Opinion
23A-JC-2888
06-28-2024
In the Matter of P.G. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and B.G. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jane Ann Noblitt Jane Ann Noblitt, Attorney At Law Columbus, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Jennings Circuit Court The Honorable Christopher L. Doran, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 40C01-2306-JC-000020
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jane Ann Noblitt Jane Ann Noblitt, Attorney At Law Columbus, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FELIX, JUDGE.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] P.G. (the "Child") is the biological child of B.G. ("Mother") and R.G. ("Father"). For a majority of the Child's life, she lived with her maternal grandparents. After her maternal grandfather's death, the Child began missing school and was diagnosed with depression. The Child eventually moved back in with Mother, at which time she stopped attending school and follow-up appointments for her depression. The Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") filed a petition alleging the Child was a child in need of services ("CHINS"). After a hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's petition and adjudicated the Child a CHINS. Mother now appeals that decision and presents one issue for our review: Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating the Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1.
[¶2] We affirm. Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] The Child was born on January 3, 2011. Less than a week after the Child's birth, DCS removed her from Mother's care because the Child was born with hydrocodone in her system without Mother having a valid prescription for it. In early 2013, DCS again removed the Child from Mother's care because Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and ephedrine. DCS initiated CHINS proceedings, and on October 11, 2013, the juvenile court in that cause granted R.K. ("Maternal Grandfather") and D.K. ("Maternal Grandmother") sole legal and primary physical custody of the Child.
[¶4] In September 2021, Maternal Grandfather died. Soon thereafter, the Child began missing school and her grades declined. In April 2022, when Maternal Grandmother took the Child to a nurse practitioner for wellness vaccines, a depression screening showed that the Child was suffering from "severe depression." Tr. Vol. II at 97. The nurse practitioner prescribed the Child medication, and Maternal Grandmother obtained weekly counseling for the Child. At a follow-up appointment in May 2022, it was determined that the Child was doing well on the prescribed medication, so the nurse practitioner gave the Child refills for three months, at which time the Child was to return for a follow-up appointment. Due to the Child's lack of attendance at school, DCS had initiated an informal adjustment with Maternal Grandmother. In August 2022, the Child moved in with Mother. One month later, DCS discharged the informal adjustment proceedings involving Maternal Grandmother because those proceedings did not include Mother.
[¶5] On December 7, 2022, DCS filed a verified petition in Bartholomew County alleging the Child was a CHINS due to educational neglect. In March 2023, the Bartholomew County juvenile court determined that the Child was not a CHINS because she was living with Father at that time and DCS had not presented any evidence that the Child would not receive an education while in Father's custody and care. The Child lived with Father for only a few weeks in spring 2023 and has lived with Mother at all other times since August 2022.
[¶6] Since the Child moved in with Mother, she had attended only ten days of school over two school years and did not attend therapy sessions. The Child's depression medication was refilled only intermittently, which likely meant the Child was intermittently experiencing withdrawal symptoms. On June 2, 2023, DCS filed a verified petition in Jennings County alleging the Child was a CHINS due to educational and mental health neglect. It is this petition and resulting order that is at issue in this appeal. Notably, it was not until after this petition was filed that the Child had a follow-up appointment with the nurse practitioner.
[¶7] At the initial hearing on that petition, the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in family preservation services. In late June 2023, Father admitted the Child is a CHINS, and the juvenile court entered an agreed dispositional order as to Father. In July 2023, DCS filed a verified information for rule to show cause regarding Mother's failure to comply with family preservation services. The juvenile court determined that Mother had not been "reasonably diligent" in complying with those services and made the following relevant findings:
c) Service provider met with [Mother] at a tent where the family was living on June 22, 2023. [Mother] declined needing services and stated that she did not have a case. Service provider explained the expectations that she and [Mother] were to meet once per week.
* * *
f) [Mother] did not participate in any meaningful way as she did not work towards any goals nor make any progress with the provider.
g) [Mother] still does not have water utilities working in her home. The child's mental health needs have not been addressed. [Mother] testified the child has only been at school two days during this [2023-2024] school year.
