to do otherwise, would result in a "greater risk of the mother totally alienating Tara from the father." That statement was made four years ago; now, in this trial the court confronts a situation where the child is totally alienated from her father.
The court reviewed certain of these visitation tapes as evidence offered by the mother. The conclusion of the court from watching these tapes, is that the plaintiff is a loving parent who was entirely appropriate with his child, able to interact with her at an age appropriate level, praise and support her and provide her gentle direction occasionally.
On March 19, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt claiming the defendant never paid the $250 ordered on January 11, 2001. That motion was never acted upon pendente lite. At trial, the plaintiff continues to claim that amount and has stated the sum has never been paid, though it was ordered to be paid within sixty days.
On March 19, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion for the defendant to refrain from contacting his family members in India. That motion was granted by the court (Brennan, J.).
In April 2001, the mother took Tara to the Yale Child Study center for therapy which lasted for four sessions. It terminated as a result of the plaintiff insisting on its termination and threatening the clinicians with a lawsuit if they continued. It was his position that it was done without his permission and his daughter did not need therapy.
On April 20, 2001 and May 9, 2001 the defendant filed motions for the plaintiff to undergo a psychological examination. An objection was filed by the plaintiff. Those motions were granted by the court (Brennan, J.) on June 7, 2001.
On May 18, 2001, the Child Guidance Center did a telephone intake with Ms. Debek over the telephone in preparation for starting Tara in therapy (the therapy request having been initiated on February 15, 2001). Ms. Debek reported that Tara set traps around the house, just as her father did, to try to catch neighbors trying to steal his money. Also, the defendant reported that the plaintiff thinks she is a prostitute and drug addict, which she denied. She also reported that the plaintiff is a survivor of sexual abuse as a child. Mother was also concerned with father's objection to counseling for Tara and so was delaying to see if she could initiate it. That issue was clarified one week later. Ms. Susan Brownlee, MSW commenced therapy with Tara on June 17, 2001.
The therapist's impression of Tara at intake on June 17, 2001, was of a bright girl very attached to her mother; they engaged in caretaking of each other. Tara expressed that her parents do not get along. Her mother was present for the intake and the therapist noted that the mother seemed quite anxious and was easily brought to tears. No such observations were made regarding Tara.
In late May 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion to increase his visitation.
By June 2001 both parties were pro se and the child's attorney was seeking fees.
On June 4, 2001, the plaintiff, pro se, filed a motion for sole custody in which he asserted that the defendant showed erratic paranoid behavior, has a history of substance abuse, is emotionally damaging the child with her behavior, taking the child for counseling without his consent, and is sexually abusing the minor child, "as the child has mentioned to the plaintiff about the defendant's inappropriate touching." On June 11, 2001, the defendant through new counsel moved to modify visitation asserting the plaintiff was about to be evicted and that the plaintiff was irrational as shown in a certain incident with Derby police. On June 13, 2001, the defendant filed an emergency motion to suspend the plaintiff's visitation with the same assertions in it. On June 14, 2001, the court (Bassick, J.T.R.) issued an order confirming the then present visitation schedule while awaiting scheduled short calendar hearing.
In May 2001 the visits ceased being overnight as a result of asserted fire hazards at the plaintiff's residence. On July 28, 2001, the defendant claims that the plaintiff told the child that her mother was a murderer, that she had killed the plaintiff's mother by stressing her when she contacted the mother in India.
On July 30, 2001, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for contempt claiming the defendant interfered in a variety of ways with, his visitation, arriving late and blocking his car and "making emotional dramas" in front of all at the transfer because she has mental, emotional and psychological problems that he characterized as psychotic schizoid behavior. On the same date, the defendant filed a motion for contempt for violation of her restraining order. On August 2, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to extend her February 16, 2001 restraining order, claiming that the plaintiff continues to contact her in violation of the order. That motion was granted by the court (Sheedy, J.) on August 9, 2001, for a period of 90 days. At the same time the court granted the plaintiff a restraining order against the defendant as well. Ironically, on October 30, 2001, the court (Dewey, J) denied the motion for contempt for violation of the restraining order.
From June 12, 2001, to September 12, 2001, Tara continued in therapy with the Child Guidance Center. She attended ten sessions. She was articulate. In her therapy, Tara often expressed her upset with her father for saying negative things about her mother. She said she enjoyed visiting her father but disliked the bad things he said abut her mother and wished he would stop. She never reported any sexual touching, molestation or contact of any kind by her father. On September 12, 2001, the Clinic terminated counseling with Tara and closed the file because the child was asymptomatic and the father objected to the counseling continuing. On September 13, 2001, Ms. Brownlee noted in her treatment summary that the child was able to easily express and identify her feelings. She separated easily from her mother. She expressed love for her father and indicated that she was unhappy when he said bad things about Catholic school and her mother.
One week later, on Friday, September 21, 2001, Ms. Debek contacted the supervisor at the Clinic on an urgent basis because she said that Tara did not want to see her father for an upcoming weekend visit. In her phone call, the defendant said the child said she did not feel safe with her father. Ms. O'Donnell, the supervisor agreed to see the child on an emergency basis to make sure she was safe in the visit. Ms. O'Donnell spent time with Tara asking her several ways whether she felt safe with her father; Tara did not express any sense at all of a lack of safety. Ms. O'Donnell told the defendant that notwithstanding her request to the contrary, she could not give the defendant any kind of statement that the visit would be unsafe for Tara.
The defendant wanted to keep Tara in therapy with the Clinic and was upset that the plaintiff was blocking it. On September 25, 2001, Ms. O'Donnell suggested to her that if there was no agreement the court could order it.
On October 4, 2001, the parties were back in court and the unsupervised visitation schedule was not changed.
On October 9, 2001, the defendant called Ms. O'Donnell at the clinic and told her that over the weekend, Tara had told her "that some time ago, in the apartment, before going to the carnival, daddy held my shirt and touched my vagina. It made me feel uncomfortable." Ms. O'Donnell called the Hotline and also followed it up with a written report, form 136. Her written report also stated, "Tara was seen here for family problems from 6/12/01 to 9/12/01. Parents divorced and are engaged in ongoing custody, visitation battles. Child was asymptomatic and that's why case was closed. Also, father did not want child in therapy. Child has not disclosed any physical or sexual abuse by other parent. Child has done well in preschool and now in kindergarten."
On October 10, 2001 the defendant contacted DCF stating that her daughter had told her that her father had taken her to a carnival and touched her vagina for a long time. She also told DCF that she had stopped court-ordered visitation after this disclosure by her daughter on October 7, 2001. DCF told her to contact the Derby police.
On October 11, 2001, the defendant told the Derby Police that the plaintiff had sexually molested their daughter. The defendant reported that the child had disclosed this to her on October 7, 2001, saying that her father had taken her to a carnival and touched her vagina for a long time. At that same time the mother told the police, according to DCF records that the father had a history of mental illness and had grieved two judges and three family relations' counselors. She also told the police that the father had threatened Yale Child Study Center with a lawsuit for counseling his daughter and so they had stopped seeing her. Therefore, she was brought to the Fairfield Child Guidance Clinic and was counseling with a Ms. Brownlee.
The police commenced their own investigation and referred the matter to DCF as well. The Child Guidance Clinic indicated to DCF that the mother had brought the child in for therapy because she was concerned about her daughter's mental state. The child had no symptoms of anxiety or depression and was not exhibiting any concerning behaviors at school. Nothing in the therapy was found to indicate sexual abuse. As of the end of October 2001, no further work was being done with the child.
The minor child was also referred by the police to Lisa Ratigan, abuse team coordinator. Ms. Ratigan stated that the child said that the plaintiff touched his daughter's vagina with both of his hands, that she did not have her clothing on and that he touched her one time in her bathing suit and one hundred million times, and that, he touched her genital area inside. Also, Ratigan stated that the child stated that her father told her not to tell, that it was a secret. Ratigan concluded that the assertions by the child were credible. In her conclusion, she reported that Tara provided consistent and credible statements to her, including a description of digital penetration.
However, the review of the interview notes provided in the report give direct quotes of Tara's statements and they were that he touched her vagina, that he did it with his hands, and when asked how he touched it, she said, "Just touched it." The only indication that there may have been an assertion of digital penetration was after showing an adult male doll touching a child doll's genital area, the social worker, Ms. Ratigan asked the child if the father touched her vagina on the inside or outside and she said inside. This court cannot determine from the written report whether the child had clarity of what inside versus outside would be regarding her vagina, at her age, at that time. At trial, the testimony of Tara was that there was touching; her testimony did not even intimate penetration of any sort.
As a part of the investigation, Dr. John Leventhal also physically examined the child. His report indicates that the child's father touched her vagina; he did not independently interview her and would have procured this information from Ratigan. Nothing remarkable was found on physical examination. Dr. Leventhal is the medical director of the child abuse and sex abuse clinic at Yale-New Haven Hospital, concluded in his report on November 7, 2001, "normal exam in child with clear statement of touching of vagina by her father." Based upon Lisa Ratigan's interview, but not as a result of any independent memory, Dr. Leventhal testified at trial that it was his opinion to a standard of reasonable medical probability that Tara was sexually abused.
