Paternity may also be adjudicated in a divorce proceeding. Beyer v. Metze, 326 S.C. 356, 359, 482 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Ct.App. 1997). If the issue of paternity was raised, or could have been raised, in a prior action, a party to that action is barred from challenging paternity at a later date.

See, e.g., In re Paternity of Rogers, 697 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill.App. Ct. 1998); Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523 (Nev. 1998); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998); Gann v. Gann, 705 So. 2d 509 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997); Grice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755 (Ga.Ct.App. 1997); Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789 (S. C. Ct. App. 1997); In re A.L.J., a/k/a A.L.E., 929 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Ct.App. 1996); see also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, In SubsequentProceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in Divorce or Annulment Decree or in Support or Custody Order Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846. The Vermont Supreme Court set out succinctly the policy considerations which favor this principle:

See, e.g., In re Paternity of Rogers, 697 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998); Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523 (Nev. 1998); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998); Gann v. Gann, 705 So.2d 509 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997); Grice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755 (Ga.Ct.App. 1997); Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789 (S.C.Ct.App. 1997); In re A.L.J., a/k/a A.L.E., 929 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Ct.App. 1996); see also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, In Subsequent Proceedings, Of Paternity Findings Or Implications In Divorce Or Annulment Decree Or In Support Or Custody Order Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846. [3] The Vermont Supreme Court set out succinctly the policy considerations which favor this principle:

Under the plain language of Chapter 52C, Mr. Dixon may not now assert the defense of nonparentage in this UIFSA proceeding because his paternity has already been established by another legal proceeding. Accord, State v. Hanson, 725 So.2d 514 (La.Ct.App. 1998) (holding that Louisiana's enactment of UIFSA prevented the defendant from asserting a paternity defense since his paternity had already been established by an Iowa court); Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789 (S.C.Ct.App. 1997) (holding that South Carolina's enactment of UIFSA prevented the defendant from asserting the defense of nonparentage since an Ohio family court had already determined paternity); Villanueva v. Office of the Attorney General of Texas, 935 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.Ct.App. 1996) (holding that Texas' enactment of UIFSA explicitly forbade a paternity defense when paternity had been established by another legal proceeding). Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-3-314 explicitly bars the defense of nonparentage when paternity has already been established, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Dixon to challenge his paternity of the subject child in North Carolina. Accordingly, the orders of the trial court are

" The trial court's rulings on discovery matters will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 381 S.E.2d 734 (1989); Beyer v. Metze, 326 S.C. 356, 482 S.E.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1997). The burden is upon the party appealing from the order to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion.