Opinion
24A-JC-292
08-26-2024
In the Matter of: B.G. and R.G. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and J.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vigo Circuit Court The Honorable Daniel W. Kelly, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 84C01-2310-JC-955 84C01-2310-JC-956
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE.
[¶ 1] J.C. ("Mother") appeals the Vigo Circuit Court's adjudication of her minor children ("the Children") as children in need of services ("CHINS"). Mother presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 2] J.C. and J.G. ("Father") (collectively, "Parents") have been a couple since approximately 2011, and they have two children together: B.G., born in March 2017, and R.G., born in November 2018. At R.G.'s birth, both Mother and R.G. tested positive for methamphetamine. Parents entered into an informal adjustment with the Department of Child Services ("DCS"), which they successfully completed in October 2019.
[¶ 3] In February 2020, with the Children present, Parents got into an argument, and Mother called 9-1-1. No arrests were made, and DCS was not called. In November 2022, Parents were at Paternal Grandfather's home when Parents began to argue. Someone called 9-1-1. Mother refused to leave the residence, and a law enforcement officer forcibly removed her from the open doorway, where she was sitting, and arrested her. The Children were in the residence and were very upset by Mother's arrest.
[¶ 4] During the early morning hours on August 17, 2023, Parents were arguing "within earshot of [the C]hildren." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 85. At one point, while Father was in bed with R.G. trying to get him to go to sleep, Mother came in and began "hitting and slapping" Father. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 81. Eventually, Mother called 9-1-1. While law enforcement officers were talking to the Parents, the Children's paternal aunt ("Aunt") arrived. She heard B.G. say, "Well, I guess they're going to jail again." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 90. Responding officers arrested both Parents in front of the Children, who had school the next morning. When an officer tried to put Mother in handcuffs, she "threw her head back and hit [an officer] in the nose." Id.
[¶ 5] DCS family case manager Angela Scherer interviewed the Children, who were staying with Aunt. B.G. was "very upset" and "very sad[.]" Id. Scherer interviewed Mother, who "admitted to having a few drinks the night of" her arrest. Id. DCS "opened a case because of the researched history of the family, the severity of the incident, and [B.G.]'s demeanor when interviewed." Id. at 91. Mother refused a drug screen. Scherer and her supervisor "attempted" a team meeting with Parents, but it became a "heated" discussion and Parents "refused to listen to answers to their questions." Id.
[¶ 6] In October, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were CHINS. Following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the court ordered Mother to comply with services, including random drug screens, a domestic violence assessment, and assisting with the creation and execution of a safety plan for the Children. This appeal ensued.
The trial court ordered Father to participate in services as well, but he is not a party on appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶ 7] Mother argues that the trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS is clearly erroneous. A CHINS proceeding is a civil action that requires DCS to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent . . . to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent . . . is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent . . . to seek
financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[¶ 8] When we review a CHINS adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. Importantly, in family law matters, we generally grant latitude and deference to trial courts in recognition of the trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 561-62 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied.
[¶ 9] It is well established that the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect the children, not punish the parents. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255. Therefore, the focus of a CHINS proceeding is on "the best interests of the child, rather than guilt or innocence as in a criminal proceeding." In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). For this reason, the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention. Id.
[¶ 10] Finally, courts should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard to avoid punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580-81 (Ind. 2017). This "guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families 'where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,' not merely where they 'encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.'" In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Fam. &Child. Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994)).
[¶ 11] It is well established that "a child's exposure to domestic violence can support a CHINS finding." In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). Further, "a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding." Id. Here, the evidence shows that the Children were present during multiple arguments between Father and Mother, and R.G. was next to Father on the bed in August 2023, when Mother began hitting Father.
[¶ 12] Still, on appeal, Mother contends that the evidence does not support the CHINS adjudication. Initially, Mother challenges six of the trial court's findings and six of the court's conclusions as clearly erroneous. As the State argues, each of Mother's arguments is merely an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[¶ 13] For example, Mother argues that finding No. 28 and conclusion No. 25 are unsupported by the evidence. The trial court found and concluded that Father was not credible when he described Mother "gracefully" getting up and "gracefully" walking out with a law enforcement officer in November 2022. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 85. As the video in Parents' Exhibit 2 shows, Mother was sitting in the open front doorway and refusing to leave Paternal Grandfather's home despite being asked to do so. It was only when a law enforcement officer intervened and pulled her up by her arm that he was able to get her to move from the doorway. Mother's characterization of her conduct as "graceful" is not well taken. The evidence supports finding No. 28 and conclusion No. 25.