When queried, Dr. Leventhal had no opinion one way or another if the child was coached, though he did emphasize that the child used age appropriate language. He cannot recall if he spoke with the child's pediatrician, though his notes indicate he had planned to; he did not speak with her therapist. He did not know the child had been taken to her pediatrician the day after her first unsupervised visit with her father, on February 12, 2001; that the mother claimed the child was experiencing vaginal discomfort, yet, the physical exam results were normal. He also did not speak to the child's therapist, who had been treating the child through the time of her unsupervised visits with her father and had no sense of any such problems in the child's visits with her father. The only problems the child consistently reported with visiting with her father is being unhappy when he would say bad things about her mother. The child was well adjusted and neither the therapist, Ms. Brownlee, nor her supervisor, Ms. O'Donnell, found any of the problems the mother kept asserting the child was having with the visits. Dr. Leventhal acknowledged that it might have been helpful to consult with the pediatrician and the therapist, particularly when the sex abuse allegations were mired in the context of a terrible custody/visitation dispute. The mother told DCF that the child has a history of urinary tract and yeast infections. After its investigation, DCF, in accordance with its standards, made a finding of substantiation of the physical abuse of the child by the father due to "child's clear disclosure."
The DCF investigating social worker, Aimee Bloch also testified at trial. Ms. Bloch did recall observing Tara's forensic interview at Yale with Ms. Ratigan. She said the child disclosed sexual abuse, did not appear coerced and was interviewed in a manner consistent with any other child she had observed being interviewed. In the forensic interview she saw Tara show how her father had placed his hand on her vagina by using a doll.
She recalled that Ms. Debek said that Tara was very upset the evening she made her statement to her mother that her father had touched her vagina. This is a direct contradiction of the testimony that Ms. Debek provided in court. On the witness stand, Ms. Debek said that Tara was calm, she was "alright" when she told her mom this.
Ms. Bloch also had neither a recollection nor notes that the mother had used dolls with Tara in discussing her disclosure. Ms. Bloch, as investigating social worker, said this would have been important information and she would have noted it if Ms Debek had told her so. Yet in court, Ms. Debek testified that over the week after the Sunday evening disclosure, she and Tara used dolls to discuss and show her father's conduct with her. Further, her own notes indicate that she again brought the topic up again with Tara, twice in fact, on October 10th. It was the second time that Tara said the touching had occurred more than once, the other time being at the pool.
In court on October 30, 2001, the defendant asserted that the minor child had told her that her father had sexually molested her. On that date, the court (Dewey, J.) found the defendant in contempt of court and incarcerated her for 96 hours or when she allows unsupervised visitation whichever first occurs. The court at that time also ordered visitation to take place supervised by DCF — which the court said was to protect the plaintiff. The court committed the child to the custody of DCF during the mother's incarceration, and ordered the defendant to pay $2,000.00 counsel fees to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims these fees remain unpaid and the plaintiff seeks them as a part of the instant proceedings. On October 30, 2001, the court also modified the existing order to provide for supervised visitation with Nick Sarno at the defendant's cost, pending DCF investigation.
While the defendant was incarcerated, the minor child was placed in foster care. The defendant's sister-in-law and brother (Cynthia and Todd Debek) offered to take the child, but the defendant told DCF that she would prefer the child remain in foster care so that the plaintiff could not try to get her from her brother's home. The child therefore remained in the care of strangers, albeit foster parents for 96 hours. DCF reports that she adjusted well while there.
While the child was in the custody of DCF, the plaintiff had one visit with her. DCF notes that the visitation was for one hour, the father brought the child gifts, and "was interacting with her well." No problems with the visit were noted by DCF. Ms. Bloch, the DCF social worker does not recall the child being alienated at all from her father.
The plaintiff had also opposed the terminating of the order of temporary custody to DCF, asserting that if the child were returned to her mother she would be manipulated by her. That objection was overruled on November 2, 2001.
Upon the defendant's release from incarceration, she was ordered to co-operate in the plaintiff having supervised visitation with the child. She refused to do so claiming she could not afford the cost of $50 per visit (the parties each having been ordered to pay one-half of the cost).
As a part of its investigation DCF also spoke with Nick Sarno, who had supervised the visits early on. He noted no problems with the plaintiff's visits and offered his opinion that the defendant might be a flight risk but had nothing in particular to base that on.
DCF also interviewed the plaintiff. He denied the sexual abuse claim and indicated that he was not opposed to counseling for his daughter but just wanted to be a part of the decision-making process. He became hysterical by the end of the interview, asserting that the defendant fabricates something new against him each time court is coming up for her denial of his access to his child.
As noted above, on November 7, 2001, Dr. John Leventhal of the Yale-New Haven Hospital abuse team examined the child and found no physical evidence of abuse noting "clear statement of touching of vagina by her father."
On October 30, 2001 the defendant filed a motion to order that the minor child attend counseling with Ms. Brownlee, which the contents of the motion stated she had been going to since June 12, 2001, but stopped when the plaintiff threatened legal action. That motion was not granted until March 14, 2002. By then Ms. Brownlee was no longer to be the counselor.
On February 11, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to open which is a pro se speaking motion claiming a variety of wrongdoings by the plaintiff apparently directed to the October 30, 2001 orders of the court. The motion was denied on March 14, 2002.
On March 28, 2002, the second family relations evaluation report was completed. The referral had come on October 30, 2001, as an update request from the first evaluation. The time frame dictated that the evaluator focus on the sex abuse allegations and the period of time immediately prior thereto. In his work, the evaluator spoke with the child's pediatrician who stated that the defendant was a very good mother. The pediatrician did note that the defendant was more diligent about her daughter's health than most parents. The pediatrician had also briefly met with the father and had unspecified concerns about his parenting skills; the pediatrician stated the father perceived him as being against him.
In the evaluation, the reporter notes that each party has had a psychiatric evaluation, The father's psychiatric evaluation resulted in a DSM-IV diagnosis of Adjustment Reaction with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. The evaluator wrote, "This diagnosis suggests that the psychiatrist deems that the father has anxiety and depression in response to an identifiable psychostressor, that is, court litigation regarding visitation and the molestation charges." He had no thought disorder, hallucinations or intent to harm others, despite assertions to the contrary through this litigation by the defendant. There was no impairment shown that would interfere with his ability to function as a parent. The mother's psychiatric evaluation resulted in a dual DSM-IV diagnosis of both an Anxiety Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified, and an Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder. The anxiety disorder displays symptoms of excessive anxiety and worry. The obsessive-compulsive personality disorder includes preoccupation with orderliness, perfection, mental and interpersonal control; such an individual is prone to upset or anger if there is a situation in their interpersonal environment that they can not control; further there may be excessive resistance to authority the person does not respect. These personality traits concerned the evaluator that the mother may have influenced the child's statements about her father.
The evaluator concluded that the mother was willing to risk willful defiance of court orders, concluding that she does not want a relationship of any kind between the child and the father, noting that the visitation was opposed by her long before the sex abuse allegations. The evaluator noted that the father has persevered despite the tremendous opposition he has faced. Basically, the evaluator seemed at loss to make a recommendation. He sought further psychological testing of the parties, and the appointment of a parenting coordinator — an experienced clinician who would act as a final decision maker when the parents reached an impasse over an issue. The parenting coordinator would have been utilized in this recommendation to introduce the father and child again when the child was ready. A further responsibility the evaluator planned for the coordinator was to evaluate the risk for parental alienation and take such steps as would be necessary to reduce the risk of it for the child.
The court notes that parenting coordinators have not yet found great favor in Connecticut but are utilized frequently with high conflict parents in California, Colorado and other jurisdictions. A review of the literature of their success and drawbacks is not necessary inasmuch as this recommendation makes no sense in light of the parties' current circumstances. This court does not believe either parent is presently in a position to cooperate with this process — certainly, not at least until each has had extensive personal therapy.
Perhaps one of the most valuable insights of the evaluator was to note that the plaintiff's personality style makes him "a prime candidate for parental alienation." The evaluator described it as aggressive. The plaintiff describes himself as assertive. The court perceives that it is assertive but if the listener is on the receiving end of the assertive statements it will be perceived as aggressive. Further, the language choice of the plaintiff is very descriptive and may be perceived as aggressive. For instance, the plaintiff describes the court processes he has experienced as "judicial lynching." Perhaps Mr. Bhatia is not aware of the strong image that is conveyed with that expression; perhaps, he is. In any case it is at least assertive and likely perceived by most listeners as aggressive language. The style of the plaintiff, the evaluator points out, along with his quest for sole custody, has fed back and forth with the defendant's aggressive attempt to impede his relationship with the child. Both parents must learn to harness their personality traits for the well-being of this child.
The defendant had told the evaluator that the plaintiff opposed any therapy for the child around the time of the sex abuse allegations. This is not wholly accurate. While his style has once again been assertive, the correspondence from Ms. Brownlee's supervisor detailed a more complex and ambiguous dynamic. After the child reported her father's negative comments about her mother repeatedly in counseling, Ms. Brownlee had offered Mr. Bhatia parent counseling and he said that his daughter did not need any counseling at all because nothing was wrong with her. The counseling terminated at that point when he demanded it — that was in mid September 2001. After the sex abuse allegations, the plaintiff told the evaluator he did not oppose counseling at that point for his daughter but wanted consideration of her working with a new therapist.
At that point, Ms. Debek refused to switch providers saying she would not accede to his request for a new provider. On April 11, 2002, after the defendant moved for permission to take the child to a substitute provider after Ms. Brownlee became unavailable, in perhaps the only agreement entered into by the parties in this entire tortured history, the parties agreed that the child could attend therapy "at any child guidance office and/or with any other comparable, licensed therapeutic provider as therapeutically recommended."
The child then commenced treating with Ms. Cioffi, which services were provided from April 2002 to July 2003. In her initial impression of the minor child, she found her to sometimes be clingy, anxious and she had occasional nightmares. She spent session time preparing the child for testimony in the father's criminal proceedings by using a workbook and play toy figurines. She also went with her to the court, with the mother and then guardian. She advised her to tell the truth and went over her testimony with her.
In a sentence completion intake worksheet that Tara did at the commencement of therapy to give the therapist a sense of where she was emotionally at that time, Tara filled in certain answers that from a lay locus of understanding were puzzling and perhaps troubling. By way of example of what she wrote, the following is extracted with her answers in bold print. "It would be fun to be a person"; "I sometimes think of myself as a person"; "I would be better looking if I was myself"; "Why would anybody touch me" (questioning voice).
On May 20, 2002, the defendant sought and received another 46b-15 restraining order against the plaintiff on behalf of herself and the child, asserting that one week before on May 13, 2002, the child had told her and the therapist that the plaintiff would kill the defendant, leaving the child alone, if the child were to tell anyone that he had touched her vagina.
On May 21, 2002, the then guardian sought advice of the court because she experienced the defendant blocking her from seeing the child until the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff were over. It was after the filing of this motion, and the defendant's filing of a motion for stay, that all these proceedings were ordered (Hiller, J.) stayed on August 22, 2002 until the criminal matters were complete. At that same hearing, the court denied the defendant's motion to clarify the family relations report that had been filed, claiming it was full of errors.
The father had no other visits with the child for the balance of the Fall 2001 straight through his arrest and then, with the stay in place, until after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. That arrest occurred on December 26, 2001, at which time the plaintiff was charged with Sexual Assault in the First Degree and Risk of Injury to a Minor. He was arraigned several days later; at his arraignment a criminal protective order was issued prohibiting the plaintiff from any contact whatsoever with the minor child. The plaintiff pled not guilty to the charges of sexual molestation of his daughter and was acquitted by the jury on June 13, 2003, of the Sexual Assault in the First Degree charge. The jury was hung on the Risk of Injury charge; ultimately, the charge was dismissed by the court on or about November 3, 2003.
At the trial, the minor child testified, though four pages of the transcript of her testimony were missing. The inferences from the testimony most favorable to the plaintiff were that the statements of abuse made by the child at trial were after much practice with her mother, the prosecutor, and others. There was also a connection made through cross-examination between rewards to the child by her mother for doing well in her testimony including a trip to Disneyland which excited the child, quite naturally. The testimony of the child about her memory of visitation activities with her father were vague at first. In the testimony of the abuse it seemed that the child was clear that it occurred after a certain watershed event of August 22, 2001 and that she did not tell her mother after the first time her father touched her vagina but did after the second time because she wanted it to stop. From the child's testimony, it appears she did not know her private parts were called a vagina until her mother told her that.
On November 5, 2003, DCF received another hotline call which was made by the father asserting emotional neglect and abuse of the child by the mother. The reporter claimed the mother has serious mental health issues and may harm herself or Tara, claiming that she may have Munchausen or Munchausen by proxy disorder, as well as asserting that she has been diagnosed with an obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. The father also asserted that the mother may have been sexually abusing the child when coaching her for her testimony in the criminal trial. DCF investigated the matter, finding the child had not been sick a lot and lived in a home that was appropriate. When DCF talked to the child, the child told the worker that her father had sexually abused her and lied about it in court. She told the worker that it was hard to testify and that she had to keep telling people the same thing over and over again. She was upset with her father for denying abusing her. DCF also received communication from the mother's counselor, the Wanik Group which said that the mother only appeared to have an anxiety disorder directly related, in their opinion, to all of the court proceedings.
After the plaintiff was acquitted he appealed the DCF substantiation of abuse. After investigation, DCF reversed its findings, discounting reporting it had previously relied on, as solely being from the defendant.
After the trial, the defendant told Ms. Cioffi, the child's therapist that she was upset with the verdict. She also told the therapist that she was concerned that the child needed therapy with a provider more experienced in sex abuse matters than Ms. Cioffi. The mother then terminated the therapy.
On June 26, 2003, after the acquittal, the plaintiff moved for a court order of liberal, frequent and regular visitation with the minor child. That motion was not acted upon until May 20, 2004. A third family relations study was ordered on December 18, 2003, to be accomplished by the New Haven office. On that same date, the court ordered temporary physical custody of the child to the defendant and ordered her not to remove the child from the state. On April 1, 2004, the stay of proceedings was lifted.
From February 2004, to the end of April 2004, the defendant took the child to a Clifford Beers group for sexually abused girls, supervised by Beth Stenger. She reported to Family Relations that Tara was "far less symptomatic of sexual abuse than most of the children their clinic treats for sexual abuse and indicated that Tara may well benefit more from parent/child counseling than continued sexual abuse counseling." She found Tara very attached to her mother.
On May 18, 2004 the third family relations study was completed. The author, Rob Lang was dissatisfied with the options available to him in making his recommendations. He recommended sole legal and physical custody to the mother because he saw no other viable option available to him at the time. He made other recommendations to try to establish regular contact between Tara and her father, starting with therapeutic visitation with a clinician picked by Mr. Bhatia and approved by the guardian ad litem. He did write, "The success of the father daughter reintegration largely rests with the supportive efforts of the mother. If she is unable or unwilling to facilitate such a goal than [sic] the court is left with no other option than to change physical custody of the child to the father and limit the mother's access to the child."
In his premises for his conclusions and recommendations, Mr. Lang drew no conclusion as to whether the actual act of sex abuse occurred but operated on the premise that the child believes it did occur. Mr. Lang observed five significant factors that have emerged around the sex abuse allegation. First he noted that the defendant first claimed the plaintiff was sexually abusing the child in June 2001 but then did not pursue the claim. This is strange, disconcerting and an ugly allegation to be made and then abandoned. Mr. Lang also noted that the timing of the disclosure by Tara coincided with an appearance in court by the defendant for contempt for not allowing visitation before and after the disclosure, and, she was facing severe coercive orders (which were imposed). Mr. Lang found the confluence in timing more than coincidental. Also a factor for Mr. Lang was that in all of Tara's therapy in the spring and summer of 2001, right to September 12, 2001, no therapist raised any concerns that Tara was being subjected to abuse; instead, once again, Tara's sadness about her father's negative comments about her mother were the major topic of concern in her visitation. Mr. Lang also reviewed the criminal transcript and noted as a factor in his thoughts that the child made clear that she had practiced her testimony with her mother, as part of a routine with rewards attached, beyond what preparatory work she did with the State's Attorney, her therapist and her guardian ad litem. Finally, Mr. Lang wrote, ". . . and perhaps the most troubling is Ms. Debek's insistence that Tara continue to be treated for sexual abuse even though, per her pediatrician, school and prior and current therapist report little to no symptomology."
On May 20, 2004, the court (J.R. Downey, J.) ordered the plaintiff to have visitation with his child the next Thursday, Tuesday and then Thursday immediately following, in a therapeutic setting for up to two hours. The court further ordered the then guardian ad litem to arrange it, and upon his recommendation of the success of the visits, visitation to commence every weekend thereafter from Friday to Sunday. The court further ordered that a psychological evaluation of the defendant be completed to "cover whether: A) there are any mental illness disorders; B) her ability to parent; C) substance abuse problems; and D) the existence or non existence of Munchouser [sic] disorder." The evaluation was to be started by June 4, 2004 and completed by July 4, 2004. The court further ordered that failure to comply with these orders will result in sanctions including imprisonment.
On June 10, 2004, the plaintiff, pro se, moved to reargue the grant of temporary physical custody to the defendant. That motion was denied on July 14, 2004. On June 10, 2004 the plaintiff also filed a motion for an ex parte restraining order against Todd and Cindy Debek, the defendant's brother and sister-in-law, seeking to keep them away from the minor child, claiming offensive behavior involving alcohol and a firearm. It was never acted upon.
On June 22, 2004, the court (Downey J.) ordered that the plaintiff have visitation the next day for two hours at the Bridgeport courthouse, with the guardian present for the visitation. It was also ordered that the guardian report to the court on the status of the visitation. The next day the court also ordered visitation for two hours each the following Monday and Tuesday, with the same conditions attached.
At the same time, the court granted a June 26, 2003 motion by the plaintiff that the defendant undergo a psychiatric evaluation and bear the cost of it. In granting the motion, the court ordered that the appointment was to be made by June 4, 2004, and to be accomplished through the child's then guardian. On June 23, 2004, in response to a motion of the plaintiff's the defendant was again ordered restrained from removing the child from the State of Connecticut. On June 26, 2004, the matter was referred to the Middletown court. By mid July 2004, both parties had representation by their present counsel.
On August 9, 2004, the Middletown court (Quinn, J.) ordered "therapeutic visitations through Dr. Sidney Horowitz as per Judge Downey's orders." On September 2, 2004, the plaintiff filed an emergency immediate motion for contempt, pendente lite claiming that the defendant was late to the August 30, 2004 appointment with Dr. Horowitz and refused to leave the child. The plaintiff sought transfer of custody, incarceration of the defendant and fees and sanctions. On September 14, 2004, after hearing, the court (Aurigemma, J.) ordered that the "child is allowed one full hour visit with plaintiff with supervision of Family Relations. Attorney Welch-Rubin will forfeit the $5,000 retainer ($1,500 to Horowitz, $3,500 to Faccadio)." The matter was also marked over for compliance and review.