* * *
i) [Mother] only met with the service provider three times total, refused to fill out paperwork, was adamant that she did not need help nor have a case, and did not work on goals with the provider.
j) The Family Preservation provider had to discharge [Mother] on August 17, 2023[,] due to her noncompliance.Tr. Vol. III at 29-30.
[¶8] On September 26, 2023, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS's CHINS petition, and on October 6, 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the Child a CHINS. In its order, the juvenile court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:
9) The child attended eight (8) days of school online at Indiana Digital Learning School during the entirety of the 2022-2023 school year.
10) The child has attended two (2) partial days of school at Scipio Elementary School during the current school year. The
child has already had over twenty five (25) absences during this current school year that began less than two (2) months ago.
* * *
20) At the September 15th, 2023 [wellness] appointment, Mother untruthfully report to [the nurse practitioner] that [the Child] had been going to school on most days, and that she even called the school for help a couple of days when the child was refusing to go to school.
21) Mother has multiple convictions for crimes of untruthfulness including fraud and theft.
* * *
25) Mother failed to take a drug test with DCS on August 29, 2023 as ordered. However, Mother tested positive for Amphetamine, Methamphetamine, Burprenorphine, and Nor Buprenorphine in a drug screen with DCS collected on August 30, 2023 ....
* * *
27) Mother lives with her fiance, who also has a history of illicit substance use.
* * *
38) Mother admits that Court intervention is needed to get the child to school, but states that she believes that it would be better suited for probation and that she should not have a CHINS case.
Mother states that the 12-year-old child needs help being responsible for her own actions.
39) . . . The Court finds the argument that the child is solely responsible for her lack of school attendance unpersuasive.
* * *
43) The Court finds that DCS has met its burden in proving the coercive intervention of the court is needed.
44) It is clear that the child is not receiving an education and that her mental health needs have been neglected. The child has experienced a lot of change and instability over the past couple of years with the death of a caregiver in addition to moving out of her grandmother's and moving with her mother, losing a home to eviction, and having to move back and forth between her mother and father's homes. It is unclear how much Mother's methamphetamine use is impacting her ability to address the child's education and medical needs, but this is an area that should be addressed in this CHINS case.
45) The Court finds that [the Child]'s mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of [Mother] to supply the child with the necessary medical care and education when she is financially able to do so and the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intention of the Court. [The Child] is a Child in Need of Services.Appellant's App. Vol. II at 127-30. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
The Juvenile Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating the Child a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1
[¶9] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that the Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. That section provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS thereunder, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Although there is "a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that-a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent." In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010).
[¶10] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the juvenile court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). "A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the juvenile court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts." Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). "[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility." Id. (citing D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78). When, as here, a trial court enters findings and conclusions sua sponte, we review any issue not covered by the findings "under the general judgment standard," which means we will affirm "on any legal theory supported by the evidence." Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.
[¶11] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to show that Mother seriously endangered the Child and that the Child's needs would not be met without intervention. First, we reiterate that a CHINS adjudication is not about parental fault; it is simply a determination that the child needs services. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. Next, in making her arguments, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the juvenile court's findings; consequently, we take all the juvenile court's findings as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Mother contends that she "tried everything in her power to get [the Child] to school and medical appointments." Appellant's Br. at 14. The trial court was free to discount Mother's testimony concerning her efforts to get the Child to attend school and medical appointments, especially in light of her prior dishonesty and prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty.
[¶12] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the juvenile court's decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that (1) the Child's mental health is seriously impaired or seriously endanger because of Mother's inability, refusal or neglect to supply the Child with the necessary medical care and education despite Mother's financial ability to do so, and (2) the Child is not receiving and is unlikely to receive the care, treatment, or rehabilitation she needs without the juvenile court's coercive intervention. We affirm the juvenile court's adjudication of the Child as a CHINS.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.