[¶ 14] Mother also challenges other findings and conclusions regarding the trial court's interpretation of Mother's actions leading to and during her arrest in November 2022. For instance, the trial court described Mother's conduct as "manipulative," and Mother disagrees. Id. at 95. But our review of Parents' Exhibit 2 comports with the trial court's characterization of events depicted in the video. Mother's contentions on these issues are entirely without merit.
[¶ 15] Mother further argues that, contrary to the court's finding No. 33 and conclusion No. 159, the Children were not present when she was initially arrested in November 2022. But, again, our review of Parents' Exhibit 2 shows that, immediately upon Mother being arrested, the camera turns and shows the Children a few feet away in the living room and crying. Even if the Children did not see the actual arrest, they saw the immediate aftermath and were clearly upset by the situation. Mother's contention on this issue is also without merit.
[¶ 16] Mother argues that the trial court erred when it found that "Mother testified that [during her August 2023 arrest] she did not receive any injuries or marks other than her teeth being knocked out by law enforcement." Id. at 87. She contends that she did not testify that her lost teeth were her only injuries and that photographic evidence shows that she sustained other injuries. But when asked during the factfinding hearing whether she had any "long lasting effects" from the arrest, she testified only that she "lost teeth." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 196. The evidence supports the trial court's finding No. 62.
[¶ 17] Mother also parses the trial court's finding No. 73 regarding how law enforcement ended up at Paternal Grandfather's residence in November 2022. Mother's argument is difficult to discern. Regardless of who called for law enforcement and why, Mother was arrested when she would not leave after having been asked to leave, and she resisted that arrest. It was the impact of that incident on the children that matters, and nothing more.
[¶ 18] Mother challenges finding No. 81 and conclusion No. 19, which again relate to the impact of Parents' encounters with law enforcement on the Children. Mother claims that the trial court overstated the number of times Mother called law enforcement. Even assuming Mother is correct, again, it is the impact of the encounters with law enforcement on the Children that matters. Mother's contention that "the actions of the police" caused more harm to the Children than the Parents' actions is not well taken. Appellant's Br. at 19. DCS presented ample evidence of the Parents' incidents of domestic violence that impacted the Children.
[¶ 19] Again, each of Mother's challenges to the trial court's findings and conclusions is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. We turn now to Mother's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the CHINS determinations, generally. Mother contends that DCS did not prove either that the Children were actually or seriously endangered as a result of her actions or inactions or that the Children's needs were unmet and are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court.
[¶ 20] Again, it is well settled that "a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding." In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 984. The evidence that Mother was "hitting and slapping" Father while he was lying in bed with one of the Children, without more, is therefore sufficient to support the CHINS determinations here. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 81. But DCS presented additional evidence. For instance, family case manager supervisor Lyndsay Seckinger testified that "the case should be opened due to the incident in August [2023] when both Parents were arrested for domestic violence in the presence of the children, other police interaction where the children were present, trauma to the children caused by Mother's behavior, and previous DCS involvement." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 91. She testified further that "domestic violence is very concerning because[,] not only for the physical safety of children, especially younger children, but studies show there is trauma suffered by children who witness, hear, or are involved in domestic violence." Id. And Seckinger clarified that "domestic violence does not require there to be physical interaction." Id.
[¶ 21] Seckinger testified further that she "believed [that] coercive intervention was necessary with this family." Id. And the evidence supports that conclusion. During her testimony at the factfinding hearing, Mother denied having intentionally ingested methamphetamine when R.G. was born. Instead, she stated that someone must have put the methamphetamine in her vitamin capsule. Mother testified that she "refused DCS'[s] drug screens because she did not trust them." Id. And Mother denied any domestic violence between her and Father. In short, Mother continues to deny responsibility for her actions. And she has not fully cooperated with DCS.
[¶ 22] In sum, DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶ 23] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.