By October 18, 2004, this matter had found itself on the Regional Family Trial Docket, located in Middletown. On that date, the other orders of the court (Dubay, J.) along with the referral were that the therapist for the visitation was changed from Dr. Horowitz to Dr. Roeder, the plaintiff was to pay Dr. Roeder and a certain refund from Dr. Horowitz was ordered over to Attorney Welch-Rubin.
On November 12, 2004, a variety of motions then pending before the court were heard. Without cataloguing each motion, the orders that were entered by the court (Abery-Wetstone, J.) were: 1) denial of the defendant's motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order entered on May 21, 2004; 2) denial of the defendant's motion for the minor child Tara to be permitted to testify at trial or to have a meeting with the judge in chambers; 3) psychological evaluation of both parties on an expedited basis with one of two evaluators specified [Bruce Freedman, Ph.D. was one of them and performed the evaluations and testified at trial.]; 4) therapeutic visitation with one of three specified agencies or individuals to occur a minimum of once per week, with neither of the parties' attorneys to have contact with the provider, the costs of which was to be borne one half by each party; 5) denial of the plaintiff's motion for contempt for failure of the defendant to comply with therapeutic visitation with Keith Roeder, Ph.D., finding "the Defendant had legitimate questions as to Dr. Keith Roeder's ability to supervise the visits"; 6) a restraining order on either party selling or transferring assets, including the defendant's residence, until the completion of the trial; and 7) payment of the guardian ad litem's fees within 45 days. On November 18, 2004, the court denied a motion to reargue, seeking the therapeutic visitation to continue with Dr. Roeder. On the same date, the court noted that Susan Berry, Ph.D. had agreed to be the therapeutic visitation supervisor but further ordered that no such visitation was to occur until the plaintiff has the funds to pay for it. On December 10, 2004, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue regarding his payment of fees for the guardian and psychological evaluation, claiming that the plaintiff was not allowed to be heard and provide evidence on the same. Those orders are the subject of an appeal by the plaintiff taken pro se. In the appeal statement, the plaintiff asserts his due process rights were denied, that the court acted contrary to the orders of four previous judges regarding contempt of court by the defendant, and that he is treated wrongfully by the courts of Connecticut as a minority. That appeal is apparently still pending.
On December 10, 2004, the Regional Family Trial docket judge (Abery-Wetstone, J.) recused herself sua sponte from the file and ordered it transferred to the judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport. When all counsel and the guardian moved to withdraw because of the impending inconvenient geographic location, the Bridgeport court (B. Fischer, J.) later in December 2004 granted a motion to transfer the matter to the New Haven judicial district. Matters in preparation for trial were heard by the court in January and on February 8, 2005. All substantive motions were marked over to the time of this trial. At the commencement of the trial evidence suggested the guardian had been having trouble arranging with the defendant to see his ward, the defendant asserting the child did not want to see him. An arrangement was made for a meeting in a public restaurant during the trial on a Monday. Sua sponte, the court also ordered that the guardian see the child the Friday before at school (on an afternoon when the trial had been recessed after a morning session) without any previous notice to the child or communications directly or indirectly by the parties with the child.
In late August 2004, the defendant had contacted Ms. Cioffi again to recommence therapy with Tara. The mother wanted the therapy to focus on visitation with the father. Ms. Cioffi also was attentive to typical issues for girls of Tara's age. This therapy has again stopped as of two to three weeks before trial because of problems with the child's attendance, and, once again the defendant was concerned that Ms. Cioffi is not sufficiently experienced in certain areas that the defendant believes she should be. At trial, Ms. Cioffi asserted that the child continues to need therapy. She is concerned that the child has been allowed by the defendant to decide not to see her father, not to see her therapist, and not to see her guardian. The therapist views this as the mother giving the child too much power over decision-making. Ms. Cioffi has discussed with the supervisor of her clinic that the child has become so locked into these positions that the only way to ease her safely from these positions and away from the legal wrangling between her parents is to remove her from her mother's care, be placed in foster care and have supervised visitation with both of her parents.
On August 24, 2004, Dr. Sidney Horowitz met with the child in anticipation of commencing the court ordered therapeutic visitation sessions. The child did not want to visit with her father and expressed automatic responses of resistance. In a separate meeting with the defendant two days later, she gave him voluminous materials that supported her view of sexual abuse and cautioned the doctor not to be fooled by the plaintiff who she called a sociopath. She called on the telephone later that day and the next day demanding to know each step of the reintroduction process.
On August 30, 2004, the plaintiff was in a waiting room within Dr. Horowitz's offices and the defendant was in the public waiting room with the child on her lap. The child clinged to her mother stating that she did not want to and would not go into the offices to see her father. The mother kept saying to her, "I believe you" over and over. She did nothing to encourage her daughter to separate from her and go with Dr. Horowitz. The doctor went in and told Mr. Bhatai what was transpiring; he became very upset and started saying he was going to sue everyone for not doing their job. Dr. Horowitz tried again to retrieve Tara but the same situation continued and he made a decision to terminate the attempt at therapeutic visitation. He notified the guardian of what occurred. He informed the defendant over the ensuing weeks that she should help the child to separate from her and work through her issues with her father. After the defendant faced further contempt proceedings, on September 23, 2004, another attempt was made with Dr. Horowitz. Initially the child balked again, but ultimately a session was held with Dr. Horowitz present with the child and her father. The child would not look at her father and told him that he abused her. In a loud and pointed voice, more than once the father denied any abuse occurred and told the child she was coached by her mother. The child was very upset and crying and told him that he insulted her and her mother. He was unable to support her emotions and challenged her instead. Dr. Horowitz suggested redirection to him to not argue and instead support her feelings, not necessarily the facts, but the father was unable to do this; he did try to change the topic offering her a book and to talk about school. When she refused his gift and told him she had destroyed past gifts from him, he came upset and angry and chided her for disrespecting her father. Once more, Dr. Horowitz tried redirection, but it was not successful and the child remained so upset that the doctor terminated the session, had the father leave and spent a few minutes alone with the child telling her that he did not know what happened regarding the abuse but knew that she really felt it and that she was very brave for expressing her feelings to her father.
In describing the plaintiff's psychological state, Dr. Horowitz found him labile, displaying volatile anger, sometimes hypomanic with pressured speech and threatening, anxious and sad to the point of being bereft. He advised the plaintiff to get individual therapy if he was going to continue to attempt reunification with his daughter.
Dr. Horowitz found the defendant to have heightened anxiety, be occasionally hypomanic, argumentative and confrontive. He further found her psychological state to include a self belief that is pervasive such that she rejects anything that does not fit into her belief system. He could not say whether or not it was delusional.
It is Dr. Horowitz's concern that Tara has been damaged emotionally beyond repair, that she has fears hidden in deep pockets of her mind and that it will take heroic efforts to decrease this. She has a fervent belief her father is evil and the doctor is sure that it is too late to find out the truth of her feelings because she has been involved in this whole matter for too long, restating her abuse statements over and over too many times to too many people.
It is Dr. Horowitz's opinion that the defendant is harming her child by developing in her a lack of safety in the outside world because she is getting a mixed message about the sex abuse: that the outside world does not believe it occurred and the defendant believes that it did and fosters the child in continuing that belief. The child, being at the point of latency is at the point of great likelihood from this to have her development interfered with in terms of her trust in herself, her interaction with others and in future relationships. In other words, the harm to the child's relationship with the father is not the extent of harm suffered in her mother's care. While the chances of reunification with her father are not quantifiable, interference with her emotional development is likely in the care of her mother.
The parents submitted to a psychological evaluation by Dr. Bruce Freedman. In testing, both parties presented themselves in an overly positive light; parenthetically, this is not an uncommon occurrence among highly intelligent individuals presenting themselves for psychological evaluation attendant to a custody dispute. Dr. Freedman's overall impressions regarding the plaintiff is that his emotional resources have been overwhelmed by the trauma he has experienced. The trauma he has weathered has included the sexual abuse accusations, criminal defense trial, custody battle, loss of his child's affection, loss of his employment, loss of standing in his business community by loss of security clearance, the financial losses to his family, and the death of his mother, which he directly attributes to the stress caused by his circumstances with the defendant and her contact of his mother. As a result of these stressors, Mr. Bhatia's mechanisms for handling emotional dissonance are not working well.
