Opinion
1:01CV50-T
October 16, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the court upon the court's own motion to dismiss. By earlier Order, the respective parties were given notice of such motion. Defendants responded, and plaintiff timely responded after being provided with a brief extension of time. Plaintiff points out in her response that she is not a beneficiary of the estate and that the sole beneficiary is the decedent's infant daughter, who resides in another state. Plaintiff also alleges that the estate has no assets.
Having fully considered the briefs, the court concludes that plaintiff, in attempting to represent the Estate of Hazel Virginia Beyer pro se, is proceeding in a manner that is not consistent with North Carolina or federal law. While individuals have a right to represent their own interests in a court of law without the assistance of counsel, they have no right to represent the interest of any other person or legal entity. In this case, Ms. Beyer is attempting to represent the legal interests of an estate, which is a distinct legal entity, and the legal interest of its sole beneficiary-| a minor residing in another state.
First, plaintiff is attempting to represent in this court the legal interests of decedent's estate. The legal interests of an "estate," as a matter of both federal and state law, cannot be pursued by an administrator proceeding pro se.
Third, and most important, this case cannot be prosecuted on a pro se basis. Estates cannot represent themselves.
Appearances in federal court are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Section 1654 permits parties "[i]n all of the Courts of the United States . . . [to] plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel or attorneys at law." 28 U.S.C. § 1654. This section, enacted to enforce the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, "guarantee[s] a choice between representation by counsel and the traditional practice of self-representation." See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 825, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2536, 2541 (1975). The right to self-representation, however, has been interpreted to mean that only individuals (or natural persons) have a right to represent themselves and that an individual can represent only himself; it by no means affords a right to lay representation by someone (even an agent) other than one's self. See Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326, 365-66, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ("A corporation, it is true, can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself."); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A `corporation' is an abstraction, and abstractions cannot appear pro se."); United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1978) (constitutional right to assistance of counsel does not include right to representation by persons unlicensed to practice law); United States v. Peterson, 550 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1977) (Faretta "does not hold that a defendant has the freedom of choice to select a non-licensed person as his counsel"); McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966) (pro se petitioner could act on his own behalf but not on behalf of other class members).
Like a corporation, an estate can only act through an agent; in this case, an administrator. An estate by its very nature cannot represent itself and, therefore, must be represented by a licensed attorney, regardless of the relation between the administrator and the decedent. To permit an unlicensed lay administrator to appear pro se would be to permit the unauthorized practice of law. I cannot do so.McCants v. Village of Broadview, 1994 WL 117478, 1-2 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
As to plaintiff's attempt to represent the interests of the beneficiary, a federal court's award of damages on claims with a common-law basis are governed by state law. Bowling v. Oldham, 753 F. Supp. 588, 591 (M.D.N.C. 1990). In accordance with Chapter 28A-13-3 (23) of the North Carolina General Statutes, the personal representative of a decedent's estate has the exclusive authority to seek damages for his or her decedent's death; and in accordance with Chapter 28A-18-2(a), damages recovered by the personal representative are then distributed to the decedent's beneficiaries in accordance with the Intestate Succession Act. North Carolina's highest court has held that "the real party in interest is the beneficiary under the statute for whom recovery is sought, and not the administrator." In Re Ives' Estate, 248 N.C. 176, 181 (1958) (citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff has argued that she seeks only injunctive relief on behalf of the estate and that such relief is not "damages" contemplated by North Carolina law. Whether the benefit that is sought on behalf on an estate is money damages or injunctive or declaratory relief, the analysis is the same: only a lawyer can pursue the legal claims of another.
The amendment to the complaint points out the problem with a layperson purporting to represent the legal interests of others. Here, Ms. Beyer has unilaterally decided to forego seeking money damages on behalf of the estate and, in doing so, has placed in jeopardy what could, theoretically, be a substantial legal right of the estate that may accrue to another. If she has made a mistake in such legal decision, the estate, as well as the beneficiary, if bound by such decision, have little recourse. If Ms. Beyer were a lawyer, then any such error could be remedied through a professional malpractice suit and/or a Bar complaint. Because Ms. Beyer is not a lawyer, she may also be unaware that if she were allowed to proceed and ultimately lost this litigation, the defendants would be entitled to collect their costs from either her or the estate. Such costs typically amount to several thousand dollars.
Finally, plaintiff must understand that the courts are concerned not just with her legal interests, but with the legal interests of all parties and the public's overriding interest in continued confidence in the judicial process. In addition to the tights of the estate and its beneficiary are the rights of the named defendants, who would be subject to multiple suits and undue expense if this case were to be permitted to proceed. For example, if defendants were to litigate this matter to the end with plaintiff proceeding pro se and win, they could be subject to identical claims by the beneficiary or the estate on theories that such judgment was invalid.
The issue is whether Pluma Beyer can pursue the legal interests of the estate and its purported sole beneficiary in this court without the assistance of counsel. The overwhelming weight of authority, and common sense, answer that she cannot. Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, as follows:
[The] representative of the estate may not proceed pro se in an action by the estate where the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the representatives," because such an action "cannot be described as the litigants own, because [the interests of others] . . . will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings.Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 559 (2nd Cir. 1998). While an argument could be made that a plaintiff could proceed forward if she were the sole beneficiary of the estate see Diamantis v. Judd-Falk, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), plaintiff admits that she is not even a beneficiary. Allowing plaintiff to proceed to judgment in this matter pro se would place at risk legal interests of others, promote the unauthorized and criminal practice of law, and further waste judicial resources.
Attempting to represent the legal interests of anyone other than oneself, unless licensed to practice in the State of North Carolina or admitted elsewhere and specially admitted, is the unauthorized practice of law, which is a criminal offense in North Carolina, punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 84-4 8.
Inasmuch as it appears that plaintiff brought this action with the best of intentions and without knowledge that what she was attempting to do was unlawful, the undersigned will recommend that the dismissal be without prejudice or further sanction. Plaintiff is advised that if she desires to bring such action again in this court, she must do so by and through a lawyer licensed to practice in the Western District of North Carolina. Plaintiff is further advised that she should seek counsel as to statutes of limitations, which may limit her ability to pursue this matter further.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the court's motion to dismiss be ALLOWED and that such dismissal be without prejudice or sanction. The undersigned further recommends that all other motions, which appear to have been made by the parties in the event such relief was not granted, be DENIED as a matter of housekeeping.
The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(C), written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein must be filed within ten (10) days of service of same. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and Recommendation with the district court will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).