Dr. Freedman's evaluation of the defendant focused on her psychological profile and its effect on her ability to facilitate the child's contact with her father. He wrote, "She presented herself clearly and repeatedly, with the zeal and conviction normally reserved for fervent religious devotees, as being convinced that Mr. Bhatia was mentally [sic] disturbed, had molested Tara, and that only Ms. Debek could protect her daughter through intense and vigilant effort." Of course, criticism of this presentation emanates from a starting point by Dr. Freedman that the abuse did not occur; he arrived at that point after reviewing the DCF reversal of substantiation. He points out however, that the defendant's fervent and intense opposition and obstruction to visitation and court orders predates the sex abuse allegation by approximately one year, and, it was continuous throughout that time. The personality of the defendant, as observed by this court is that she is so inflexible that she will not be able to abide by court orders that go contrary to her belief system. As Dr. Freedman observed, "A striking feature of Ms. Debek was that counselors, evaluators, service providers, and others found her inflexible, closed to suggestions or modifications of her behavior, consistent with her obstinate refusal to obey court orders." The court also had the opportunity to observe Ms. Debek on the witness stand and listen to her testimony. She struggled to present herself in a way that would show she was flexible but she is not. Her practice with each provider is to thoroughly examine them until they provide a view of matters inconsistent with hers and then she rejects them absolutely. For instance, she wanted Ms. Cioffi to be Tara's counselor, but once Ms. Cioffi started challenging and questioning, the defendant decided she needed someone more experienced "in matters of this kind" than Ms. Cioffi. She has attacked all of the family relations officers' work as inadequate and inaccurate. She has claimed that Dr. Roeder is lacking specialization in the field of child sex abuse to supervise visits. The one expert that Ms. Debek praised in her correspondence is Dr. Horowitz: "I thought the visits should continue with Dr. Horowitz — after Ajai received adequate counseling — because Dr. Horowitz has extensive experience in forensics and in treating both victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse." Consequently, it is ironic that he is one of the many providers who testified that the defendant is so septic for her child emotionally, that this court should seriously consider the removal of the child from her care.
Throughout these proceedings the defendant has presented herself as a victim of physical abuse by the plaintiff The only incident of a physical contact that the defendant can point to as abuse is one occasion in which the plaintiff held her tightly by her wrists. Repeatedly throughout these proceedings, it has been recommended to the defendant to get counseling. The only counseling she has attended was briefly from September/October 2004 to February 2005 as part of a pretrial disposition for criminal charges filed against her for an incident arising out of all these proceedings. She is not presently in counseling.
When DCF was investigating the sex abuse claim, the defendant told the worker that the plaintiff had no contact with his daughter for the first few years of her life until he moved to Connecticut and requested visitation. This was not true. The plaintiff was a part of the child's life in her immediate infancy, when she was born in Florida. When the defendant moved with her to Connecticut the plaintiff came up on his work vacations as described earlier in this opinion, expressly to see his daughter.
In the same interview with the DCF worker, which took place on October 15, 2001, the mother said that she had not "questioned her or pursued Tara about the sexual abuse because she did not want to traumatize her even more." The inference was that when she demonstrated on a doll it was at the same time. In her testimony, the defendant acknowledged that throughout the week after the Sunday evening conversation with Tara, she did discuss the abuse with her and had her show it to her on dolls several days later. The defendant also told the DCF worker that the child talks about spreading her legs frequently. This never came up in the child's therapy from the child or the mother. Once again, the defendant either lied to DCF or the court. Both impugn her credibility. Also, the context of her statement to DCF shows the defendant knew the inappropriateness of continuing to discuss the matter with Tara.
In fact, after the Sunday conversation, on October 7, 2001, the mother did not immediately report it to anyone: the pediatrician, the child's therapist, the police, DCF, the child's guardian, or her own lawyer for two days. The defendant says she did not call anyone from October 7, 2001 until October 9 or 10, 2001 because she "was trying to figure it out," trying "to figure out what Tara was telling me." The defendant took notes on events to do with custody. Immediately after Tara told her what she did on the evening of October 7, 2001, the defendant went to her bedroom and wrote in her notes, "Before taking her to a carnival, she said she was getting dressed and Ajai held her shirt and touched her vagina for a long time and that's why she feels uncomfortable with him and doesn't want to see him." The notes are then unclear whether anyone was contacted on the 9th of October but it appears that she called Ms. O'Donnell that day; she noted to herself to call DCF, the pediatrician and Bridgeport police on the 10th of October. This mother is the same woman who ran into the pediatrician's office the day after the first supervised visitation occurred; and, ran to the therapist's supervisor, Ms. O'Donnell trying to prevent unsupervised overnight visitation. Further, her history with DCF and the police discloses her intimate knowledge of their roles in matters such as these.
Nothing substantial that the plaintiff has said or done in this case has undermined his credibility. This court, on the balance of all the evidence and lack of credibility of the defendant, is inclined to disbelieve that the "disclosure conversation" took place as she indicated. It is entirely possible that the child discussed with her mother time spent with her father and she stated he touched her vagina. From there, the inference was made by the defendant that it was sexual in nature. From there, she spent days going over it with her daughter. Still, at the end of October her daughter was not yet afraid of her father. In therapy to that point the child showed no trauma. It is only after a lot of time with a mother who concluded her daughter had been sexually molested by the father that the mother most wanted out of the child's life, does this 5 year old child develop the fear and antipathy toward her father. The disclosure that Sunday evening and later (much later in the month) to Lisa Ratigan provide the sole substance of these assertions. The fact remains, to this day that this child now 8 1/2 believes that her father has sexually molested her. It is a conclusion a 5 year old does not reach without the assistance of an adult. The court concludes that the harm done by this mother is devastating.
Such further facts necessary for the disposition of this matter will be stated hereinafter.
II.
Jurisdiction over the matter before the court is found squarely in Connecticut General Statutes Section 46b-1. In determining the appropriate custodial orders, the court must determine what is in the best interests of Tara. "In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall . . . be guided by the best interests of the child . . ." General Statutes § 46b-56(b)(l); see also Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 789, 621 A.2d 267 (1993); Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 282, 440 A.2d 899 (1981). The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment. Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985). Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134 (1997).
Sec. 46b-l. (Formerly Sec. 51-330). Family relations matters defined. Matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court deemed to be family relations matters shall be matters affecting or involving: (1) Dissolution of marriage, contested and uncontested, except dissolution upon conviction of crime as provided in Section 46b-47; (2) legal separation; (3) annulment of marriage; (4) alimony, support, custody and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment; (5) actions brought under Section 46b-15; (6) complaints for change of name; (7) civil support obligations; (8) habeas corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of children; (9) habeas corpus brought by or in behalf of any mentally ill person except a person charged with a criminal offense; (10) appointment of a commission to inquire whether a person is wrongfully confined as provided by Section 17a-523; (11) juvenile matters as provided in Section 46b-121; (12) all rights and remedies provided for in chapter 815j; (13) the establishing of paternity; (14) appeals from probate concerning: (a) Adoption or termination of parental rights; (b) appointment and removal of guardians; (c) custody of a minor child; (d) appointment and removal of conservators; (e) orders for custody of any child; (f) orders of commitment of persons to public and private institutions and to other appropriate facilities as provided by statute; (15) actions related to prenuptial and separation agreements and to matrimonial decrees of a foreign jurisdiction; (16) custody proceeding brought under the provisions of chapter 815o; and (17) all such other matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court concerning children or family relations as may be determined by the judges of said court.
Sec. 46b-56. Superior Court orders re custody, care, therapy, counseling and drug and alcohol screening of minor children or parents in actions for dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment. Access to records of minor children by noncustodial parent. Parenting education program. (a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint under Section 46b-45, the court may at any time make or modify any proper order regarding the education and support of the children and of care, custody and visitation if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815o. Subject to the provisions of Section 46b-56a, the court may assign the custody of any child to the parents jointly, to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. The court may also make any order granting the right of visitation of any child to a third party, including but not limited to, grandparents.
The dilemma for the court is when some of these factors are in internal conflict with each other. Undoubtedly, the only home Tara has known is with her mother. She has, in many ways, flourished in her mother's care. Her education and extra curricular activities have been well attended to by her mother. Tara looks to her mother for all of her emotional support. To tear her from this attachment because remaining with her mother would continue other harm is an excruciating choice.
The plaintiff, Mr. Bhatia is not an immediate appropriate custodial caretaker for Tara. The court has no reason to doubt that his day to day parenting skills, just as the defendant's are, meet every measure of appropriateness. Not a lot of attention in this trial, and therefore the evidence, addressed these matters. However, there is sufficient basis in the record to conclude that both parents can meet the physical needs of Tara. Neither is presently equipped to meet her emotional needs. Mr. Bhatia must continue to develop the emotional and psychological skills to support Tara through her own emotional struggles. She views him as her abuser. She has been taught by her mother to see him as a sick person who has wronged her.
Further, Mr. Bhatia's view of the defendant is so clouded by his own hostility and frustration that he has acted and spoken poorly to the child about her mother. He thinks the defendant is a drug addict, prostitute, and alcoholic. None of those are true. Instead, Mr. Bhatia when with the child in the past has stated bad things about the child's mother. He has repeated these accusations to DCF, the court and other entities. In therapy, Mr. Bhatia must learn to harness these emotions and learn not to speak so inappropriately to the child. Further, he has sat through the trial and should know there is no basis for these accusations. Until he accepts this, the court finds it unlikely that the plaintiff will appropriately restrain his dialogue with his child about the defendant. Specific to the needs of his child, painful examples of this played out, unfortunately, in the reunification therapeutic visitation with Dr. Horowitz. Mr. Bhatia's personal outrage, frustration and anger was experienced acutely when his daughter confronted him, asserting that he had sexually molested her.
In testimony in court, Mr. Bhatia had difficulty staying directed in answers to questions, instead showing an absolute need to vent verbally and emphatically once again, his outrage, anger and frustration at his circumstances. That said, he showed an ability to harness his emotions when admonished or redirected by the court, or, by his counsel. This is consistent with the opinion of Dr. Roeder.
Mr. Bhatia's anger at his circumstances is so great, the court finds, that he has made poor choices about funding supervised therapeutic visitation since the late Fall of 2004. He has not paid for the work with Dr. Roeder's successor (Berry or McCormick) after the defendant rejected working with Roeder and the court (Abery-Wetstone, J.) approved of a change. He protested that the reason was that he could not afford it because he is tapped out in sources he can borrow money from and he cannot get employment (having lost a bank teller position at the onset of the trial because the security check continues to show a criminal record from the sexual assault charges, when it should show no record). A friend, Jeffrey Hall has lent the plaintiff money in the past which he says has been paid back (though the plaintiff says there is a balance which he will repay one day though Hall believes he has received almost all of it); the plaintiff has not sought to borrow from him in the last year. No doubt that finances are very tight for Mr. Bhatia; however, he has borrowed money from members of his temple for rent and other things; he could have found a way, the court is sure, to at least partially fund either Berry or McCormick.
The plaintiff was recommended to seek personal counseling after his sessions with Dr. Horowitz. He followed through on this advice and had several counseling sessions with Keith Roeder, a clinical psychologist in early October 2004. The focus of the therapy was Mr. Bhatia's need to develop empathy for his daughter, which he lacked. In this therapy, the plaintiff over three sessions became less agitated and demonstrated a higher degree of understanding his daughter's situation emotionally. He became more amenable to reacting in a way with her that was not defensive and demonstrated his developing understanding. These emotional tools were evident when Mr. Bhatia saw his daughter in the Middletown courthouse by judicial order. He demonstrated an ability to not engage in denial and confrontation with her but instead to redirect her to age appropriate child activities with toys and books. Even when she persisted, he was able to tell the observing Family Relations officer that he would read the officer a book and Tara could listen if she wanted. This demonstration of restraint by him leads the court to conclude that with proper guidance and effort by the plaintiff he is capable of being sensitive and attentive to his daughter's emotional and psychological state and put that before his own internal immediate needs for vindication in her eyes.
What really occurred between Mr. Bhatia and his daughter, at this point, only he will know. The child does not know. She only knows the reality that has developed since that fateful day in October over three years ago. She is firm in her conviction that her father sexually molested her. She states it affirmatively and uses that very language. Her mother, who she looks to for her nurturance, security and stability believes it and reaffirms it to Tara all the time. Tara has so internalized this that she tries to shed herself of all things related to her father, including her last name and her Indian heritage. While the defendant protests that she wants her to appreciate her heritage and embrace it, she allows — and therefore approves of the child signing her name with the surname Debek, her mother's, rather than Bhatia. When the child's class was going on a field trip to a cultural event that might include South Asian/Indian cultural acts as a part of the program, the mother wrote a note to the teacher to let the child skip that part of the act if she wanted to and play with a Game Boy in the lobby. The loud and clear messages from the mother to this child are that rejection of her father, and everything associated with him, is entirely appropriate.
The defendant protests, and testified under oath, that she wants her daughter to have a relationship with her father. The court not only does not believe her; instead the court finds that the defendant lied under oath when she said these things. The record is clear that the only reason the defendant has said these things and is offering, now to follow through on therapeutic supervised visitation is because every single professional who has dealt with her and testified at trial finds her the major obstacle to the child having a relationship with the father. They have all recommended the court consider placing custody of the child with a third party rather than with her.
The credibility issues surrounding the sexual abuse claims all bear out poorly for the defendant. Besides those discussed above, there are a variety of other significant inconsistencies in her behavior and statements. The defendant reported to the DCF investigators that the child was making sexualized statements and engaging in sexualized behavior with another child. In a letter to DCF on April 23, 2004 (articulating her upset with the Department's reversal of substantiation of abuse by the plaintiff), the defendant said that the child was bed wetting from her upset in 2001. The child's therapist reported none of these symptoms. The child's pediatrician reports that beyond the visit on February 12, 2001 when the mother reported the child had vaginal discomfort (the day after her first unsupervised visit with her father), the child was only treated in the balance of the year for teeth grinding on June 11, 2001 and seen for immunizations on two days in August 2001. Surely, if the child was symptomatic as the mother reported to DCF when investigating the sexual abuse claim, she would have taken her daughter to her pediatrician for consultation and treatment. Indeed, DCF's own contacts with the pediatrician reflected no known health problems or special needs of the child.
Also, in her testimony before the court, the defendant said that when Tara came home from that visit she appeared traumatized and that is why she took her to the pediatrician. That is not what the pediatrician reported was the complaint presenting in the visit. She also testified that Tara had sleeping problems, nightmares and other trouble sleeping that summer. Nothing of this nature was presented to the pediatrician. The therapist, Ms. Cioffi, whose work with the child commenced after the allegations, said only an occasional nightmare was reported.
However, as Tara's most recent therapist, Julie Cioffi, phrased the present circumstance to the child's guardian. "Tara still firmly believes her father molested her and has great difficulty understanding why she has been ordered to see her father and why adults must comply with the Court's ruling . . . Tara needs a place and a person with whom she can consitently [sic] talk and be on a regular basis." The court concludes that it is not important for it to determine the ultimate question of whether sex abuse occurred for the purpose of understanding the psychological state of Tara, because for her it did occur. However, it is important for the court to reach some conclusion for the court to understand what orders should enter about the parents' respective contact with the child, and what services must be utilized by each parent to normalize their respective relationship with Tara for her benefit. The court concludes that of everything that it heard, the following is most likely what occurred. On at least one occasion, Mr. Bhatia's hand was on his daughter's bottom, whether by helping her pull up a bathing suit, tucking a shirt tail in her pants or the like. Tara did not like it. She did not tell him but told the person she feels safest with, her mother. Her mother was, at the time Tara gave her this information, predisposed to believe that the father would sexually abuse his daughter. She believed he was a victim of sex abuse and that was very important to his behavior as a parent; she believed he was dangerous for his daughter and her and she was mentally preset to view all information in the most detrimental way for him, and, the way most in furtherance of her goal to restrict his contact to her daughter; i.e., her psychological prism automatically construed what Tara told her as sexual abuse and so, she told Tara this. Tara is a bright little girl who immediately learned that her mother felt these acts that made her somewhat uncomfortable were very, very bad. A whole gradient scale of responses could have come from a mother after what Tara said — many of which would not have assumed the worse but also protected the child. For instance, Mr. Bhatia might be told that Tara did not like this physical contact of any sort by her father with her private parts — that she was a little girl who had been raised, really only by her mother and had no one else, particularly no man ever helped her in these little girl, private ways. But that sort of re-education path was not chosen by Ms. Debek nor, frankly, was she capable of the same, the court assumes. Her emotional state prevented her from receiving, appreciating and processing the information she received in any way other than the way she did. Ms. Debek profoundly believes all of the things she says about Mr. Bhatia. They fit in her view of him; any more ambiguous or benign explanation does not work for her internally. The fear the court has is that because her perceptions of Mr. Bhatia are so driven by her personality disorder, they are not likely to change — perhaps only temporarily abate out of a sense of self need just as now the defendant vigorously asserts to the court that she will cooperate in and accede to supervised visitation, because it is a necessary concession to meet her goals.
The larger question is whether these personality traits of the defendant will also hinder the proper development of the child in other spheres of her life as Drs. Horowitz and Freedman have stated. As Dr. Freedman succinctly put it, "It seemed likely that a parent with such a narrow, rigid, and highly defended view of the world would warp the development of a child." If so, the court must conclude that the removal of the child is necessary not only to allow the growth of a relationship of the child with her father but also to provide her with an environment where she is safe to grow without the overwhelming control her mother imposes on her. The super mom image that comes across from those who know Ms. Debek have observed this with a little child who is not yet fully ready to assert her own will.
The guardian ad litem testified at length at the trial and was subject to cross-examination. His ward does not want to see her father and wants to live with her mother. He found her an articulate child who communicated freely with him once she had the opportunity to do so. The child's mother made it very difficult for the guardian to see the child once the trial approached. She claimed the child was uncomfortable with him and a third party, an advocate from the Center for Women and Families should be present for his time with her. The defendant wrote to the guardian, "She is becoming more self conscious and she is more reluctant to speak with anyone — especially men — about court, about what her father did to her, about how she feels about the events of the last four years, about how she feels about the events of the last nine months."
Then, the mother told the guardian as the trial approached that Tara was refusing to see her therapist and refusing to meet with her guardian. The court concludes that this behavior of the child, at her age of 8 plus years had to be tacitly encouraged by the mother or it would not be continued. The child is told she has to do something, the child protests and the mother gives in. This is not a healthy dynamic.
Ultimately the court ordered one visit of the guardian with his ward and another one was accomplished at a restaurant with the mother and child's cooperation. The guardian perceived no resistance from the child and continued with the easy rapport with her he had developed when he first was appointed.
In his testimony, the guardian opined that the child needs an opportunity to know her father and develop a meaningful relationship with him. The guardian does not believe that can occur while the child lives with her mother. He recommends a court order removing the child from her mother for a period of time, during which a therapist be engaged for reunification with the father and supervising visits with the mother toward the goal of a post-conflict working relationship between the two parents for the child. Factors involved in his recommendation that removal was important were the testimony of Drs. Horowitz and Freedman, and the opinion of Ms. Cioffi, the mental health professional with the most amount of time spent with Tara, and the history of the mother's inability to parent the child toward a relationship with her father, including most recently her removal of the child from Ms. Cioffi's treatment as soon as she started talking about working with the child toward reunification.
The guardian noted that the mother used the same excuses for why the child should not see Ms Cioffi as him, that it was inconvenient on Tara's schedule, that Tara not trust them, and that they are not expert enough.
The guardian also explained that he was not recommending custody of Tara to her father at this time as it would not be in her best interests because she believes he molested her, and, he is not psychologically ready for custody of her given her belief.
A major extracurricular activity that Tara has been involved in is playing the violin. The defendant has enlisted Tara in this with a violin program that has the child and parent an integrated part of the program together, so that they practice together and attend the lesson together. The progress of Tara in this has been very satisfactory.
Mother has repeatedly complained during the visitation process from 2000 to 2001 that she requested supervised visitation for the father because he might flee with Tara to India. There is no evidence to support this fear. Instead it is the mother who has researched how to flee to "the underground" with Tara. She states that she has decided not to because she knows if she is caught she will lose Tara, and, the economics of it, e.g., the ability to survive, was not reassuring to her. This court is concerned, that now that these orders enter, that those economic risks will not seem so insurmountable to the defendant. Mr. Lang, the family relations officer wrote, "Ms. Debek acknowledged to this counselor that she had considered fleeing with Tara and talked to other people about the possibility but would not do so because if she were caught Mr. Bhatia would "get" Tara and she could not let that happen." That the defendant has contemplated fleeing, and has researched it, leads this court to conclude that safeguards for the child must be put in place by court order, so that this does not occur.
Tara attends a public school in Fairfield (though she lives in Bridgeport) through a lottery program. Her present third grade teacher testified. From the testimony, the court can conclude that Tara is an excellent student, a hard worker, who has a lot of friends in her school and is generally very well adjusted there. The teacher confirmed that the child writes her name as Tara Debek on all her papers. The school is also attended by Tara's cousins, the children of Cynthia and Todd Debek; Todd is the defendant's brother. A review of some of Tara's school work discloses that she is very fond of her cousins and her aunt and uncle and loves being at their home in Fairfield. The court heard testimony from these two adults. They were called as witnesses at the request of the court after a review of the witness lists disclosed that they were not prospective witnesses. They were examined in depth, including about those issues relevant to whether they would be appropriate parties to have custody of Tara directly or as a result of DCF placement.
Because of the many recommendations before the court to remove the child, both parties were aware that the court was being asked to consider granting custody to a third party who had not intervened. Further, testimony clearly disclosed that the Debeks as well as DCF were options the court was being asked to examine for a third-party custody order. The court also permitted the parties to call additional witnesses, beyond those on the trial management mandated witness list so that all of the evidence could be elicited regarding third parties. Therefore, the parties' due process rights in this regard were adequately protected. "A preference for formal intervention recognizes that parents have significant constitutionally protected rights to the companionship, care, custody and management of their children. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, reh. denied, 435 U.S. 918, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 400-01, 479 A.2d 176 (1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1747, 84 L.Ed.2d 813 (1985). Nonetheless, Manter v. Manter did not hold, and we do not now hold, that formal intervention is in every case a sine qua non to a valid order of custody. The overarching concern of the search for the best interests of the child may, in some cases, permit a court to award custody to a third person who is not a party if, even without formal intervention, that person's potential custodial status was properly before the court." Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 14-15, 490 A.2d 996 (1985).
The court is painfully aware of the preference that a child live with her parents. It is only after the conclusion of the present inability of either party to ensure the child's secure and emotionally safe development that the conclusion of placement with a third party is reached. "In a controversy between a parent and a stranger, the parent has the stronger right to custody unless the child's welfare clearly requires that custody be placed in the stranger." Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, CT Page 7902 551, 438 A.2d 755 (1980). "The term `stranger' means anyone not a parent. It may include relatives, friends, or child care agencies." Id., 551 n. 3; In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 662 n. 12, 420 A.2d 875 (1979)." Franklin v. Dunham. 8 Conn.App. 30, 32-33, 510 A.2d 1007 (1986).
Both the aunt and uncle are fond of Tara and are willing to have her live with them for an extended period of time. They are aware of the stresses it may cause to their family. They have two children, a boy and a girl, and it is clear that the girls (their daughter and Tara) would need to share a room. They are both concerned that Tara be able to stay in the same school and not lose her place through the lottery if she is temporarily removed from her mother and then back with her over time. They both believe that this is a very good school, and, a very good school for Tara. The aunt believes that Tara should be asked before she has unsupervised visitation with her father; she bases that on a belief that something inappropriate between the father and child occurred. She does not describe her relationship with the defendant in positive terms ("There is no love lost between the two of us"). The relationship between the Debek children and the parties' child is very good. Until this school year they spent a lot of time together. In fact, Tara used to take the school bus to the Debek home daily after school and stay there until her mother picked her up. Ms. Debek has not done that this school year; she says it is because Mr. Bhatia does not like her brother and she wishes to respect his wishes. The court does not believe that. As the defendant has written to a family relations supervisor on January 18, 2002 in regard to whether the plaintiff should be able to weigh in on who Tara's therapist should be, the defendant wrote, "I am assuming Mr. Wilensky [family relations officer] expects me to submit to Mr. Bhatia's demands. Please know that I will not jump through Mr. Bhatia's hoops. In addition, I will not force my daughter to jump through Mr. Bhatia's hoops."
It is apparent instead that a tension has arisen between Ms. Debek and her brother and sister-in-law. Some of it arises out of the fact that this whole custody controversy and the events surrounding it have colored every family gathering and Cynthia Debek is tired of it. Also, the defendant believes that her brother has a drinking problem. (The plaintiff believes that as well and also is concerned that he keeps firearms in the house; plaintiff believes both are inappropriate.) While the brother has some history of excessive alcohol consumption it was quite a few years ago. His wife worries that his work stress may accentuate it, even recently. While this is an area for some concern, the court notes that Mr. Debek has remained a high functioning person and there is no suggestion that his consumption has been inappropriate around his children or his niece.
It is worrisome to the court that Tara has lost the close contact that she had developed with her cousins. The defendant's choice to create a distance is for no apparent benefit to her daughter. Instead of going to her cousin's after school, she now is at a bus stop down the street, and, in after school programs. The participation in social time with this family appears to have been largely restricted to holidays at this point. In her criminal testimony, she had referred to them as brother and sister — it is clear that they have been a source of closeness, nurturance and extended family for her.
The relationship between Todd Debek and his wife and the defendant may also be stressful because of her parental behavior. Cynthia Debek has noticed the defendant is "overboard" about school things for Tara, that Tara is "more prepared for things than the average child." Mr. Debek says his sister is a fabulous mother on the one hand, and, on the other hand he is concerned whether what she does is in Tara's best interest, because he knows she has strong opinions. His concern was sufficient that he repeated it in his testimony a second time.
If Cynthia and Todd Debek were granted custody of Tara for a period of time, Cynthia Debek would have a difficult time keeping Tara's mother away if that was what was court ordered, but she believes that she would follow the court order if she fully understood it and had direction from the court as to how to explain the circumstance to Tara and her own two children. She is concerned because her children have always understood that they could open the door of their house for their Aunt Marlene, but of course not for strangers. Perhaps more difficult for Cynthia Debek would be delivering Tara to visits with her father. She would want another adult present, and, she would not want to deliver Tara if she was "kicking and screaming." Ultimately she said, "I would have a problem emotionally with it but I'd do what I have to do." Cynthia Debek is the child transporter in her family, inasmuch as Todd Debek works many hours to support his family. She is willing to integrate driving Tara about into her family unit. This would also involve transporting Tara to her violin lessons. She has been playing for quite some time, appears to enjoy it and has done well.
Todd Debek and Ajai Bhatia do not get along. They had a bad event in Florida surrounding the disintegration of the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant. The plaintiff firmly believes that Mr. Debek is a racist toward him and has animosity to him. The plaintiff's animosity to Mr. Debek is not a major concern for the court though the court is aware that, to a certain extent it will undermine Mr. Bhatia's faith in any court orders that may result in Tara living with her Uncle Todd. Both Mr. and Mrs. Debek have firmly testified, and the court believes both of them, that they do not discuss the plaintiff and all of the matters pertaining to this case with Tara, their children and they will never do so. Their maturity about this is genuine. Given a choice whether to rely on that and insist that Mr. Bhatia put his own hostility aside, and on the other hand, honoring his feelings and exclude the aunt and uncle as a placement for Tara, the choice is easy for the court: Tara is entitled to the security, comfort and love her aunt and uncle offer if the DCF finds them an appropriate relative foster placement, which the court encourages based on the facts before it at trial.
Mr. Debek was his least genuine on the witness stand when he downplayed his animosity to the plaintiff He said he did not dislike Mr. Bhatia, that he did not necessarily like him, and that he was ambivalent about him. Perhaps his reason for this vacillation is one of his best insights for the court to rely on if Tara is placed with his family: Todd Debek realizes that it is not going to benefit the situation for him to take a position about Mr. Bhatia. Mr. Debek clearly feels a large sense of responsibility to his niece. He offered to take her when DCF had custody of her in October 2001; it was only when the defendant objected that it did not occur. He is willing to do "anything humanly possible" to assist Tara's situation and would restrict his sister's access if that is what the court orders. He would follow the court instruction to the letter. The Debeks were preliminarily screened for appropriateness for foster placement by DCF in October 2001, and, as far as they were taken in the process they were found appropriate.
Mr. and Mrs. Debek have provided significant financial help to the defendant and it has been a drain on their family. Cynthia Debek is candid in worrying about the additional costs associated with custody of Tara. It is clear from the parties' financial affidavits and current situations that neither is in a position, to offer significant financial contribution to the services needed. Of course, they each have a legal responsibility to support their child.
The plaintiff offered a lay witness, Vina Vani as a character witness for himself and a community resource who would be willing to take Tara into her home. She has known the plaintiff for two years through the Middletown Hindu Temple. She does not know the defendant or the child. Her generosity was extraordinary: she is a physician who is married to a University of Connecticut professor and they have three children in her five bedroom home. The distance of her home from the child's school in Fairfield is a detracting factor, since the child should not be removed from that school. Dr. Vani's home is not a licensed foster home though she would be willing to go through that process. The court makes no findings regarding the appropriateness of placement of Tara with her and her family.
The costs associated with the reunification goals of Tara with her parents are significant: both her parents and she require counseling. She will be reunited successfully only if her contact with each of her parents is accomplished through a therapeutic environment, where each parent can be guided toward good decision-making in their emotional and verbal interaction with their daughter. Tara, being removed from her mother, will fare better if placed with the relatives that she is comfortable with and who she has looked to for nurturance and support. As Dr. Horowitz testified, Tara may have some regression when removed from her mother, but it represents the greatest hope for her healthy personal development in the long run. That regression and the painful losses the child will feel are likely to be less, and optimally minimized, if Tara can live with her cousins, aunt and uncle in their home. The court strongly recommends to DCF that it positively consider the relative placement of Tara with Cynthia and Todd Debek, if it is satisfied that they are able to obey the court orders. The Debeks must understand it will result, if all proceeds well, to a reunification of Tara emotionally with her father.
At trial, the defendant testified that she has discussed with the minor child that she may be placed in foster care. She apparently did this after Ms. Cioffi raised it with her. Ms. Debek has said she does not "hide the truth" from Tara. The court remains concerned that the defendant therefore continues to fill Tara with her perception of events that are best not discussed with a child for her own healthy, happy development.
After consideration of all these findings, the court finds (1) that it is contrary to the best interest of Tara to remain in the custody of her mother or be placed in the custody of her father, presently, (2) that Tara is at present risk to her physical and emotional safety if she remains in the physical care of her mother, and (3) that it is in Tara Bhatia's best interest to order:
1. Custody of the minor child, Tara Bhatia to the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families effective immediately; pursuant to 46b-l and 46b-56(a). The court orders the Commissioner to immediately take physical custody of he child to ensure her physical safety inasmuch as the court finds the defendant is likely to flee with the child if given the opportunity, upon learning of these orders.
2. DCF shall consider, as soon as practicable, the placement of Tara in her aunt and uncle's home if they are willing to comply with these court orders and such other requirements imposed by DCF.
3. In light of the tortured history of this case through our courts, the court specifically declines to refer the subsequent proceedings that will follow from these orders to the Juvenile Court, but will retain jurisdiction with the undersigned in this court, pursuant to CGS Sections 46b-1 and 46b-4.
Sec. 46b-4. Judge may retain jurisdiction until final disposition. Any judge who hears a family relations matter may retain jurisdiction thereof until its final disposition if, in his opinion, the ends of justice require.
4. DCF is to ensure that regardless of the child's placement she is to remain in her present school such that her continued place in the lottery choice program is not jeopardized. Any conferences, PPTs or the like regarding education are to be noticed to Tara's guardian ad litem and his counsel toward ensuring this result, and, her continued success in school. The guardian and his counsel at their option, may attend these meetings.
5. DCF is to provide services for the child, her mother and her father as it deems necessary but to include, in any case, at least the following services:
a. Commencing within seven days, Tara shall attend individual therapy at least weekly, initially, to give her an environment to deal with adjustment to these orders, her living situation generally, and such other matters that properly arise between her and her therapist. If DCF deems it wise and it is acceptable to the caregiver, her therapy may continue with a previous provider. Neither parent shall have input into the selection of the therapist or the frequency or duration of therapy. That judgment shall be made by DCF in its discretion as custodian.
b. Tara shall have supervised visitation with her mother at least two times per week. The supervisor of that visitation shall be someone designated by DCF. The supervisor shall be of sufficient training to be able to direct the defendant in appropriate communication with Tara as she experiences reunification therapy with her father. The Department shall endeavor not to have the visitation in an artificial environment at all times. The DCF supervisor may not allow the parent and child unsupervised conversation inasmuch as the defendant is presently incapable of wholly appropriate conversation with the daughter; the court finds the defendant unsupervised will undermine these orders in her conversation with her daughter.
c. Tara shall be given violin and karate lessons at least once weekly, respectively, if she desires to continue in the violin and karate.
d. Tara shall have therapeutic supervised time with her father toward the goal of reunification, once she has her own therapist (no later than seven days from these orders). However, these visits shall not occur until the father's therapist can report to DCF that he has made such progress with both harnessing his emotions and empathizing with his daughter's feelings that he will be able to provide her an emotionally safe environment for visits. Once these visits commence they should progress as speedily as is practicable while continuing to ensure that Tara is in an emotionally safe environment. The court finds that this may occur more readily if Tara does not live with her mother, overshadowed by the mother's omnipresent reminder to her that she has been molested by her father and that he is unsafe for her.
6a. DCF shall provide counseling for the father that will provide him the opportunity to progress in harnessing his emotions, anger, and frustration at his situation, gain insight into the effect of his assertiveness and claims of racism on others — particularly Tara's care providers, and, gain empathy for Tara's emotional state and her psychological and emotional view of him, her mother, and her own life circumstances. The father may, at his election, select Dr. Roeder for continued therapy if Dr. Roeder is a DCF provider.
The court is not aware if DCF has such a list for providers.
6b. DCF shall provide therapy with a psychologist or psychiatrist for the mother. In that therapy, the mother must progress to develop the ability to support her daughter in a relationship with her father that is not dependent upon acquiescence to the mother's rigid views of him; she develop tools and techniques to not view and regard her daughter as able only to be protected by her; she develop skills to overcome the tendencies and compulsions to reject those who disagree with her.
7. DCF shall provide access to a parenting skills course of treatment for the father so that he may become fully sensitized to the special day to day skills he needs to acquire caring for his child who is an emerging female adolescent in this complicated society. While, this court finds Mr. Bhatia has sufficient day to day skills as a parent, the defensiveness that he has assumed because of what he has been accused of, and his daughter's view of him, (even if it evolves to a more healthy view), would benefit from his acquisition of additional insights of this nature. This course, perhaps, would best be initiated closer in time to the contemplation of the plaintiff ultimately, at least in part assuming a physical parenting role.
While not intending to cause DCF to recommend one provider over another, the court has been very impressed with the work of Roseanna and Louis Tufano in regard to educational counseling of parenting such as this.
8. DCF shall provide such other services and support services to Tara and her foster family as it deems necessary to properly support her and provide for her medical, physical, educational and emotional well being.
9. DCF shall have an opportunity to be heard in regard to these orders (akin to Steps) at the hearing date provided for below.
10. The mother shall comply with DCF's requests for authorizations and release of information to verify treatment as provided for in these orders.
11. The mother shall at all times make DCF aware of her address and telephone number.
12. The mother shall attend therapy as provided for in paragraph 6b, and, such other recommendations for treatment as may be made by DCF.
13. The mother shall visit with Tara at such times as made available by DCF pursuant to these orders. The mother shall not attempt to contact or visit Tara (directly or indirectly) at any times not expressly authorized by DCF.
14. The father shall comply with DCF's requests for authorizations and release of information to verify treatment as provided for in these orders.
15. The father shall at all times make DCF aware of his address and telephone number.
16. The father shall attend therapy and a parenting program as provided for in paragraph 6a and 7, and, such other recommendations for treatment as may be made by DCF.
17. The father shall visit with Tara at such times are made available by DCF pursuant to these orders. The father shall not attempt to contact or visit Tara directly or indirectly at any times not expressly authorized by DCF.
18. The court approves the fees for service of the guardian ad litem ($29,936.25), his attorney ($16,282.95) and Dr. Horowitz for his testimony ($1,200.00) and orders the State of Connecticut to pay the bills in full or at least at State approved rates, paying at such maximum rate of payment (to the full amount of the bills) as may be allowed.
These fees, the reasonableness and the time spent were not challenged by the parties; they contested who should be ordered to pay the fees.
19. The guardian shall notify the United States Department of State that no passport shall be issued for Tara nor is she permitted to travel out of the United States. It is further ordered that Tara is not be permitted to leave the State of Connecticut unless expressly authorized by DCF as custodian.
20. All passports of Tara shall be given to the Commissioner of DCF for safekeeping.
21. This matter is set down for initial compliance with these orders by review on May 9, 2005 at 2:00 p.m. courtroom 3E. No counsel presently in the case shall be permitted to withdraw prior to that review date. Counsel, the parties, DCF through its assigned worker or supervisor and its attorney, and the aunt and uncle Cynthia and Todd Debek must be present.
22. The Commissioner of DCF shall be provided notice of these orders immediately upon signature so that the physical safety of Tara can be immediately secured by the Commissioner.
All, so ordered.
Munro, J.